John Owen on Penal Substitution--Part Three

This is part three in my series on John Owen's (1616-1683) defense of the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST). As noted before, Owen, the 17th century Puritan, is one of the "superstars" of Reformed theology. His explanation of how the sins of the elect could be transferred to Jesus, thus allowing Jesus to suffer the penalty for those sins, is found in his work on the Doctrine of Justification (in The Works of John Owen, vol. 5, ed. William Goold).

First, Owen takes issue with the distinction between reatus poenae [guilt related to penalty] and reatus culpae [guilt related to fault] which was commonly made by medieval theologians. He writes:

Others say that our sins were imputed unto him "quoad reatum poena" ["as to the guilt of the penalty"] but not "quoad reatum culpae" ["as to the guilt of the fault"]. But I must acknowledge that unto me this distinction gives "inanem sine mente sonum" ["an empty unmeaning sound"]. The substance of it is much insisted on by Feuardentius, Dialog. v. p. 467; and he is followed by others. That which he would prove by it is, that the Lord Christ did not present himself before the throne of God with the burden of our sins upon him, so as to answer unto the justice of God for them. Whereas, therefore, "reatus," or "guilt," may signify either "dignitatem poenae" ["deserving penalty"]," or "obligationem ad poenam" ["obligated to penalty"] as Bellarmine distinguisheth, De Amiss. Grat, lib. vii . cap. 7, with respect unto Christ the latter only is to be admitted. And the main argument he and others insist upon is this, that if our sins be imputed unto Christ, as unto the guilt of the fault, as they speak, then he must be polluted with them, and thence be denominated a sinner in every kind. And this would be true, if our sins could be communicated unto Christ by transfusion, so as to be his inherently and subjectively; but their being so only by imputation gives no countenance unto any such pretence (pp. 196-97).

He continues:

Guilt, in the Scripture, is the respect of sin unto the sanction of the law, whereby the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment; and to be guilty is to be ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, liable unto punishment for sin from God, as the supreme lawgiver and judge of all. And so guilt, or "reatus," is well defined to be "obligatio ad poenam, propter culpam, aut admissam in se, aut imputatum, juste aut injuste" ["obligation to penalty, close to being fault, or giving access into it, or reckoning, legitimately or illegitimately"] .... And the distinction of " dignitas poenae" ["desert of penalty"] and "obligatio ad poenam" ["obligation to penalty"] is but the same thing in diverse words; for both do but express the relation of sin unto the sanction of the law: or if they may be conceived to differ, yet are they inseparable; for there can be no "obligatio ad poenam" ["obligation to penalty"] where there is not "dignitas poenae" ["desert of penalty"].

Much less is there any thing of weight in the distinction of "reatus culpae" and "reatus poenae;" for this "reatus culpae" is nothing but "dignitas poenae propter culpam." Sin hath other considerations, namely, its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law, and the stain of filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. And so, indeed, "reatus culpae" is "reatus poenae," the guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where there is not this "reatus culpae" there can be no "poena," no punishment properly so called; for "poena" is "vindicta noxae," the revenge due to sin. So, therefore, there can be no punishment, nor "reatus poenae," the guilt of it, but where there is "reatus culpae," or sin considered with its guilt; and the "reatus poenae" that may be supposed without the guilt of sin, is nothing but that obnoxiousness unto afflictive evil on the occasion of sin which the Socinians admit with respect unto the suffering of Christ, and yet execrate his satisfaction.

...There is, therefore, no imputation of sin where there is no imputation of its guilt; for the guilt of punishment, which is not its respect unto the desert of sin, is a plain fiction, there is no such thing "in rerum natura" ["in existence"]. There is no guilt of sin, but in its relation unto punishment [emphasis mine] (p. 199).

So far so good. I think Owen is correct to say that punishment makes no sense if there is no responsibility. In other words, the attempt to separate punishment and responsibility and make Christ obligated to the former but not the latter is non-sensical because the only reason for punishment is in response to a culpable act. To punish someone who is not culpable is as Owen says, "an obnoxious affliction of evil." However, as we will see, Owen does not think Jesus is culpable in real sense but in some type of formal sense.

Now Owen presents his position:

That, therefore, which we affirm herein is, that our sins were so transferred on Christ, as that thereby he became אָשֵׁם, ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, "reus," responsible unto God, and obnoxious unto punishment in the justice of God for them. He was "alienae culpae reus," perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt on him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin (p. 200).

He deals with the objection that such a transfer as he proposes would result in Christ becoming an actual sinner himself.

But it is fiercely objected against what we have asserted, that if the guilt of our sins was imputed unto Christ, then was he constituted a sinner thereby; for it is the guilt of sin that makes any one to be truly a sinner. This is urged by Bellarmine, lib. ii., De Justificat, not for its own sake, but to disprove the imputation of his righteousness unto us; as it is continued by others with the same design. For saith he, "If we be made righteous, and the children of God, through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, then was he made a sinner, 'et quod horret animus cogitare, filius diaboli;' by the imputation of the guilt of our sins or our unrighteousness unto him." ...

Nothing is more absolutely true, nothing is more sacredly or assuredly believed by us, than that nothing which Christ did or suffered, nothing that he undertook or underwent, did or could constitute him subjectively, inherently, and thereon personally, a sinner, or guilty of any sin of his own. To bear the guilt or blame of other men's faults, to be "alienae culpae reus," makes no man a sinner, unless he did unwisely or irregularly undertake it. But that Christ should admit of any thing of sin in himself, as it is absolutely inconsistent with the hypostatical union, so it would render him unmeet for all other duties of his office, Heb. vii. 25, 26 (p. 201).

So, according to Owen, even though the responsiblity for man's sin is transferred to Christ thus allowing him to be punished justly; nevertheless, Christ does not become personally and subjectively a sinner. If he did become subjectively a sinner, then of course that would overthrow the doctrine of the atonement (as well as the Trinity and the whole Christian faith). Thus, Owen is going to argue that in some way, Christ became objectively a sinner and personally culpable without becoming subjectively a sinner.

He continues:

None ever dreamed of a transfusion or propagation of sin from us unto Christ, such as there was from Adam unto us. For Adam was a common person unto us, we are not so to Christ: yea, he is so to us; and the imputation of our sins unto him is a singular act of divine dispensation, which no evil consequence can ensue upon.

To imagine such an imputation of our sins unto Christ as that thereon they should cease to be our sins, and become his absolutely, is to overthrow that which is affirmed; for, on that supposition, Christ could not suffer for our sins, for they ceased to be ours antecedently unto his suffering. But the guilt of them was so transferred unto him, that through his suffering for it, it might be pardoned unto us (p. 201).

Owen seems to be saying that our sins were not removed from us and placed upon Christ because that would mean they are no longer our sins. Instead, somehow Christ joins himself to us in such a way that he shares the responsibility and penal consequences that our sins deserve (This is quite a game of mental gymnastics that Owen is playing).

