Using the Same Bible, Some Christians Defend Slavery and Others Decry It

As I pointed out in previous posts, slavery was defended by many conservative Christians in the 18th and 19th centuries. These Christians were not only southerners. Charles Hodge, for example, from Princeton Seminary defended the practice. It seems that most Calvinists did defend it. Three vocal Calvinist defenders were George Whitefield, R. L. Dabney and James Petigru Boyce. Those who spoke out against slavery tended to be non-Calvinists, for example John Wesley, Charles Finney, George Fox, and so-on.

Abraham Lincoln in his second inaugural address said:  Both [the pro-slavery side and the abolitionists] read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other.

My point is that the Bible was not really clear on this important moral issue, just as it is not clear on much of what it teaches, including how one is to be saved. It seems that if the Bible were actually a divine revelation, an omniscient being could have done a better job of making himself clear.

Below is a 15 minute section from the documentary, God in America, which details how American Christians used the same Bible to both defend and condemn slavery.

Watch the full episode. See more FRONTLINE.

R. L. Dabney's Attempt to Justify Penal Substitution--Part Two and Evangelicals Attempt to Defend Slavery--Part Five

In this post, I continue my discussion of R. L. Dabney's attempt to justify the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the Atonement. Towards the end of the post, Dabney's defense of slavery will illustrate how one's surrender of moral intuitions, which has to be done to defend the PST, can lead to heinous conduct.

Dabney uses the the analogy of someone who hires another to commit a murder as an analogy showing the justice of the PST.

They [rationalists] may exclaim, "Yes, it is an ethical intuition that one man cannot justly be made responsible for another man's righteousness or sin;" yet the slightest close analysis will show that they are making a very shallow confusion of their pet proposition with another which is different. There is an intuition, universally held by thinking and just men, for which they mistake their opinion. The true predication is this: The consequences of righteousness or sin may not be transferred to another, unless he is in some way reasonably responsible therefor (emphasis original). Now, in order to identify this proposition (which everybody accepts} with theirs, they must assert that there is no way in which a moral agent can become reasonably responsible except solely by personally doing himself the moral or immoral actions in question. Is that self-evidently true? Is it at all true? Manifestly not. They have heedlessly begged the whole question. Every good jurist, yea, every man of common sense, knows that there are other ways in which moral responsibility may attach besides the personal doing of the responsible acts, as by the voluntary assumption of the responsibility for the sake of some valuable consideration. Here is another class of instances. The law justly holds "accessories before the fact" to a murder guilty of death. Here the law claims two victims for one murder, the life of the assassin and the life of the man who bribed him. Yea, if twelve men combine to hire him, there would be thirteen, each guilty of death for one and the same murder, while only one single hand perpetrated it. How comes this to be just? Because the twelve voluntarily associated themselves in the responsibility of an immoral act, which neither of them personally executed. Again, does the just law punish the accessory for the sin of suborning a murderer, or for murder itself? The correct answer is, for both: for his sin of subornation, because it was his own personal act and was evil, and for the murder, because he voluntarily associated himself in the responsibility of it (pp. 77-78).

I believe Dabney is wrong here. My understanding is that in the scenario described above the person who hires the murderer is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder but not murder itself. The penalty may very well be the same but technically the crime is different. Charles Manson, for example, received the death penalty (which was later commuted to life in prison) for the crime of "conspiracy to commit murder." He didn't actually commit the murders but he was instrumental in them. No one would say that Manson is innocent and that the guilt of his followers murders were imputed to him, as would be the case with Jesus under the PST. The reason the conspirators are prosecuted is because they are guilty of wrongdoing.

Next, Dabney refers to a father who refuses to give his daughter's hand in marriage to a man because the prospective bridegroom's own father is in the penitentiary. Dabney says in this case, even though the bridegroom is not personally guilty of a crime, his father's guilt is imputed to him tarnishing his reputation. He writes:

There are, for example, two citizens of high moral and social rank, each of whom has a marriageable daughter who is refined and beloved. One is sought in marriage by a John Doe, the other by a Richard Roe. Both these young men are personally reputable, industrious, and intelligent. The one parent says to John Doe, you cannot have my daughter; because a man whose father is now serving his long term in the penitentiary for a bad felony cannot be a son in my family, and husband to my pure daughter. The other parent gives the same refusal, and justifies it by reminding Richard Roe that he is "filius nullius." The young men sorrowfully protest, and urge that these misfortunes were not their own faults; but each parent persists in declaring: I have nothing against you personally, but you cannot marry my daughter, become a son to her mother and a brother to my other children. But society fully justifies their decision, and there is not one of our opponents who would not concur. Here, then, is the partial transfer of penal responsibility (emphasis added) where the consent of the second party is not even asked, yet the judgment may be just(pp. 79-80).

These unfortunate men in Dabney's example do not receive a "partial transfer of penal responsibility" as he claims. They have their reputation's tarnished because of what their fathers have done but they are not being legally punished. This example does not reflect what transpires under the PST.

Dabney maintains that those who object to the justice of the PST commit a logical fallacy. He says:

Then their common sense tells them, as it tells everybody else, that essential attributes, being subjective personal qualities, are not transferable from the person whom they really qualify to another person. And so they jump to the non-sequitur that therefore guilt is equally untransferable, and its imputation an immoral legal fiction. . . . In syllogistic form the process of thought would be this enthymeme: personal subjective qualities are untransferable therefore a personal relation conditioned on actions which these qualities have determined, must be equally untransferable. Manifestly the suppressed premise must be the universal proposition: that all such relations are as inalienable, or as incapable of being substituted as such subjective qualities. But who is absurd enough to believe that (p. 83)?

Dabney wants us to believe that even though "personal subjective qualities," such as sinfulness cannot be transferred, the "personal relation conditioned on actions [sins] which these qualities have determined," namely guilt can be. As pointed out above, personal guilt only results from personal sin. To take sin out of the equation is to take guilt out as well.

He argues that retribution, which is what God's nature requires for sin, can be fulfilled by a substitute.

Let us take the true theory, that the just punishment of guilt is dictated primarily by God's essential attribute of distributive justice, not by expediency; that the remedial and deterrent effects of punishments among human sinners who are still under a dispensation of hope are secondary and subordinate in God's purpose; and that in his punishment of reprobate men and angels, these have no place at all, but God's whole purpose is moral equalization in his government by the due requital of sin (just as by the due requital of righteousness) to the glory of his own holiness and honor. Then there remains no reason why this purpose of retribution, pure and simple, may not be as completely gained from a substitute as from the sinner, provided a voluntary substitute be found who is able to fulfill the other proper conditions. Such a substitute is our Messiah (p. 85).

This fails to understand the most basic principle of retribution which is that the the one who commits the crime is the one who must face retribution. Retribution, which means to "pay back" or to "recompense," only makes sense when it is the one who committed the wrong that is "paid back" (The word "back" or the prefix "re" in retribution loses its meaning otherwise). As C. S. Lewis said: the concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice (God in the Dock, p. 288).

Next Dabney gives the same argument William Shedd gave concerning the idea that no one has grounds to complain with regard to the PST.

The reasonableness and righteousness of this plan of vicarious redemption may be very shortly proved by pressing this plain question: Whom does it injure? God, the lawgiver, is not injured, for the plan is his own, and he gains in this way a nobler satisfaction to the penal claims of law and to his own holiness, truth, and justice, than he would gain by the punishment of the puny creatures themselves. The Messiah is not injured, because he gave his own free consent, and because the plan will result in the infinite enhancement of his own glory. Certainly, ransomed sinners are not injured, because they gain infinite blessedness, and the plan works moral influences upon them incomparably more noble and blessed. The unsaved are not injured, for in bearing their due punishment personally they receive exactly what they deserve and precisely what they obstinately preferred to redemption in Christ. None of the innocent subjects of God's moral judgment on earth or in all the heavens are injured, because this vicarious redemption of believing men originated a grand system of moral influences far sweeter, more noble, more pure, and more efficacious than those which they would have felt without it. But how can there be injustice when nobody is injured' (pp. 85-86)?

As I responded with regard to Shedd, this argument misses the point. The point to be proven is that the punishment of an innocent can be just not that no one was harmed by it. If the God of the Bible is righteous and just by nature, then whatever he does must also be righteous and just.

Dabney concludes by arguing that only God's word is infallible and if man's moral intutitions are contradicted by God's Word, then God's Word must be believed and man's intuitions disregarded. He writes:

Philosophy and moral intuitions are not infallible but God's Word is. Much of our argument has been run into the field of rational discussion, because our opponents are rationalists, and they, by their attacks on God's truth, have made it necessary to follow them to their own ground. But the reader must not infer from this that we think that human philosophy is the superior, and Scripture the inferior source of evidence. Our comparative view of the sources of authority -- a view taught by a long acquaintance with the contradictions, mutations, and vagaries of the most boastful human philosophies -- may be truly expressed in the apostle's words: "Let God be true, but every man a liar." What saith the Scripture? When that is carefully and honestly ascertained, it should be the end of controversy. Therefore, the main thing which we have to allege in support of our thesis is this: that the doctrine of Christ's substitution under our penal obligations, and the imputation of his satisfaction for guilt to be the ground of our justification, is, either implicitly or expressly, taught throughout the Scriptures. It is so intertwined as an essential part of the whole warp and woof of the fabric that it can only be gotten out of it by tearing it into shreds (pp. 87-88).

This kind of thinking allowed Dabney to defend slavery in the Old South. He wrote an entire book in defense of the institution, A Defense of Virginia and the South.

In the aforementioned book, Dabney argues that the Bible has authority over man's conscience. He writes:

[T]he cause of our defence is the cause of Gods' Word, and of its supreme authority over the human conscience. For, as we shall evince, that Word is on our side, and the teachings of Abolitionism are clearly of rationalistic origin, of infidel tendency, and only sustained by reckless and licentious perversions of the meaning of the Sacred text. It will in the end become apparent to the world, not only that the conviction of the wickedness of slaveholding was drawn wholly from sources foreign to the Bible, but that it is a legitimate corollary from that fantastic, atheistic and radical theory of human rights, which made the Reign of terror in France, which has threatened that country, and which now threatens the Untited States, with the horrors of Red-Republicanism. Because we believe that God intends to vindicate His Divine Word, and to make all nations honour it; because we confidently rely on the force of truth to explode all dangerous error; therefore we confidently expect that the world will yet do justice to Southern slaveholders. The anti-scriptural, infidel, and radical grounds upon which our assailants have placed themselves, make our cause practically the cause of truth and order (pp. 21-22).

When one believes that one has divine sanction, one is capable of acts that would normally violate one's conscience. To hold another human being as property and force that human being to be a slave is a violation of human dignity. One would never want that for one's self or one's family. However, if one believes that God condones it and even ordained it, then the pangs of conscience can be silenced.

Dabney believed that the black people were actually under a divine curse. Commenting on Genesis 9:20-27, he states:

[I]t gives us the origin of domestic slavery. And we find that it was appointed by God as the punishment of, and remedy for (nearly all God's providential chastisements are also remedial) the peculiar moral degradation of a part of the race. God here ordains that this depravity shall find its necessary restraints, and the welfare of the more virtuous its safeguard against the depraved, by the bondage of the latter. He introduces that feature of political society, for the justice of which we shall have occasion to contend; that although men have all this trait of natural equality that they are children of a common father, and sharers of a common humanity, and subjects of the same law of love; yet, in practice, they shall be subject to social inequalities determined by their own characters, and their fitness or unfitness to use privileges for their own and their neighbours' good. But second: this narrative gives us more than a prediction. The words of Noah are not a mere prophecy; they are a verdict, a moral sentence pronounced upon conduct, by competent authority; that verdict sanctioned by God. Now if the verdict is righteous, and the execution blessed by God, it can hardly be, that the executioners of it are guilty for putting it in effect (p. 103).