He explains:

First, There is in sin a transgression of the preceptive part of the law; and there is an obnoxiousness unto the punishment from the sanction of it. It is the first that gives sin its formal nature; and where that is not subjectively, no person can be constituted formally a sinner. However any one may be so denominated, as unto some certain end or purpose, yet, without this, formally a sinner none can be, whatever be imputed unto them. And where that is, no non-imputation of sin, as unto punishment, can free the person in whom it is from being formally a sinner. When Bathsheba told David that she and her son Solomon should be חַטָּאִים (sinners)[1 Kings 1:21], by having crimes laid unto their charge; and when Judah told Jacob that he would be a sinner before him always on the account of any evil that befell Benjamin (it should be imputed unto him)[Gen. 43:9]; yet neither of them could thereby be constituted a sinner formally. And, on the other hand, when Shimei desired David not to impute sin unto him, whereby he escaped present punishment, yet did not that non-imputation free him formally from being a sinner [2 Sam. 19:19-20]. Wherefore sin, under this consideration, as a transgression of the preceptive part of the law, cannot be communicated from one unto another, unless it be by the propagation of a vitiated principle or habit. But yet neither so will the personal sin of one, as inherent in him, ever come to be the personal sin of another. Adam hath upon his personal sin communicated a vicious, depraved, and corrupted nature unto all his posterity; and, besides, the guilt of his actual sin is imputed unto them, as if it had been committed by every one of them: but yet his particular personal sin neither ever did, nor ever could, become the personal sin of any one of them any otherwise than by the imputation of its guilt unto them. Wherefore our sins neither are, nor can be, so imputed unto Christ, as that they should become subjectively his, as they are a transgression of the preceptive part of the law. A physical translation or transfusion of sin is, in this case, naturally and spiritually impossible; and yet, on a supposition thereof alone do the horrid consequences mentioned depend. But the guilt of sin is an external respect of it, with regard unto the sanction of the law only. This is separable from sin; and if it were not so, no one sinner could either be pardoned or saved. It may, therefore, be made another's by imputation, and yet that other not rendered formally a sinner thereby. This was that which was imputed unto Christ, whereby he was rendered obnoxious unto the curse of the law; for it was impossible that the law should pronounce any accursed but the guilty, nor would do so, Deut xxvii. 26 (p. 202).

Owen is saying that a person can agree to be held responsible for someone else's sin and justly punished for it, without having that person's sin beome subjectively his. He uses the biblical illustrations of Bathsheba and Solomon being treated as sinners by Adonijah (1 Kings 1:21) and Judah agreeing to be held responsible if anything happens to Benjamin (Gen. 43:9).

First, in the case of Bathsheba and Solomon, if Adonijah treats them as sinners, he does so unjustly. His reason for treating them as sinners (criminals) would be because he sees them as a threat to his kingship. Second, in the case of Judah and Benjamin, Judah agrees that if anything happens to Benjamin, he will bear the blame. That makes sense. He is merely agreeing that he will protect Benjamin and that it will be his fault (subjectively) if harm comes to the boy. How these illustrations are supposed to reflect the imputation of man's sins to Jesus is beyond me. In the first case, the imputation to Bathsheba and Solomon would be unjust and in the second case, the imputation would be deserved because Judah has agreed to protect Benjamin and if he doesn't then it is subjectively his fault.

Owen then maintains that the guilt of sin is separate from the sin itself (external to it) and can be legitimately transferred to another party. He says that if this is not so, then "no one sinner could either be pardoned or saved." I fail to see how the guilt can be separated from that which caused the guilt. If the cause is removed, then so is the effect. When a person is pardoned, the guilt and the crime are not being separated. Merely the judge is agreeing to forego punishment. It is true that here a logical division between the punishment and the crime is being made but I fail to see how such a logical division can be used to claim that the punishment could be transferred to someone else.

Now Owen turns to the question of how God the Father could be angry at God the Son, which presents a host of theological problems. He writes:

But it will be said that if our sins, as to the guilt of them, were imputed unto Christ, then God must hate Christ; for he hateth the guilty.... [But]God in this matter is considered as a rector, ruler, and judge. Now, it is not required of the severest judge, that, as a judge, he should hate the guilty person, no, although he be guilty originally by inhesion, and not by imputation. As such, he hath no more to do but consider the guilt, and pronounce the sentence of punishment (p. 203).

It is true that a judge would not necessarily be angry with the criminal or hate him personally. However, in the case of God we are not talking about a party who is disconnected from the crime. Sin, according to the Bible, is an offense against God himself. It is an offense against his person. The Bible says that God is angry and full of wrath as a result of the sin. He is not presented as an objective and unaffected third party (which a judge would be).

So, while Owen has made a valiant effort to defend the PST, it seems to me that his attempt also fails. There does not seem to be anyway to justify the punishment of a person unless that person is himself responsible in some way for the crime for which the punishment is demanded. One can go through all manner of mental gymnastics to try to justify it, but at the end of the day, in my opinion, it cannot be justified.

John Owen on Penal Substitution--Part Two

John Owen (1616-1683) is generally regarded as one of the premier Calvinist theologians. According to J. I. Packer:

Owen was by common consent the weightiest Puritan theologian, and many would bracket him with Jonathan Edwards as one of the greatest Reformed theologians of all time. Born in 1616, he entered Queen's College, Oxford, at the age of twelve and secured his M.A. in 1635, when he was nineteen. In his early twenties, conviction of sin threw him into such turmoil that for three months he could scarcely utter a coherent word on anything; but slowly he learned to trust Christ, and so found peace. In 1637 he became a pastor; in the 1640s he was chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, and in 1651 he was made Dean of Christ Church, Oxford's largest college. In 1652 he was given the additional post of Vice-Chancellor of the University, which he then reorganized with conspicuous success. After 1660 he led the Independents through the bitter years of persecution till his death in 1683.

In a prior post, I discussed John Owen's (1616-1683) position regarding retributive justice and sacrifices. In this post, I want to deal with his position regarding how man's sins are imputed to Jesus. He discusses the matter in his series of essays on the doctrine of Justification (The Works of John Owen, vol. 5, ed. William Goold; recently published in a volume entitled, The Doctrine of Justification by Faith).

He writes:

The principal foundation hereof is, that Christ and the church, in this design, were one mystical person; which state they do actually coalesce into, through the uniting efficacy of the Holy Spirit He is the head, and believers are the members of that one person, as the apostle declares, 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13. Hence, as what he did is imputed unto them, as if done by them; so what they deserved on the account of sin was charged upon him (p. 176).

Owen argues that due to a "mystical union" between Christ and the church, they somehow become one "mystical person." Apparently this is a "spiritual union" and a "spiritual person," since, according to him, it is brought about by the Holy Spirit.

I have several problems with this idea of a "mystical person." First, the word "mystical" means:

1. Of or having a spiritual reality or import not apparent to the intelligence or senses.
2. Of, relating to, or stemming from direct communion with ultimate reality or God: a mystical religion.
3. Enigmatic; obscure: mystical theories about the securities market.
4. Of or relating to mystic rites or practices.
5. Unintelligible; cryptic.

I guess Owen is using the word "mystical" according to gloss #1 above. This would mean that the "mystical union" is not apparent to the intelligence or sense or as #5 says, "unintelligible." If that is correct, then one is wasting his or her time trying to understand it because it is unintelligible.

Second, the "mystical person" created by this "mystical union" seems to be a creation of Paul's mind. It is at best an abstract entity that really has no parallel. Thus, I fail to see how it can explain how the guilt of man's sin of man could be transferred to Jesus.

Third, even if one plays along with Paul's and Owen's imaginary "mystical person," the problem of how the guilt of man's sin could be seen as belonging to Jesus is still not resolved. According to Owen and other defenders of the PST, only the guilt of man's sin is transferred to Jesus not the actual demerit or sin itself. In this way, they protect the sinlessness of Jesus while finding some way for him to justly bear the punishment that man's sins are said to deserve. However, if the guilt is shared due to the "mystical union," why isn't the demerit or the sin itself also shared? How is it that only the guilt or liability to punishment is shared? This is also an artificial distinction because guilt cannot be separated from the actual crime. Guilt only makes sense if there is something of which to be guilty. In addition, if for some reason the demerit of sin is not shared by this "mystical union," then how is the merit of Jesus' righteousness shared by the believer? It seems that Owen and others are merely making up the rules as they go. What they claim can be shared and what cannot be shared are merely their own dictates based on the imaginary "mystical union" their creative imaginations have invented.