Dabney believes the black race to be inferior to the white race mentally and morally. He writes:

[W]hen once abolition by federal aggression came, these other sure results would follow: that the same greedy lust of power which had meddled between masters and slaves, would assuredly, and for the stronger reason, desire to use the political weight of the late slaves against their late masters: that having enforced a violent emancipation, they would enforce, of course negro suffrage, negro eligibility to office, and a full negro equality: that negro equality thus theoretically established would be practical negro superiority: the tyrant section, as it gave to its victims, the white men of the South, more and more causes of just resentment, would find more and more violent inducements to bribe the negroes, with additional privileges and gifts, to assist them in their domination: that this miserable career must result in one of two things, either a war of races, in which the whites or the blacks would be, one or the other, exterminated; or amalgamation. But while we believe that "God made of one blood all nations of men to dwell under the whole heavens," we know that the African has become, according to a well-known law of natural history, by the manifold influences of the ages, a different, fixed species of the race, separated from the white man by traits bodily, mental and moral (emphasis added), almost as rigid and permanent as those of genus . Hence the offspring of an amalgamation must be a hybrid race, stamped with all the feebleness of the hybrid. and incapable of the career of civilization and glory as an independent race. And this apparently is the destiny which our conquerors have in view. If indeed they can mix the blood of the heroes of Manassas with this vile stream from the fens of Africa, then they will never again have occasion to tremble before the righteous resistance of Virginia freemen; but will have a race supple and vile enough to fill that position of political subjugation, which they desire to fix on the South (pp. 352-53).

So, ultimately Dabney believes in the PST because he believes that is what the Bible teaches. Even if it runs counter to man's moral sensibilities, one is to surrender his conscience in favor of the divine Word. I maintain that this approach is dangerous and can lead to unbelieveably inhumane practices such as slavery.

Evangelicals Attempt to Defend Slavery in 18th and 19th Century America--Part Four

Two of the original faculty members of The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, founded in 1859 in Greenville, SC (now located in Louisville, KY), were John Albert Broadus (1827–1895) on the left  and James Petigru Boyce (1827–1888) on the right. Broadus was an outstanding preacher (Spurgeon called him "the greatest living preacher") and NT scholar. His Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew and his textbook for homiletics, On the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons are both still widely used in evangelical colleges and seminaries. Boyce was a Systematic Theologian and he served as the first President of Southern Seminary. He had studied under Charles Hodge at Princeton and was a strong proponent of Calvinism. Boyce is probably best remembered today for his textbook, Abstract of Systematic Theology, published one year before he died and encapsulating a lifetime of theological studies. (It is available online here). Studies on the lives of both men have recently been published:  James Petigru Boyce: A Southern Baptist Statesman  (2009) by Tom Nettles and John A. Broadus: A Living Legacy  (2008) ed. David Dockery. They are still very highly thought of in conservative Southern Baptist circles.

As Southern men with means, they both owned slaves. Boyce called himself ultra pro-slavery, whereas Broadus seemed to be more of a reluctant slaveholder. Broadus was, in this respect, much like that great Southern General Robert E. Lee, who though he had slaves longed for the day when he did not (Bound to Be Friends: Slavery and Friendship in the Lives and Thoughts of James P. Boyce and John A. Broadus). While loyal to the South and ultimately supportive of the War, they did not favor secession. However, once the South seceeded, they both actively supported the Confederate  troops as chaplains.

Boyce thought slavery was being removed by God as a punishment on America for neglecting the slaves marital and religious rights. He said that God had allowed slavery as long as he did in America to show us how great we might have been had we treated the slaves properly.  He wrote to his brother-in-law, H.A. Tupper:

I believe I see in all this the end of slavery. I believe we are cutting its throat, curtailing its domain. And I have been, and am, an ultra pro-slavery man. Yet I bow to what God will do. I feel that our sins as to this institution have cursed us, - that the Negroes have not been cared for in their marital and religious relations as they should be; and I fear God is going to sweep it away, after having left it thus long to show us how great we might be, were we to act as we ought in this matter. (John A. Broadus, “Memoirs of James Pettigru Boyce,” in Selected Works of John A. Broadus [2001] 4:185).

Broadus, as already mentioned, was a reluctant slaveholder, and not eager to defend the practice; nevertheless, as was customary in his day, he felt the negro race to be a "lower grade of humanity." He stated:

We must not forget that the Negroes differ widely among themselves, having come from different races in Africa, and having had very different relations to the white people while held in slavery, many of them are greatly superior to others in character, but the great mass of them belong to a very low grade of humanity. We have to deal with them as best we can, while a large number of other white people stand off at a distance and scold us. Not a few of our fellow-citizens at the north feel and act very nobly about the matter; but the number is sadly great who do nothing and seem to care nothing but to find fault (Quoted from: “A Sermon on Lynch, Law, and Raping: Preached by Rev. E.K. Love, D.D. at 1st African Baptist Church, Savannah, Ga., of which he is pastor, November 5th, 1893.” [Augusta: Georgia Baptist Print, 1894], 11).

So, here again,we find Evangelical Christians defending slavery, even as it was practiced in the antebellum South. Granted, they would like to have eliminated some of the abuses, and Broadus especially felt that it was wrong to prohibit slaves to marry and to attend religious services; but the fact still remains that they did not see anything unbiblical about the essence of slavery. These men believed the Bible was the Word of God and on that basis they defended the practice of slavery.

Evangelicals Attempt to Defend Slavery in 18th and 19th Century America--Part Three

This is part three in a series on attempts by Evangelical Christians in the 18thand 19th centuries to defend the practice of slavery in the United States. In the first post, I showed that the evangelist who led the Great Awakening in the American colonies, George Whitefield, was a slaveholder and a biblical defender of its practice. In the second post, I showed that Charles Hodge, the great theologian of Old Princeton, also believed slavery, as practiced in his lifetime, was biblical. Today, I turn to one of the great Baptist leaders of the 19th century, Richard Furman.