Owen continues:

How then did he make our sins to be his own, and how did he bear our iniquities? Is it not from thence, that we are said to be his body? as the apostle speaks, "You are the body of Christ, and members for your part, or of one another." And as when one member suffers, all the members do suffer; so the many members sinning and suffering, he, according unto the laws of sympathy in the same body (seeing that, being the Word of God, he would take the form of a servant, and be joined unto the common habitation of us all in the same nature), took the sorrows or labours of the suffering members on him, and made all their infirmities his own; and, according to the laws of humanity (in the same body), bare our sorrow and labour for us. And the Lamb of God did not only these things for us, but he underwent torments, and was punished for us; that which he was no ways exposed unto for himself, but we were so by the multitude of our sins: and thereby he became the cause of the pardon of our sins, namely, because he underwent death, stripes, reproaches, translating the thing which we had deserved unto himself, and was made a curse for us, taking unto himself the curse that was due to us; for what was he but (a substitute for us) a price of redemption for our souls (pp. 177-78)?

Once again Owen's imagination is running wild. He is saying that since Christ and believers are really one body, then when one part suffers the other suffers, etc. Okay, but in a body all parts are organically connected and that is why when one part suffers the whole body suffers. For the analogy to hold true and accomplish what Owen wants it to accomplish, then one would have to say that the whole body of Christ (the "mystical person" created by the "mystical union") is corrupted by the guilt of sin and thus one part of the body (i.e., the head, Christ) can somehow suffer the penalty that the whole body deserves. I fail to see how this can keep Jesus from becoming corrupt himself through his attachment with the other corrupt parts of the body. I also fail to see how the undiseased part of a body could be punished (or removed) in order to heal the diseased part. For example, if I have gangrene in my leg, it will do no good to amputate my arm.

Owen states:

This, then, I say, is the foundation of the imputation of the sins of the church unto Christ, namely, that he and it are one person; the grounds whereof we must inquire into.... But hereon sundry discourses do ensue, and various inquiries are made, What a person is? in what sense, and in how many senses, that word may be used? what is the true notion of it? what is a natural person? what a legal, civil, or political person? in the explication whereof some have fallen into mistakes. And if we should enter into this field, we need not fear matter enough of debate and altercation. But I must needs say, that these things belong not unto our present occasion; nor is the union of Christ and the church illustrated, but obscured by them. For Christ and believers are neither one natural person, nor a legal or political person, nor any such person as the laws, customs, or usages of men do know or allow of [emphasis mine]. They are one mystical person; whereof although there may be some imperfect resemblances found in natural or political unions, yet the union from whence that denomination is taken between him and us is of that nature, and ariseth from such reasons and causes, as no personal union among men (or the union of many persons) hath any concernment in. (And therefore, as to the representation of it unto our weak understandings, unable to comprehend the depth of heavenly mysteries, it is compared unto unions of divers kinds and natures. So is it represented by that of man and wife; not as unto those mutual affections which give them only a moral union, but from the extraction of the first woman from the flesh and bone of the first man, and the institution of God for the individual society of life thereon. This the apostle at large declares, Eph. v. 25-32: whence he concludes, that from the union thus represented, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," verse 30; or have such a relation unto him as Eve had to Adam, when she was made of his flesh and bone, and so was one flesh with him. So, also, it is compared unto the union of the head and members of the same natural body, 1 Cor. xii. 12; and unto a political union also, between a ruling or political head and its political members; but never exclusively unto the union of a natural head and its members comprised in the same expression, Eph. iv. 15; Col. ii. 19. And so also unto sundry things in nature, as a vine and its branches, John xv. 1, 2. And it is declared by the relation that was between Adam and his posterity, by God's institution and the law of creation, Rom. v. 12, etc. And the Holy Ghost, by representing the union that is between Christ and believers by such a variety of resemblances, in things agreeing only in the common or general notion of union, on various grounds, doth sufficiently manifest that it is not of, nor can be reduced unto, any one kind of them. (pp.178-179).

Okay, so according to Owen, there is nothing in human experience or reason that corresponds to the "mystical union" of Christ and believers. It is a unique case. That seems to be the cop-out that theologians give when their doctrines make no sense. We see it with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. How can three be one and one be three? They reply that no human illustration accurately captures the truth of the doctrine. All analogies ultimately fail and thus it is beyond human understanding. However, we know that it contradicts reason for something or someone to be simultaneously three and one. In the same way, it contradicts reason for a "mystical union" to exist in which Jesus shares in the guilt of man's sin and man shares in his righteousness. If something contradicts reason, are we supposed to just sacrifice our intellect, swallow real hard, and believe it anyway (since it is taught in a book which is thought by some to be a divine revelation)? That seems to be what one is required to do.

Faustus Socinus on Penal Substitution--Part Five

Faustus Socinus (1539-1604), an Italian theologian, is one of the most important figures of the 16th century Reformation. He took the rejection of Roman Catholic doctrines much further than Martin Luther, John Calvin or any of the other Reformers. He rejected the deity of Christ, the Trinity, and the Satisfaction theories of the atonement. While he is sometimes called a "rationalist" by his opponents, he did not reject the divine origin of the Bible but merely believed that its teachings could not contradict sound reason (See Alan W. Gomes, "Some Observations On The Theological Method Of Faustus Socinus," Westminster Theological Journal, 70 [2008]: 49-71).

Socinus wrote De Jesu Christo Servatore (The Savior Jesus Christ) in 1574 and it was published in 1598. In this work he laid out a number of arguments against the Satisfaction Theories of the Atonement including the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the Atonement. His treatment of the subject is so thorough that some have said that every argument against the PST has its origin in the writings of Socinus. Unfortunately, his writings have not been readily available in English translation. So much of his teaching for the English reader has to be gleaned from secondary sources, usually written by those who opposed his views. Recently, Alan W. Gomes, did an English translation of De Jesu Christo Servatore as a Ph.D dissertation and he graciously sent me a copy (Faustus Socinus’ De Jesu Christo Servatore, Part III: Historical Introduction, Translation and Critical Notes. Pasadena: Fuller Theological Seminary, June 1990). My quotations from Socinus will be from Gomes' translation.

In chapter five of Socinus' classic work, he argues against the Calvinist view that Jesus kept the law in the elect's place. Calvin's argument is that not only was Jesus' death vicarious but his life was as well. In other words, he kept the law perfectly in place of the elect (active obedience) and then he died for the sins of the elect (passive obedience). Just as he died in the place of the elect, he lived righteously in their place as well. It is this righteous life of obedience that is imputed or credited to the elect as their own righteousness.

Socinus, on the other hand, maintains that since Jesus was human, he was obliged as much as any other man to keep the Law and thus his obedience brought reward to him only and not to others.

He writes:

Christ, because he was a human being, made under the law (as Paul says), was obliged to obey the eternal and unchangeable divine law no less than other human beings. . . . And since he himself was obliged to keep the divine law, he was no more able than any other human being to make satisfaction for others by obeying it (p. 86).

But how does this relate to others? His voluntary submission certainly received its adequate (and more than adequate) recompense: he was exalted by God, being given the name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee of heaven, earth and hell should bow. Paul makes it exceedingly clear (Phil. 2:6 ff.) that God gave him this reward not only for his voluntary submission (which is how you interpret the Apostle's words) but also for obedience to the point of death on the cross. One cannot reasonably infer from this passage of Paul that Christ did not indeed merit a reward for himself (pp. 86-87).

If you argue that he gained merit for us as God and in the power of the divine nature, that would be ridiculous. As we said, God, or the divine nature, does not merit but bestows, paying deserved rewards for any so-called merits (p. 90).