In 1822, Richard Furman (1755-1825), Pastor of the First Baptist Church of Charleston, South Carolina, and the President of the State Baptist Convention of South Carolina, wrote a letter to the governor of South Carolina, The Honorable John L. Wilson. Furman entitled the letter, "EXPOSITION of The Views of the Baptists, RELATIVE TO THE COLOURED POPULATION In the United States IN A COMMUNICATION To the Governor of South-Carolina Charleston, 24th December, 1822." Furman was, arguably, the preeminent Baptist leader of his time. He was the president of the first Baptist convention in America, the Trienniel Convention (from which both the Northern Baptist Convention, today known as the American Baptist Convention, and the Southern Baptist Convention originated). Furman University in Greenville, SC was named after him.

His letter to the governor begins:

His Excellency Gov. JOHN L. WILSON,

. . . because certain writers on politics, morals and religion, and some of them highly respectable, have advanced positions, and inculcated sentiments, very unfriendly to the principle and practice of holding slaves; and by some these sentiments have been advanced among us, tending in their nature, directly to disturb the domestic peace of the State, to produce insubordination and rebellion among the slaves, and to infringe the rights of our citizens; and indirectly, to deprive the slaves of religious privileges, by awakening in the minds of their masters a fear, that acquaintance with the Scriptures, and the enjoyment of these privileges would naturally produce the aforementioned effects; because the sentiments in opposition to the holding of slaves have been attributed, by their advocates, to the Holy Scriptures, and to the genius of Christianity. These sentiments, the Convention, on whose behalf I address your Excellency, cannot think just, or well-founded: for the right of holding slaves is clearly established by the Holy Scriptures, both by precept and example (emphasis added). In the Old Testament, the Israelites were directed to purchase their bond-men and bond-maids of the Heathen nations; except they were of the Canaanites, for these were to be destroyed. And it is declared, that the persons purchased were to be their "bond-men forever;" and an "inheritance for them and their children." They were not to go out free in the year of jubilee, as the Hebrews, who had been purchased, were: the line being clearly drawn between them.*[See Leviticus XXV. 44, 45, 46] In example, they are presented to our view as existing in the families of the Hebrews as servants, or slaves, born in the house, or bought with money: so that the children born of slaves are here considered slaves as well as their parents. And to this well known state of things, as to its reason and order, as well as to special privileges, St. Paul appears to refer, when he says, "But I was free born."

Furman summarizes the NT's teaching regarding slaves:

The masters are not required to emancipate their slaves; but to give them the things that are just and equal, forbearing threatening; and to remember, they also have a master in Heaven. The "servants under the yoke" (bond-servants or slaves) mentioned by Paul to Timothy, as having "believing masters," are not authorized by him to demand of them emancipation, or to employ violent means to obtain it; but are directed to "account their masters worthy of all honour," and "not to despise them, because they were brethren" in religion; "but the rather to do them service, because they were faithful and beloved partakers of the Christian benefit." Similar directions are given by him in other places, and by other Apostles. And it gives great weight to the argument, that in this place, Paul follows his directions concerning servants with a charge to Timothy, as an Evangelist, to teach and exhort men to observe this doctrine.

Had the holding of slaves been a moral evil, it cannot be supposed, that the inspired Apostles, who feared not the faces of men, and were ready to lay down their lives in the cause of their God, would have tolerated it, for a moment, in the Christian Church. If they had done so on a principle of accommodation, in cases where the masters remained heathen, to avoid offences and civil commotion; yet, surely, where both master and servant were Christian, as in the case before us, they would have enforced the law of Christ, and required, that the master should liberate his slave in the first instance. But, instead of this, they let the relationship remain untouched, as being lawful and right, and insist on the relative duties.

Furman then argues that the African slaves had voluntarily consented to being slaves:

In proving this subject justifiable by Scriptural authority, its morality is also proved; for the Divine Law never sanctions immoral actions. . . . by which it will appear, that the Africans brought to America were, slaves, by their own consent (empahsis added), before they came from their own country, or fell into the hands of white men. Their law of nations, or general usage, having, by common consent the force of law, justified them, while carrying on their petty wars, in killing their prisoners or reducing them to slavery; consequently, in selling them, and these ends they appear to have proposed to themselves; the nation, therefore, or individual, which was overcome, reduced to slavery, and sold would have done the same by the enemy, had victory declared on their, or his side. Consequently, the man made slave in this manner, might be said to be made so by his own consent, and by the indulgence of barbarous principles.

Furman next argues that the slaves in America are better off than they were in Africa:

. . .when they have come into the hands of humane masters here, has been greatly bettered by the change; if it is, ordinarily, really better, as many assert, than that of thousands of the poorer classes in countries reputed civilized and free; and, if, in addition to all other considerations, the translation from their native country to this has been the means of their mental and religious improvement, and so of obtaining salvation, as many of themselves have joyfully and thankfully confessed--then may the just and humane master, who rules his slaves and provides for them, according to Christian principles, rest satisfied, that he is not, in holding them, chargeable with moral evil, nor with acting, in this respect, contrary to the genius of Christianity.

Society, and the slaves themselves, are better off under the current arrangement, according to Furman:

It is, therefore, firmly believed, that general emancipation to the Negroes in this country, would not, in present circumstances, be for their own happiness, as a body; while it would be extremely injurious to the community at large in various ways: And, if so, then it is not required even by benevolence.

Furman says there might come a day when the African slaves can be granted their freedom:

Should, however, a time arrive, when the Africans in our country might be found qualified to enjoy freedom; and, when they might obtain it in a manner consistent with the interest and peace of the community at large, the Convention would be happy in seeing them free: And so they would, in seeing the state of the poor, the ignorant and the oppressed of every description, and of every country meliorated; so that the reputed free might be free indeed, and happy. But there seems to be just reason to conclude that a considerable part of the human race, whether they bear openly the character of slaves or are reputed freemen, will continue in such circumstances, with mere shades of variation, while the world continues.