Socinus holds that Jesus as a human being kept the law perfectly and God rewarded him by exalting him. His obedience could not be substituted in the place of another anymore than his death could be substituted in another's place. Jesus did not do more than God required thereby earning an abundance of merit that could then be applied to someone else. He writes:

Christ did nothing that God had not commanded him to do. If we are talking about observing the divine law, everything Christ did was enjoined on him by that very law. Because he was a human being, he was obliged to keep the law no less than other human beings. If we should consider the unique deeds he performed, while yet mortal, over and beyond what the law requires of everyone, even these unique deeds had been enjoined on him by God. We greatly praise his obedience by saying that he was obedient even to the point of death on the cross. But obedience is not possible where there is no commandment (p. 89).

I will discuss chapter six in Socinus' work in a future post.

Does the believer's Union with Christ explain how sins are justly imputed to Jesus?

Defenders of the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the Atonement, such as A. A. Hodge, believe that the NT concept of the believer's union with Christ can explain how God is able to impute the guilt of man's sin to Jesus.

Norman McIlwain is an evangelical Christian but an opponent of the PST. He has written a book entitled, The Biblical Revelation of the Cross. It is available online.  In an addendum to the book, he points out why the NT concept of the believer's union with Christ is of no help in justifying the PST.

1. It would involve Christ and the church sharing personal identity.

While a husband and wife may become "one flesh," that does not mean they become one person. They share many things but they don't share everything.

A husband takes on the wife’s financial debt and pays it off. In marriage, wealth and financial burdens can be shared, but acts of sin on the part of one committed without complicity on the part of the partner cannot implicate the partner in the guilt or cause the other to justly suffer for the offence. Husbands and wives are not made guilty for the sins of their partners. It matters not that the partner might be willing to suffer for the crime of the other. Although there can be a marriage of wills to share certain responsibilities and burdens, there can be no marriage of wills where there is no complicity in the committing of a crime. We are each held responsible for our own sins. So it is with Jesus. In marriage with the Church, there is no marriage of His will with the will of man regarding acts of sin – no complicity. Therefore there can be no imputation of guilt or sin.

[Moreover], to whom is the world in debt, because of sin? Against whom have all sinned? – As both Man and God, the Word made flesh is the One against whom all have sinned. Mankind is in debt to Christ. . . . So, why should the Groom suffer punishment for the unpaid debt of the bride, when He Himself is the bride’s creditor?

2. It would involve Christ ceasing to be righteous.

If the union means that man's sin is transferred to Christ and man is no longer guilty, then it ought to also mean that when Christ's righteousness is transferred to man, Christ is no longer righteous.

The idea that man’s sins can somehow be imputed to Christ does not work. Jesus does not consent to sin. The idea presented above suggests that by imputing our sins to Christ, we somehow are set free. Yet, Jesus retains His righteousness, though His righteousness is imputed to His followers. By the same token, we should retain our guilt and sin, though these be imputed to Christ. It simply does not make sense, nor can it be just.

Charles Hodge vs. A. H. Strong on Penal Substitution

In a previous post, I discussed A. H. Strong's attempt to justify the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the Atonement. Strong's solution, which was that Jesus assumed the guilt of humanity without assuming the depravity of human nature, was based on theology developed in Germany beginning with Friedrich Schleiermacher. This German theology had influenced American theologians such as Strong as well as a group called the "Mercersburg School" made up of German Reformed Scholars such as Church Historian, Philip Schaff and Theologian, John Nevin. Charles Hodge, in vol. 2 of his Systematic Theology, addresses the German Reformed school of thought and rejects it.

He writes:

. . . most of these writers admit the sinlessness of Christ, and yet maintain that only sinners can be treated as sinners, and only the personally righteous treated as righteous; and as they hold that imputation implies the real possession of the quality, act, or relation which is imputed, they are forced to teach that Christ in assuming our nature as guilty and fallen, ipso facto, assumed all the responsibilities of men, and was bound to answer to the justice of God for all the sins which humanity had committed. The doctrine of one class of these writers is, that the Logos in assuming our nature did not become an individual, but the universal man; He did not take to Himself “a true body and a reasonable soul,” but the whole of humanity, or humanity as an organic whole or law of life; the individual dying for the sins of other individuals, does not satisfy justice. When He was nailed to the cross, not an individual merely, but humanity itself, was crucified; and, therefore, his sufferings were the sufferings not of an individual man, but of that which underlies all human individualities, and consequently avails for all in whom humanity is individualized. As Christ becomes personally responsible for the guilt which attaches to the humanity which He assumed, so we become personally righteous and entitled, on the ground of what we are or become, to eternal life because of our union with Him. . . (p. 534)

Hodge rejects this teaching for metaphysical and moral reasons:

1. Metaphysical--It is based on particular philosophical presuppositions which he does not share, namely a type of Platonic realism.

Hodge argues:

. . .it is a mere speculative, or philosophical, anthropological theory. It has no more authority than the thousands of speculations which the teeming mind of man has produced. . . . The theory itself is unintelligible. The phrases “universal man,” and “the whole of humanity,” as here used, have no meaning. To say that “humanity itself was nailed to the cross,” conveys no rational idea (p. 535).

2. Moral--Only persons are moral agents.

Hodge writes:

The doctrine is, that in assuming human nature Christ assumed the guilt attaching to the sins humanity had committed. He became responsible for those sins; and was bound to bear the penalty they had incurred. Nevertheless human nature as it existed in his person was guiltless and absolutely pure. This, to our apprehensions, is an impossibility. Guilt and sin can be predicated only of a person (emphasis mine). This if not a self-evident, is, at least, a universally admitted truth. Only a person is a rational agent. It is only to persons that responsibility, guilt, or moral character can attach. Human nature apart from human persons cannot act, and therefore cannot contract guilt, or be responsible. Christ assumed a rational soul which had never existed as a person, and could not be responsible on the ground of its nature for the sins of other men. Unless guilt and sin be essential attributes or properties of human nature, Christ did not assume guilt by assuming that nature. If guilt and sin cannot be predicated of Christ’s person, they cannot by possibility be predicated of his human nature. (p. 536).

...These theologians admit that, as a person, He was without sin. But if without sin, He was without guilt. It was according to the Scriptures by the imputation to Him of sins not his own, that He bore our guilt, or assumed the responsibility of satisfying justice on our account. It is only by admitting that by being born of a woman, or becoming flesh, Christ placed Himself in the category of sinful men, and became personally a sinner, and guilty in the sight of God, as all other men are, that it can be maintained that the assumption of our nature in itself involved the assumption of guilt, or that He thereby became responsible for all the sins which men possessing that nature had committed (p. 537).

So, according to Hodge, the proper way to understand how Jesus could be punished in man's place is the doctrine of imputation. The sins of mankind (or actually the elect in Hodge's opinion) were imputed, that is charged or reckoned, to Jesus and these sins were considered by God as legally belonging to Jesus. The problem with this, as already shown, is that it based on a "legal fiction." It involves God considering something that is not true to be true. How can a God of truth, who cannot tell a lie (Tit. 1:2) and whose very nature is light and in whom is no darkness at all (I John 1:5) base man's salvation on a "legal fiction"? That would mean the atonement, if the PST is true, is based on a lie.

"Original Sin" and Infant Salvation

One of the difficulties within evangelical theology relates to what happens to infants when they die. Because evangelicals believe in original sin, they believe that infants are born corrupt and sinful. Listen to John MacArthur, the wildly popular Christian author and preacher, in a sermon on Infant Salvation:

the Bible is absolutely crystal-clear that all children are sinners from conception–all children. The principle of iniquity is embedded in the human race. Children are born morally corrupt. They are born with an irresistible bent towards evil. And any notion that children are born morally neutral and free from a predisposition to sin is absolutely contrary to Scripture.... All humans are born in sin. If infants were not sinful, if they were not morally corrupt, then they wouldn’t die. If they were born innocent or pure or morally neutral, there would be no basis for their death! The very fact that they die indicates that the disease of sin is there in them, because sin is the killer. It is in their inherited sin nature that the seeds of death are planted.

Since infants are sinners and since faith is the means through which one receives forgiveness and salvation, and since infants obviously are not capable of faith, how then can infants be saved? The simple fact is that the Bible does not address this issue. However, since it seems terribly unfair and even hideous to think that infants would be condemned to an eternal hell, evangelicals have sought ways to explain how these infants can be saved.

MacArthur opens his sermon on infant salvation by saying:

Some of you who tuned into the Larry King Show, a week ago Saturday, will remember that Larry fired a question to me on the air–it came out of nowhere–a question that reveals a nagging, troubling issue in the human heart. He asked me, “What about a two-year-old baby crushed at the bottom of the World Trade Center?” I answered, “Instant heaven.” He replied with another question: “Wasn’t a sinner?” I again answered, “Instant heaven.” All kinds of strange answers have been offered in the past. We don’t need to deal with those; we need to know the right answer.

MacArthur is right. Not all Christians throughout church history have held that infants automatically go to heaven. Gregory, Bishop of Nazianzus (329-374 CE), held that only baptized infants go to heaven and that unbaptized infants do not. He said unbaptized infants will neither be admitted by the just judge to the glory of Heaven nor condemned to suffer punishment, since, though unsealed [by baptism], they are not wicked (Oration on Baptism, par. 23). Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE) was the first to deal with the issue in any detail. In a chapter entitled: Unbaptized Infants Damned, But Most Lightly, he said: It may therefore be correctly affirmed, that such infants as quit the body without being baptized will be involved in the mildest condemnation of all. That person, therefore, greatly deceives both himself and others, who teaches that they will not be involved in condemnation....

Augustine's reasoning was that baptism removes original sin and therefore baptized infants can go into the presence of God but unbaptized infants cannot. Thus, he came up with the idea of a place which was not quite heaven and not quite hell. Medieval theologians called it Limbo of infants (Latin, limbus infantium). In 2007, Pope Benedict XVI released a report which said: "The conclusion of this study is that there are theological and liturgical reasons to hope that infants who die without baptism may be saved and brought into eternal happiness even if there is not an explicit teaching on this question found in revelation. There are reasons to hope that God will save these infants precisely because it was not possible (to baptise them)." (Some people saw this as a public relations move because Islam teaches that babies go to heaven and the RCC and Islam are in stiff competition in many 3rd world countries where the infant mortality rate is extremely high.)

Most Protestant theologians have held that all infants go to heaven, although the Westminster Confession leaves the possibility open that some infants might not. It says in chapter X, paragraph III: Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word.(10.3)Some hard-core Calvinists (e.g., Jonathan Edwards ) have implied at least that there may be some infants who are not elect. This is very much a minority view in today's world where most everyone sees it as completely unjust for God to damn infants. In previous times, it might have been acceptable for some religions to teach that not all infants go to heaven but it is a public relations nightmare in today's world.

The simple fact, however, is that the Bible does not really answer this question definitively. Thus, theologians are left with a dilemma. How does one hold that babies are born sinners and condemned before God (i.e., original sin) and yet also hold that if they die before reaching maturity, they go to heaven? I will explore how evangelicals attempt to handle this thorny issue in the next post.

Is Imputation a "Legal Fiction"?

Most evangelicals hold to the doctrine of imputation to explain how man is considered guilty for Adam's sin, how Christ is accounted guilty for man's sin, and how the believer is regarded as righteous in Christ. The doctrine of imputation is based on the Greek word λογίζομαι (logidzomai) which occurs 49 times in the Greek NT. The KJV translates it: to reckon, to count, to impute. It is a bookkeeping term used to refer to placing something on one's account. While the word is not used, the idea is found in Philemon 1:18, where Paul tells Philemon in regard to Onesimus (a runaway slave): If he has wronged you at all, or owes you anything, charge that to my account (ESV). So, as mentioned above, there are 3 elements to the doctrine of imputation in evangelical theology: 1)God put Adam's sin on his posterity's account; 2)God put man's sins on Jesus' account, (and Jesus paid the debit on the cross, i.e., penal substitution), 3) God puts Christ's righteousness (as a credit) on the believer's account. While there is some biblical basis for #3 in Romans 4, #'s 1 and 2 are based on theological inference not explicit biblical statements.

Romans 4:3-5 says: For what does the Scripture say? "Abraham believed God, and it was counted (logidzomai) to him as righteousness." Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted(logidzomai) as a gift but as his due. And to the one who does not work but trusts him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted (logidzomai) as righteousness (ESV).

This passage seems to teach that the believer's faith is considered or regarded (logidzomai) to be righteousness by God, thereby resulting in the believer being acceptable (i.e., justified) before God and not subject to his condemnation.

A question arises here as to whether the believer is truly righteous or just considered to be righteous by God. Some have argued that what we have here is a legal fiction. This was actually a major contention between the Reformers and the Catholics and remains today an essential difference in the soteriology (i.e., doctrine of salvation) of conservative Protestants (i.e, evangelicals) vs. the soteriology of conservative Roman Catholics. The Catholics maintain that the believer's justification is not an imputed righteousness which would be a legal fiction but is rather an infused righteousness, whereby the believer is in truth now righteous (or more accurately in the process of becoming righteous).

It has not only been the RCC that has seen this problem, however. John Nevin, a conservative Reformed theologian and perhaps the best student of Charles Hodge the noted Princeton theologian of the 19th century, argued that the doctrine of imputation as taught by the Reformers was in fact a legal fiction and could not therefore be a true doctrine. He wrote:

The judgment of God must ever be according to truth. He cannot reckon to anyone an attribute or quality that does not belong to him in fact. He cannot declare him to be in a relation or state that is not actually his own, but the position merely of another. A simply external imputation here, the pleasure and purpose of God to place to the account of one what has been done by another, will not answer. Nor is the case helped in the least by the hypothesis of what is called a legal federal union between the parties, in the case of whom such a transfer is supposed to be made; so long as the law is thought of in the same outward way, as a mere arbitrary arrangement or constitution for the accomplishment of the end in question. The law in this view would be itself a fiction only, and not the expression of a fact. But no such fiction, whether under the name of law or without it, can lie at the ground of a judgment entertained or pronounced by God. (The Mystical Presence and Other Writings on the Eucharist, pp. 190-91 cited in Real Union or Legal Fiction by Mark Horne).

I think Nevin is right. God cannot be considered just if he simply regards man as righteous without man in fact being righteous. Its a legal fiction and as Nevin says, the judgment of God must ever be according to truth.

How, then does Nevin resolve the problem without becoming a Roman Catholic? He believes that in the Eucharist, the believer mystically receives the body and blood of Christ, not the physical body and blood as the Roman Catholics teach (transubstantion), but the spiritual body of Christ. Nevin is following the Westminster Confession that in the Eucharist one partakes of Christ’s flesh and blood in a non-physical way.

The Westminster Confession (29.7) states:

Worthy receivers, outwardly partaking of the visible elements, in this sacrament, do then also, inwardly by faith, really and indeed, yet not carnally and corporally but spiritually, receive, and feed upon, Christ crucified, and all benefits of His death: the body and blood of Christ being then, not corporally or carnally, in, with, or under the bread and wine; yet, as really, but spiritually, present to the faith of believers in that ordinance, as the elements themselves are to their outward senses.