Furman summarizes his conclusions for the governor:

. . .the following conclusions:--That the holding of slaves is justifiable by the doctrine and example contained in Holy writ; and is; therefore consistent with Christian uprightness, both in sentiment and conduct. That all things considered, the Citizens of America have in general obtained the African slaves, which they possess, on principles, which can be justified; though much cruelty has indeed been exercised towards them by many, who have been concerned in the slave-trade, and by others who have held them here, as slaves in their service; for which the authors of this cruelty are accountable. That slavery, when tempered with humanity and justice, is a state of tolerable happiness; equal, if not superior, to that which many poor enjoy in countries reputed free. That a master has a scriptural right to govern his slaves so as to keep it in subjection; to demand and receive from them a reasonable service; and to correct them for the neglect of duty, for their vices and transgressions; but that to impose on them unreasonable, rigorous services, or to inflict on them cruel punishment, he has neither a scriptural nor a moral right. At the same time it must be remembered, that, while he is receiving from them their uniform and best services, he is required by the Divine Law, to afford them protection, and such necessaries and conveniencies of life as are proper to their condition as servants; so far as he is enabled by their services to afford them these comforts, on just and rational principles. That it is the positive duty of servants to reverence their master, to be obedient, industrious, faithful to him, and careful of his interests; and without being so, they can neither be the faithful servants of God, nor be held as regular members of the Christian Church. That as claims to freedom as a right, when that right is forfeited, or has been lost, in such a manner as has been represented, would be unjust; and as all attempts to obtain it by violence and fraud would be wicked; so all representations made to them by others, on such censurable principles, or in a manner tending to make them discontented; and finally, to produce such unhappy effects and consequences, as been before noticed, cannot be friendly to them (as they certainly are not to the community at large,) nor consistent with righteousness: Nor can the conduct be justified, however in some it may be palliated by pleading benevolence in intention, as the motive. That masters having the disposal of the persons, time and labour of their servants, and being the heads of families, are bound, on principles of moral and religious duty, to give these servants religious instruction; or at least, to afford them opportunities, under proper regulations to obtain it:

Sir, your very obedient and humble servant,
RICHARD FURMAN.
President of the Baptist State Convention.

So, it is indisputable that Evangelical Christian leaders, leaders who were highly educated in the Scriptures and highly respected in the country, defended the justice and morality of antebellum Slavery in the United States. They did so on the basis of the teaching of "God's Holy Word." This same Word that we are told today by Christian apologists provides the only "objective morality."

Evangelicals Attempt to Defend Slavery in 18th and 19th Century America--Part Two

In a prior post, I discussed Charles Hodge's view on the Penal Substitutionary Theory of the Atonement. Hodge was Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary for 50 years. He is, by all accounts, one of the greatest theologians America has ever produced. He was a staunch advocate of the inerrancy of Scripture and an opponent of liberalism and higher criticism. He lived in the 19th century during which time there was a great debate in this country about the morality or immorality of slavery. While Hodge detested some of the practices of slaveholders in the South, he maintained that slavery was not in principle wrong nor was it unbiblical.

In an article entitled, "The Bible Argument on Slavery," in Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments, (ed. E. N. Elliott [1860]), Hodge laid out his thoughts on the matter.

The great question, therefore, in relation to slavery is, what is right? What are the moral principles which should control our opinions and conduct in regard to it? Before attempting to answer this question, it is proper to remark, that we recognize no authoritative rule of truth and duty but the word of God. Plausibe as may be the arguments deduced from general principles to prove a thing to be true or false, right and wrong, there is almost always room for doubt and honest diversity of opinion. . . . Unless we can approach the consciences of men, clothed with some more imposing authority than that of our own opinions and arguments, we shall gain little permanent influence. Men are too nearly upon a par as to their powers of reasoning, and ability to discover truth, to make conclusions of one mind an authoritative rule for others. It is our object, therefore, not to discuss the subject of slavery upon abstract principles, but to ascertain the scriptural rule of judgment and conduct in relation to it (p. 847).

I find Hodge's argument very interesting in light of some comments made on a previous post regarding objective morality. Hodge is saying that our moral codes cannot be anchored in the opinions of man but must be anchored in divine authority if they are to have any real force. This is precisely what many Christian apologists say today with regard to the need for an objective morality. The interesting thing is that virtually all, if not in fact all, current Christian apologists, who believe their morality is objective and based on the revelation of God in the Bible, would find themselves in disagreement with Dr. Hodge on the matter of slavery. Thus, I contend that all morality is ultimately subjective simply because even if the Bible were the objective standard of morality, the fact that individuals differ on what it means, and how it applies, shows that it is objective in theory only and not in reality. Any moral code  is "objective" only in the sense that a particular society has agreed to bind themselves under it.

Listen to Hodge defend slavery:

It is on all hands acknowledged that, at the time of the advent of Jesus Christ, slavery in its worst forms prevailed over the whole world. The Saviour found it around him in Judea; the apostles met with it in Asia, Greece and Italy. How did they treat it? Not by the denunciation of slaveholding as necessarily and universally sinful. Not by declaring that all slaveholders were men-stealers and robbers, and consequently to be excluded from the church and the kingdom of heaven. Not by insisting on immediate emancipation. Not by appeals to the passions of men on the evils of slavery, or by the adoption of a system of universal agitation . . . If we are wiser, better, more courageous than Christ and his apostles, let us say so; but it will do no good, under a paroxysm of benevolence, to attempt to tear the Bible to pieces, or to exhort, by violent exegesis, a meaning foreign to its obvious sense.  (p. 847-48).

. . .  if "slaveholding is one of the greatest of all sins [as the abolitionists say]; that it should be immediately and universally abandoned as a condition of church communion, or admission into heaven, how comes it that Christ and his apostles did not pursue the same course? We see no way of escape from the conclusion that the conduct of the modern abolitionists, being directly opposed to that of the authors of our religion, must be wrong and ought to be modified or abandoned. . .  (p. 849).

Slaveholding is not necessarily sinful. The assumption of the contrary is the great reason why the modern abolitionists have adopted their peculiar course. They argue thus: slaveholding is under all circumstances sinful, it must, therefore be immediately abandoned. This reasoning is perfectly conclusive. If there is error anywhere, it is in the premises, and not in the deduction. It requires no argument to show that sin ought to be at once abandoned. Everything, therefore, is conceded which the abolitionists need require, when it is granted that slaveholding is in itself a crime. But how can this assumption be reconciled with the conduct of Christ and the apostles? Did they shut their eyes to the enormities of a great offence against God and man? Ddi they temporize with a heinous evil, because it was common and popular? Did they abstain from even exhorting their masters to emancipate their slaves, though an imperative duty, from the fear of consequences? Did they admit the perpetrators of the greatest crimes to the Christian communion? Who will undertake to charge the Blessed Redeemer and his inspired followers with such connivance at sin, and such fellowship with iniquity? Were drunkards, murderer, liars, and adulterers thus treated? Were they passed over without even an exhortation to forsake their sins? Were they recognized as Christians? It cannot be that slaveholding belongs to the same category with these crimes; and to assert the contrary, is to assert that Christ is the minister of sin  (pp. 849-50).

Hodge admits that slaves are sometimes physically abused and he decries this, but he does not think it delegitimizes the practice of slaveholding.

Because masters may treat their slaves unjustly, or governments make oppressive laws in relation to them, is no more a valid argument against the lawfulness of slaveholding, than the abuse of parental authority, or the unjust political laws of certain states, is an argument against the lawfulness of the parental relation, or of civil government ( p. 850).

Hodge maintains that it is really quite simple. If one rejects the legitimacy of slavery, one rejects the Bible as God's Word. He says:

The fact that the Mosaic institutions recognized the lawfulness of slavery is a point too plain to need proof, and is almost universally admitted. Our argument from this acknowledged fact is, that if God allowed slavery to exist, if he directed how slaves might be lawfully acquired, and how they were to be treated, it is in vain to contend that slaveholding is a sin, and yet profess reverence for the Scriptures. Everyone must feel that if perjury, murder, or idolatry had been thus authorized, it would bring the Mosaic institutions into conflict with the eternal principles of morals, and that our faith in the divine origin of one or the other must be given up  (pp. 859-60).

Next, Hodge answers the objection that slavery violates "human rights":

It is, however, argued that slavery must be sinful because it interferes with the inalienable rights of men. We have already remarked that slavery, in itself considered, is a state of bondage, and nothing more. . . . That this condition involves the loss of many of the rights which are commonly and properly called natural, because belonging to men, as men, is readily admitted. It is, however, incumbent on those who maintain that slavery is, on this account, necessarily sinful, to show that it is criminal, under all circumstances, to deprive any set of men of a portion of their natural rights. That this broad proposition cannot be maintained is evident (pp. 861-62.)

So, in the case of Charles Hodge we find a clear example of what can happen when one surrenders his mind to the dictates of a holy book. Any number of great evils have been perpetrated by men who thought they were acting in accordance with the will of their god(s). Unfortunately, it continues even to this day.

Evangelicals Attempt to Defend Slavery in 18th and 19th Century America--Part One

I have in prior posts shown contemporary Evangelicals attempts to defend the Canaanite genocides. I have also shown that the God of the OT condoned rape. It is also clear that the same God condoned slavery. Often it is said, by current day Christian apologists, that the slavery of the OT was not the same as the slavery of the antebellum Southern United States. The fact, however, is that a number of conservative Christians, many of whom are held up as great examples of men who were used mightily by God, argued that the slavery being practiced during their time (18th and 19th centuries) was in fact God's will.

C. S. Cowles, former Professor of Theology at Point Loma Nazarene University wrote:

There is no way to overstate the inhumanity, the atrocities, the horrors visited upon generation after generation of slaves by our Bible-believing slave-holding ancestors. When abolitionists became serious about ending slavery in this country, they were vigorously slapped down by biblical literalists on `scriptural grounds.' George Whitfield, the great English evangelist and Wesley co-worker who was instrumental in sparking our country's first Great Spiritual Awakening, purchased a Georgia Plantation along with its slaves, and put them to work at his orphanage as well as nearby plantations. Slavery had been outlawed in Georgia in the early 18th century. But thanks to Whitefield's vigorous campaign defending slavery on `biblical grounds,' it was re-legalized in Georgia in 1751. (“Scriptural Inerrancy? 'Behold, I Show You A More Excellent Way': An Open Letter by C. S. Cowles, " Spring, 2009).

As Cowles points out, slavery was actually banned from 1735 to 1750, in the colony of Georgia.

General James Oglethorpe, the earl of Egmont, and the other Trustees were not opposed to the enslavement of Africans as a matter of principle. They banned slavery in Georgia because it was inconsistent with their social and economic intentions. Given the Spanish presence in Florida, slavery also seemed certain to threaten the military security of the colony. Spain offered freedom in exchange for military service, so any slaves brought to Georgia could be expected to help the Spanish in their efforts to destroy the still-fragile English colony (Betty Wood, "Slavery in Colonial Georgia," The New Georgia Encyclopedia).

One of the leading voices calling for slavery to be re-instituted in Georgia was the evangelist George Whitefield, who is credited with being the major human force behind the First Great Awakening.

In 1749, George Whitefield campaigned for its legalisation, claiming that the territory would never be prosperous unless farms were able to use slave labour. He began his fourth visit to America in 1751 advocating slavery, viewing its re-legalisation in Georgia as necessary to make his plantation profitable. Partially through his campaigns and written pleas to the Georgia Trustees, it was re-legalised in 1751. Whitefield became a slave owner, using them to work at his Bethesda Orphanage. To help raise money for the orphanage, he also put slaves to work at a plantation called Providence. Whitefield was known to treat his slaves well; they were reputed to be devoted to him, and he was critical of the abuse and neglect of their slaves by other owners. When Whitefield died, he bequeathed his slaves to Selina Hastings, Countess of Huntingdon.

So, partly due to the great influence of evangelist George Whitefield,

Georgia's enslaved population grew in size from less than 500 to approximately 18,000 people [Between 1750 and 1775]. Beginning in the mid-1760s, Georgia began to import slaves directly from Africa—mainly from Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. Most were given physically demanding work in the rice fields, although some found employment in Savannah's expanding urban economy ("Slavery in Colonial Georgia," The New Georgia Encyclopedia).