Thus, for Nevin, the imputation of righteousness is not a legal fiction but a spiritual reality. Interestingly enough, his renowned teacher, Charles Hodge was adamantly opposed to Nevin's teaching. He accused him of in fact resorting back to Roman Catholicism calling his doctrine, popish. The great majority of Reformed scholars today would agree with Hodge against Nevin. In addition, most evangelicals today, following the Baptist position, would see the eucharist (or as they prefer to call it, the Lord's Supper) as simply being a memorial and the elements as being purely symbolic. They would reject both the RCC doctrine of transubstantiation and the Reformed doctrine of the real presence.

I think Nevin was right, though, to see the problem of imputed righteousness being a legal fiction and therefore being impossible for a God whose nature is truth. Here is just another internal contradiction for evangelical theology.

Christian Philosophers Attempt to Defend "Original Sin"--Part Two

Paul Copan, the current President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, has written an article entitled, Original Sin and Christian Philosophy (Philosophia Christi, 2 [2003]: 519-41, available on-line), in which he makes a valiant attempt to defend the Christian concept of original sin (see my response to Keith Wyma's attempt in Part One of this series).

He begins by stating that God did not create man as a sinner but rather, as with all of God's creation, he created him good (Gen. 1:31). Copan says: We must remember that Genesis 1-2 comes before Genesis 3, that human nature was first made good by God but has been corrupted. Yes, but didn't God know that the man he created was vulnerable to falling? Didn't God stack the deck against him by: (1) allowing the deceiver (i.e., the serpent) into the garden; (2) not warning him of a deceiver who does not have his best interest in mind; (3) naming the tree with an innocuous name, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (would it not have been better to call the tree something like, the tree of misery and death?); and (4) expecting him to know the difference between good and evil before he ate from the tree which supposedly gave him that knowledge? It seems pretty obvious that God wanted Adam to fall and arranged things in such a way that it was extremely likely that he would do so.

Louise Antony, in her presentation at the Notre Dame conference, My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character Of The God of The Hebrew Bible, used an illustration to demonstrate how unfair God was in the Edenic test. She says imagine a parent tells her child before sending him out on Halloween night: Do not eat any of the candy that you get until I have a chance to inspect it. Then, unbeknownst to the child, the parent employs an evil person to give the child some poisoned candy. The evil conspirator tells the child to go ahead and eat the candy. The child says, No, my mother told me not to eat any candy until she inspects it first. The malefactor says: Oh it will be okay. Go ahead and eat it.. The child eats it and dies. Who is most culpable in this story?

After a lengthy discussion of Romans 5:12 and its theological implications, Copan concludes, in contrast to classic Protestant theology, that guilt is not transferred through original sin but merely damage. He argues:

It seems both theologically permissible and apologetically useful to speak about original sin in terms of “damage” rather than “[alien] guilt”; but even if “guilt” is somehow involved, it should be construed as conditional: The traditional teaching of original sin in Augustinian tradition implies, among other things, that we have (a) a sinful disposition which is inherited from Adam and (b) Adam’s guilty status is imputed to us apart from any immoral actions humans may commit. As we have seen, (b) would present problems: Are all without exception imputed an alien guilt and therefore damned to separation from God—including infants, the senile, and the retarded?

Copan's denial of the imputation of guilt provides him with a way out as it relates to the damnation of infants and others who are mentally underdeveloped. One could respond, however, that if God is sympathetic to the plight of those who are mentally challenged, through no fault of their own, then why isn't he sympathetic to the plight of all mankind who, according to Copan, are born morally damaged through no fault of their own?

Copan posits the challenge facing Christian apologists with regard to original sin:

The challenge for the Christian is to put in perspective our corporate connection to Adam (something individualistic Westerners resist) while also accounting for individual human responsibility (which makes sense of the justice of punishment and personal moral accountability).

He believes this challenge is appropriately met by the distinction made by Alvin Platinga of sinning vs. being in sin. He writes:

Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga speaks of sin in two respects: (1) sinning—something for which one is responsible (“he is guilty and warrants blame”), and (2) being in sin—a condition in which we find ourselves from birth. Whereas I am culpable for a sinful act, original sin is not something for which I am culpable: “insofar as I am born in this predicament, my being in it is not within my control and not up to me.” (Warranted Christian Belief, pp. 206-07).

Does this really resolve the issue? If one is born into the condition Platinga describes, can one then avoid sinning? If not, then how can one be held culpable for something that one cannot avoid? Copan continues:

We are born with an original corruption, a self-centered orientation that permeates all we do. Simply being born does not render an infant guilty before God—even if, say, atonement is still necessary for removing the stain of sin. So, though we do not sin necessarily (i.e., it is not assured that we must commit this or that particular sin), we sin inevitably (i.e., in addition to our propensity to sin, given the vast array of opportunities to sin, we eventually do sin at some point).

He says that we do not sin necessarily but inevitably. I see that as a distinction without a difference. If it is inevitable that I sin, then how is it not necessary that I sin? Unless Copan wants to argue that some people could live their entire lives without sinning, then I don't see that this distinction provides any support to his theodicy. I am quite certain that Copan does not want to espouse Pelagianism.

Copan wants to say that original sin involves only the transmission of damage, and not the transmission of guilt. Somehow, he believes this gets his God off the hook, so to speak. I don't agree. If I loan my car to my friend knowing that the car has defective brakes and my friend wrecks the car as a result of the bad brakes, who is most culpable?

Next, Copan argues that the Christian view of original sin, at least the version he espouses, is a better explanation of the world than any non-Christian explanation. He writes:

The doctrine of original sin has the benefit of universal empirical verifiability; thus it supports a Jewish-Christian anthropology as opposed to more neutral or optimistic views of human nature "sans" grace: G.K Chesterton (Orthodoxy, p. 15) is noted for his famous statement: “Certain new theologians dispute original sin, which is the only part of Christian theology which can really be proved."

Copan continues:

Naturalistic explanations of moral evil (e.g., evil as “abnormal” or “maladjusted” according to psychological/therapeutic categories) are woefully inadequate to deal with their depth and horror, whereas the Christian worldview furnishes a sufficient context to understand it.... how can we make sense of personal moral responsibility and punishment if our behavior is nothing more than acting out our physiology? Are we truly willing to say that the Columbine killers were simply “abnormal”—not evil?"

First, I reject Copan's implication that the word evil can only be used in a theistic worldview. In my non-theistic worldview, evil describes an act (or the person who perpetrates the act) that causes harm or injury to an underserving individual. Second, Copan argues that any indvidual moral responsiblity is erased if our behavior is nothing more than acting out our physiology? If that is true, then why doesn't the notion that man is born into this world as damaged goods with a propensity to commit evil erase his moral responsiblity? Third, I do believe the actions of the Columbine killers, as well as other notorious criminals, can be explained pathologically without any appeal to original sin. One does not have to resort to a belief in God or the Bible to explain such actions. As a matter of fact, one could argue that a God who orders genocide (including the killing of children and infants) is himself pathological. (Maybe man created in the image of God involves more than Copan realizes).

Copan continues his attempt to defend the justice of original sin by stating that God has provided the remedy. He writes:

In defending the idea of original sin, we must point out to the critic that we cannot consider this doctrinal dangler without the narrative/historical context which explains the solution God has provided. If we follow the secularist line, we are driven to despair because of the track record of man’s inhumanity to man generation after generation. Naturalistically speaking, we are without hope for resolution to our deep depravity. Thus we must keep in mind the complete diagnosis—the damage as well as the basis of and the hope for full repair.