Whitefield was not alone in his defense of slavery, The Princeton Theological Review, the journal of Princeton Seminary, the home of strict Calvinism and biblical inerrancy, published an article in 1838 entitled: ("State of the West Indies before Emancipation," PTR  [1838], pp. 603-04). The article stated:

The leading characteristic doctrine of [the abolitionists] is that slaveholding is in all cases a sin, and should, therefore, under all circumstances, be immediately abandoned. As nothing can be plainer than that slaveholders were admitted to the Christian church by the inspired apostles, the advocates of this doctrine are brought into direct collision with the Scriptures. This leads to one of the most dangerous evils connected with the whole system, viz., a disregard of the authority of the word of God, a setting up a different and higher standard of truth and duty, and a proud and confident wresting of Scripture to suit their own purposes (emphasis original). The history of interpretation furnishes no examples of more willful and violent perversions of the sacred text than are to be found in the writings of the abolitionists. They seem to consider themselves above the Scriptures; and when they put themselves above the law of God, it is not wonderful that they should disregard the laws of men. Significant manifestations of the result of this disposition to consider their own light a surer guide than the word of God, are visible in the anarchical opinions about human governments, civil and ecclesiastical, and on the rights of women, which have found appropriate advocates in the abolition publications. Let these principles be carried out, and there is an end to all social subordination, to all security for life and property, to all guarantee for public or domestic virtue."

As I continue this series, I will point out other notable Bible-believing, evangelical Christians who defended the institution of slavery in the Antebellum Southern United States.

Does the God of the Bible Condone Rape?--Part Two

In part one of, Does the God of the Bible Condone Rape?, I dealt with the passage in Exodus 21:7-11, in which God gave regulations concerning the selling of a daughter into slavery. It is bad enough that the God of the OT does not condemn slavery outright but in this particular case he condones rape as well. Any study of the Ancient Near Eastern societies will quickly reveal that women had few if any rights. They were regarded as property of their husbands, or if not married, their fathers. The fact that the father has the right, acknowledged by God in this passage, to sell his daughter is proof that she was considered property. Sadly, women are still treated this way today in certain Islamic societies (see Infidel, by Ayaan Hirsi Ali).

Today, I want to consider another passage, Deuteronomy 21:10-14:

When you go to war against your enemies and the Lord your God delivers them into your hands and you take captives, if you notice among the captives a beautiful woman and are attracted to her, you may take her as your wife. Bring her into your home and have her shave her head, trim her nails and put aside the clothes she was wearing when captured. After she has lived in your house and mourned her father and mother for a full month, then you may go to her and be her husband and she shall be your wife. If you are not pleased with her, let her go wherever she wishes. You must not sell her or treat her as a slave, since you have dishonored her.(NIV)

The word translated "dishonored" in v. 14 is the Hebrew verb `anah (ענה ). In the Piel perfect it means compressit feminam [Latin], to deflower a woman, usually by force (Gesenius' Hebrew Lexicon, p. 783). The Latin compressit feminam means to suppress/control/stifle/frustrate/subdue/ a woman . This word obviously refers to rape and is so translated in other Hebrew scriptures. For example,

Judges 20:5: They raped my concubine, and she died.
2 Sam. 13:14: since he was stronger than she, he raped her.
2 Sam.13:32: ever since the day Amnon raped his sister Tamar.

The captive was taken from her family by force and made to live with the one who had killed her family. To think that a woman who had gone through such tragedy would voluntarily agree to become the wife of her family's killer is incredible. The fact is she had no choice in the matter. As the text says, she was "raped."

The following could have been written by one of these so-called "war brides."

I was compelled to live under the same roof with him--where I saw a man forty years my senior daily violating the most sacred commandments of nature. He told me I was his property; that I must be subject to his will in all things. My soul revolted against the mean tyranny. But where could I turn for protection?

Instead it was written by Harriet A. Jacobs, an African-American slave in 19th century America.

So, the obvious fact is that, if the OT is really a divine revelation, then God condones the selling of a human being as property and the forcing of the female slave to grant the sexual wishes of her master. One may argue that the regulations laid out here are better than those in some other ANE societies but that is beside the point. There is no condemnation of this practice by the Hebrew God. He is not hesitant to condemn other practices that he finds abhorent such as homosexuality but apparently forcing women to have sex with a man is permissible or at least tolerable.

Now, as I expected some Christians have objected to my interpretation of these texts and offered arguments in an  attempt to mitigate what is obviously repugnant.

First, I am told that the phrase in Exodus 21:8, "if she does not please her master," does not relate to sex. That is extremely naive. As Pressler notes: her economic worth is, first of all, her sexuality and her reproductive capacity. (Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, eds. Victor Matthews, Bernard Levinson, and Tikva Frymer-Kensky [1998], p. 162).

Then, I am told that she is a concubine not a slave. While this admission contradicts the first claim (that "not pleasing" doesn't refer to sex), it is a "distinction without a difference" anyway. As Susanne Scholz says with regard to Genesis 35:

Overall, however, the roles of a concubine and a female slave are similar, so that the term "concubine" in Gen. 35:22 does not necessarily indicate a socially higher status than the term "slave." Even as a concubine, Bilhah is owned by Jacob, who has unrestricted sexual access to her body. It is thus inconsequential to Bilhah's position whether she is a concubine or a slave because in either case Bilhah lacks control over her life. She is property, and so Reuben challenges his father's property rights when he rapes Bilhah. Thus, this sad narrative illustrates an important, though depressing, truth about rape in androcentric and class-stratified texts: men rape women, enslaved or free, to mark their territory over against other men (Sacred Witness: Rape in the Hebrew Bible, p. 75, see also Thomas Dozeman, Eerdmans Critical Commentary: Exodus , p. 529).

Next, I am told that these passages in the OT do not suggest that God approved of the practices but that he merely tolerated the hardness of man's hearts. The objector says: To equate toleration with commendation is to impose one's preconceived view of the will of God onto the progressive revelation of Scripture.