Once again, Copan's argument fails. First, to say that God provides a cure for the illness that man is born with does not eliminate the culpability of the creator. He created man knowing that man would fall and that all future human beings would be born, due to no fault of their own, into this diseased condition. Now that he provides a cure, he is to be excused? Unless he grants them that cure from the moment of conception, I do not see how this removes his culpability. Second, Copan says that naturalism has no resolution to the problem of man's inhumanity to man. I think the argument could be made that Christianity's solution has failed as well. As many inhumane actions have been perpetrated by Christians throughout history as by any non-Christian group.

Copan continues: . . . we must avoid the red herring of original sin as inevitably condemning a person without the cooperation of his will. This original corruption, by itself, does not condemn us, but rather when we align ourselves with it. But is man capable of doing otherwise? He has already argued that the universality of sin is the most empircally established truth of Christianity. It doesn't appear that man has any choice. If my car is out of alignment (an analogy that Copan uses to refer to the effects of original sin),is it any surprise when it pulls too much in one direction? Can it do otherwise?

As seems to be the case with most Christian apologists today, when everything else fails, middle knowledge is trotted out as the ultimate theodicy. Copan acknowledges that a common complaint is that it is not fair or just for all men to be held accountable for a sin that they did not personally commit. Here comes middle knowledge to the rescue:

Perhaps it’s the case that had any of us human beings been in Adam’s place, each of us would have freely chosen to eat of the fruit and refused to trust God’s word and character. What if every human being God created would also have fallen into sin just as Adam did? Though human sinlessness in the garden is logically possible, it could be the case that those human beings God has actually created would have, according to His middle knowledge, chosen the same Adamic course, resulting in the same Adamic curse. The selection of another person would have produced no different outcome. Had any of us actualized human beings been in Adam’s place, none of us by his free choice would have avoided bringing about the fall and its consequences.

I would like to know how Copan knows this to be the case. Does he have access to God's middle knowledge also? Did God tell him this? It seems to me that this argument from middle knowledge is nothing more than an assumption created ad hoc to explain a problem for Christian theology. If one assumes the concept of middle knowledge to be valid (and many philosophers do not), and if one assumes that God only created those whom he knew would fall if placed in the same circumstances of Adam (and there is no way we can know that), then perhaps Copan has a point. But there are too many assumptions here to satisfy me. We might as well just do what some other Christians do and assume that whatever God does is right and if we don't understand it, it is because it is beyond our comprehension. That is much simpler and takes a lot less work to explain. Then again, Christian apologists might be out of a job if they took that approach.

So here we have another effort by an evangelical Christian to justify the ways of God to man. Although it was a valiant effort, it fails in the final analysis.

Christian Philosophers Attempt to Defend "Original Sin"--Part One

Keith D. Wyma, a Christian philosopher, has written an article entitled, Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Justice (in A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology, ed. Oliver Crisp, pp. 278-91). His essay begins:

As a college sophomore taking a course in Reformed theology, I was troubled by the doctrines having to do with original sin. Eventually I raised my questions in class. "How can it be just," I asked, "for God to create me in an already sinful state? And if I start life with original sin, and so am sinful such that I cannot help but do evil, how can it be just on God's part to condemn and punish me for it?" In response, the professor stared at me, drew a long nasal breath, and in stern tones of righteous indignation proclaimed, "Well, I think that's the kind of question a good Christian just wouldn't ask!"

In the next paragraph, Wyma says: But my questions remained, and they nag at me to this day. (p. 278). With that, he sets out to assuage his nagging doubts, by presenting several arguments to justify the doctrine of original sin. I do not find his arguments persuasive but I have to admit that they are very creative.

How does he try to answer the problem of a just God holding us guilty for being sinners when we are born into that condition? The first justification points to our complete inability to assert any moral obligation upon God with regard to the status of our creation. He says that since life is a gift, not something that is owed to us, it follows that we cannot make any claims on God as to how we shall exist (p. 279). And since by definition, creatures cannot be infinite, we are created as finite beings. He continues: To apply the general point to our question about original sin, our moral capacities to identify and to perform the good, or to identify and to avoid evil, must have some boundaries. As finite beings, we creatures necessarily have some circumstances possible in our lives such that under those conditions we could not know or could not do the good (p. 280).

Does this answer hold any merit? I think not. God may have the right to create us any way that he chooses but does the then have the right to condemn us because we do not measure up to his perfect standard? That does not seem just to me. He is holding us accountable for not meeting an impossible standard. Let's say that my son is born deaf. Would it be just for me to punish him because he didn't hear something that I said? Obviously not.

Wyma goes on to lay out a second argument in an attempt to justify his Christian doctrine of original sin. He makes use of the middle knowledge argument of Luis de Molina, a 16th century Jesuit priest. While Wyma admits that the concept of God's middle knowledge is highly controversial (p. 282), he believes that it can be defended and therefore goes ahead to make use of it. God's middle knowledge, for those who may not know, is the knowledge that God has of counterfactuals of freedom. In other words, God knows what any free being would choose to do in any possible world. On that basis, Wyma argues:

In creating Adam's progeny, God could restrict himself to the set of possible humans who would freely have done as Adam did in the circumstances of his temptation and fall. That is, I propose that the humans who do exist, and those who have existed and who will exist, constitute some subset of those possible humans who would freely have fallen, just as Adam did (p. 282).

It seems to be very popular these days for Christian apologists to punt to God's middle knowledge to solve their problems. Of course, William Craig is famous for his use of the argument as it relates to divine election. But does God's middle knowledge, if it even exists, really solve anything with regard to the problem of man being born already condemned? I think not.

Wyma seems to realize the weakness of his argument because in a footnote, he says:

It might be asked, at this point, why God would choose to create from this set. That is, if God has middle knowledge, why wouldn't he simply create only those humans whom he knew would not fall? One answer might rely on Alvin Platinga's notion of "transworld depravity." If every possible human is essentially such (emphasis added) that in any world in which she exists, she freely does some evil, then God's choice would be constrained to the set of would-be-Adams (p. 290).

It seems to me that Wyma has just undercut his own argument. If transworld depravity is true, then there is no world where man might not choose to freely do evil because of his essentialness,then how can God condemn man for sinning? If there is something about man's essence that demands he will sin in any possible world, and God is the one who created him this way, how can God blame man? The blame must rest on the one who created man in this condition.

Furthermore, my problem with the middle knowledge argument as used by Christian apologists is this: Why couldn't God create a world in which all men freely choose to worship and serve him? Why is that impossible for an omnipotent being?

Apparently not fully satisfied with the transworld depravity argument, Wyma offers another possible justification in the footnote. Alternatively, one might appeal to supralapsarian notions that fallen-then-redeemed humanity makes for a better world than unfallen humanity (p. 290). I fail to agree. How could the world be better with sin than without sin? If that were so, however, it seems that God should be pleased with sin instead of opposed to it, because it allows for a better world.

Even after all of this, Wyma acknowledges that there is still a problem with God holding us guilty for Adam's sin. He says: If it's true that we would have rebelled as Adam did, it's one thing to skip giving us his test; but it seems a much farther step to blame us for failing it. . . . it seems unjust for us to share Adam's guilt, as only he actually committed the transgression in question (p. 284). So, what solution does Wyma now offer? He says:

I propose this: the state itself of original sin should be understood more of a shortfall than as a transgression. That is, rather than being a kind of wrongdoing, original sin resembles the Old Testament states of uncleanness. Having leprosy might have indicated imperfection that made an Israelite unfit to enter the wholly perfect presence of God, but it didn't count as a crime against the Almighty. . . . seen this way, original sin does not constitute a damning offense. Original sin is a sinful state in that its disorder disposes us to become actual sinners, but this is not itself grounds for guilt. It is a state of innocent sinfulness (p. 284).

So, according to Wyma, man is not born into a state of guilt and condemnation. He only becomes guilty once he actually commits a sin. Therefore, he can argue that anyone who dies before committing an actual sin is not condemned but goes to heaven.
I have a couple of problems here. First, the Reformed tradition, of which Wyma, I think, considers himself and the Bible itself disagree with the notion that man is not born into a state of guilt. For example, the Westminster Confession states: They [i.e., Adam and Eve] being the root of mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by original generation. David says in Psalms 51:5: Surely I was sinful at birth, sinful from the time my mother conceived me. Similarly, Psalms 58:3 states: Even from birth the wicked go astray; from the womb they are wayward and speak lies. Ephesians 2:3 proclaims that we were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind. Romans 5:12 states: Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned.

Second, Wyma's Reformed tradition has held that more than just innocence is needed for admittance to heaven. A positive righteousness, which Jesus achieved through his active obedience (Calvinists make a distinction between active obedience, i.e., Christ keeping the law perfectly, and passive obedience, i.e., his death upon the cross. The latter removes man's sin and the former provides the positive righteousness) is also required.

Now, we finally come to the heart of Wyma's argument in his attempt to justify God for original sin. He says there is an important distinction between the inevitability of sinning and the inevitability of committing a particular sin. I believe a correct view of original sin includes the former but not the latter. . . . . I thus propose that not only should the initial disposition of original sin be considered guiltless, but so also should the necessarily-subsequent state of being a sinner. However, that excuse does not extend to committed sinful acts; for those, responsibility, blame, and punishment can justly be assigned (p. 285). So, he is saying that man is only condemned before God for the actual sins that he commits.

Does this get God off the hook? Again, I think not. First, if it is inevitable that man commit actual sin because of the condition in which he is born, how can God condemn him for it when he does commit it? My dog is born in a state in which it is inevitable that he will chase a cat if he sees one. Am I right to condemn my dog for doing so? Second, I think most Reformed theologians would disagree with Wyma's definition of sin. Sin is not just acts of commission but there are also sins of omission. The Westminster Catechism defines sin: Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God. In Romans 3:23, Paul defines sin as : falling short of the glory of God.In Romans 14:23, he says: For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin. The Epistle of James 4:17 states: So whoever knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin. On this understanding of sin, Wyma's theodicy, fails miserably.

It seems to me that if evangelical Christian philosophers are going to attempt to defend Christian doctrines, they cannot redefine those doctrines in such a way that contradicts what the Bible itself teaches (the Bible is supposed to be the ultimate authority for evangelicals) nor what evangelicals historically have said about those doctrines. If they do whatever it is that they are defending it is not evangelical Christianity.

PST and the Doctrine of Imputation

Norman McIlwain is a a British Christian who has authored a book, which is available online, entitled: The Biblical Revelation of the Cross .

Its a very interesting book in which McIlwain argues against the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the atonement. In an online article he reviews Pierced for Our Transgressions, the most definitive defense of PST in recent times. In the article, he states: Justice is not upheld by punishing the innocent in the place of the guilty. You don't need a law degree to see that. It is common sense.

He begins his review by rejecting the authors of Pierced claim that the death of an innocent in place of the guilty is justified due to the doctrine of imputation. The doctrine of imputation is based on the Greek word λογίζομαι (logidzomai)which occurs 49 times in the Greek NT. The KJV translates it: to reckon, to count, to impute. It is a term that was used in accounting to refer to placing something on one's account. While the word is not used, the idea is found in Philemon 1:18, where Paul tells Philemon in regard to Onesimus (a runaway slave): If he hath wronged thee, or oweth [thee] ought, put that on mine account. There are 3 elements to the doctrine of imputation. 1)God put Adam's sin on his posterity's account; 2)God put man's sins on Jesus' account, (and Jesus paid the debit on the cross with the result that), 3) God puts Christ's righteousness (as a credit) on the believer's account.

While McIlwain agrees with the idea of #1 and #3, he rejects #2. He writes:

For Jesus to have become legally guilty for the sins of believers, He would need to have consented to their crimes. Mere relationship to those who sin does not impart guilt: ‘The soul who sins shall die. The son shall not bear the guilt of the father, nor the father bear the guilt of the son’ (Ezek.18:20, NKJ). The ‘union’ that is required of one to be imputed criminal guilt is that of complicity in the unlawful acts. Legally and biblically it was not possible for Jesus to have been made guilty for sin. The punishment He suffered was an act of injustice, as the Bible states: ‘His justice was taken away’ (Acts 8:33, NKJ). ‘He submitted Himself to Him who judges righteously,’ Peter wrote (1 Pet.2:23, NKJ). The resurrection was God’s act of justice - overturning the verdict of an illegal court, whilst proclaiming the righteousness of the One who died.

He continues: It is all about consent. Sin cannot be imputed to Jesus because He never yielded to evil. He yielded His will to the Father. To be attributed sin, one must consent to sin. Those who give their consent to evil without repentance will be condemned with the devil.

I think he makes a good point. The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity makes sense to McIlwain in that man validates and confirms Adam's decision to disobey every time man disobeys God again(of course there is another whole issue here which we will have to deal with later, i.e., is it fair to condemn mankind if they are born with a nature that makes it impossible for them to avoid sin?). The imputation of man's sin to Christ does not follow because Christ never consented, never validated, the sins by committing them himself. He cannot be tied in any real sense to man's sin.

He uses an illustration that I think is helpful:

The owners of a company are responsible for actions that happen within the company rules and consent of management. Corporate manslaughter is a good example. However, the company would need to be involved in the action. One employee murdering another in a fit of temper, for example, would not make the owners of the company guilty for the crime. It would have happened without their consent and certainly against company rules. However, drugs manufactured that later are found to cause death would make the company and its owners liable. Guilt would rightly be imputed - because of the company's consent to the manufacture. Consent makes all the difference.

In my opinion, he has delivered the death blow to PST with this argument. If the sin of mankind is imputed to Christ, then he would have needed to be culpable in some way for man's sin. Otherwise, the imputation is unjust. So you either have a sinful Savior or an unjust Father. Either one destroys evangelical Christianity.

He also deals with the argument put forward by R. L. Dabney in Christ Our Penal Substitute that even though PST is counterintuitive to man's sense of justice, we must accept it on the authority of God's word (J. I. Packer argues the same way in The Logic of Penal Substitution ). McIlwain responds:

According to Dabney, regardless of what we know by moral intuition, the authority of Scripture is paramount and must override all objections of conscience. Nevertheless, the obvious danger of this position is in the misinterpretation and misapplication of Scripture to defend positions or actions that are either completely wrong or, at best, far from the ideal.

Clear examples include Dabney’s own defence of North American slavery; the German reformer Martin Luther’s use of Scripture to support anti-Semitism; and the doctrinal support given by Thomas Aquinas for the Inquisition and the use of the secular arm for the execution (normally preceded by torture) of those supposed guilty of schism or heresy (Summa Theologica, 2-2: 11, 3 & 4). Luther not only preached that the age-long sufferings of the Jews proved God's hatred of them, but went on to advise the Germans to burn down the homes of Jews, to close their synagogues and schools, to confiscate their wealth, to conscript their men and women into forced labour; and wrote, ‘All Jews should be given the choice between either accepting Christ, or having their tongues torn out’ (Concerning the Jews and their lies, 1542). One could also mention the drowning of Baptists in Calvin’s Geneva besides giving many more instances where a God-given conscience and moral intuition within man should have claimed precedent over man’s logic and his interpretation of God’s written word.

I think McIlwain's point is well made. PST defies man's innate sense of justice which according to the Bible is derived from God (see Rom. 2:14). Therefore, evangelicals who adhere to PST have a contradiction in God's revelation to man that they must resolve. I personally don't think it can be resolved. Thus, I reject evangelical theology.