My question is: How can a perfectly moral God regulate a practice that is clearly immoral? Can these Christian apologists imagine their God regulating homosexuality or idol worship? No, he condemns them unequivocally. If slavery and rape are "objectively wrong," based on the nature of God, how can God do anything but condemn them? If I tolerate improper behavior, I am tacitly approving of the behavior. The word tolerate means: to allow to be or to be done without prohibition, hindrance, or contradiction .  Thus, it seems crystal clear to me that the God of the Bible condones both slavery and rape.

Does the God of the Bible Condone Rape?--Part One

It is fairly well known that the God of the Bible condones slavery and lays out laws governing the treatment of slaves. Often, Christian apologists argue that this slavery was not at all like slavery in the antebellum Southern United States. According to them, it was not based on race and it was not truly slavery but "indentured servitude." If a person found himself deeply in debt, he could sell himself and/or his family into servitude for six years to pay it off and then he was free (although apparently the Israelites did not always follow this law--Jer. 34:14) The master provided room and board in exchange for the servant's work and was required to treat him/her with a certain amount of dignity. So, according to these apologists, slavery as a means of paying off a debt was really not so bad.

What these apologists don't usually tell you is that the laws regarding non-Hebrew slaves was different. The contrast is seen clearly in Leviticus 25 (NIV).

Law regarding Hebrew servants

If one of your countrymen becomes poor among you and sells himself to you, do not make him work as a slave. He is to be treated as a hired worker or a temporary resident among you; he is to work for you until the Year of Jubilee. Then he and his children are to be released, and he will go back to his own clan and to the property of his forefathers. Because the Israelites are my servants, whom I brought out of Egypt, they must not be sold as slaves. Do not rule over them ruthlessly, but fear your God (vv. 39-43).

Law regarding non-Hebrew slaves

Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your fellow Israelites ruthlessly (vv. 44-46).

Note, (1) the non-Hebrew slavery was in fact based on race. They must be non-Hebrews. (2) The slaves became the property of the slaveholder, and could even be inherited by the master's children. That appears to be the same as the slavery of the antebellum South. (3)These slaves were slaves for life with no hope of gaining freedom. (4) They could be treated ruthlessly. The last part of v. 46 says that fellow Israelites cannot be treated ruthlessly. The implication is that non-Israelites could be so treated.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the slavery of non-Hebrews condoned by the God of the Bible was not much different, if different at all, from the slavery practiced in the Old South. My purpose in this post, though, is to focus on something that the God of the Bible condoned that is not widely known or recognized, namely rape.

In Exodus 21:1-11, laws are laid down related to Hebrew servants. These laws are part of what is usually called, The Book of the Covenant or The Covenant Code (Exod. 20:22-23:33). Douglas Stuart writes:

This foundational portion of the Sinai covenant continues without interruption from the Ten Commandments. Although God left off speaking directly to all the Israelites at their request after the Ten Commandments (20:19), he had not stopped revealing his covenant. Moses simply went directly to the top of the mountain (20:21) and the instructions continued . . . . Now the divine discourse continues with what has come to be called the Covenant Code, a basic block of laws that guide the behavior of God's covenant people ( New American Commentary: Exodus [2006], p. 473).

So, following on the heels of the 10 Commandments are these regulations regarding female slaves (I doubt any of the Christian Right want to post these on public property):

If a man sells his daughter as a servant, she is not to go free as menservants do.If she does not please the master who has selected her for himself, he must let her be redeemed. He has no right to sell her to foreigners, because he has broken faith with her. If he selects her for his son, he must grant her the rights of a daughter. If he marries another woman, he must not deprive the first one of her food, clothing and marital rights. If he does not provide her with these three things, she is to go free, without any payment of money (Exod. 21:7-11--NIV).

The word tranlated "servant" in verse 7 is the Hebrew word אמה ('amah ) which means maid-servant, female slave, maid, handmaid or concubine (Gesenius' Hebrew Lexicon, p. 63 ). So, here we have God condoning a man selling his own daughter to be a female slave. Note the phrase if she does not please her master (v. 8). What does this have reference to? Certainly, it means that he does not find her sexually satisfying. So, if the master has sex with his female slave and decides he does not like her, he has four options: 1) get his money back ("let her be redeemed"); 2) give her to his son as his wife; 3) continue to provide for her; or 4) let her go free.

Carolyn Pressler writes:

The law of the enslaved daughter highlights the extensive authority a father has over his daughter. He may sell her into bondage. She is one of his economic assets; her economic worth is, first of all, her sexuality and her reproductive capacity. Because she is purchased for sexual purposes, the daughter, if sold, does not go free at the end of six years (Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, eds. Victor Matthews, Bernard Levinson, and Tikva Frymer-Kensky [1998], p. 162).

So, a master buys a young girl to be his slave. She has no rights of her own but belongs now to her master. When her master has sex with the slave girl is it rape? Rape is defined as: unlawful sexual activity and usually sexual intercourse carried out forcibly or under threat of injury against the will usually of a female or with a person who is beneath a certain age or incapable of valid consent.

Even if the girl were to give her consent, it would still be rape because as a slave she is incapable of valid consent. A slave has no will of her own. She is fully at the disposal of her master. As Martin Noth writes, only the man is a person, while the woman on the other hand is a possession. (Exodus: A Commentary, 1962, p. 177). The slave laws are unquestionably written from an androcentric perspective. The presumed audience is male. ... Women are referred to in these text as objects of men's claims and obligations (Pressler, p. 160).

Now I can hear some apologist saying that the slave girl actually becomes the wife of her master with all of the privileges that entails. That is simply not true. As Pressler points out:

Three factors indicate that the daughter assigned to her master (v.8) or his son (v.9) was regarded as a slave rather than a "full wife" or "free wife." First, the drafters of Exod. 21:7-11 carefully use terminology that distinguished the girl from a free wife. . . . she is called an 'amah (אמה) not an 'ishshah (אשה). She is sold (makar--מכר), not given in marriage (nathan--נתן) The purchaser is referred to as her master or owner ('adown--אדון), not her husband (ba`al--בעל).

Secondly, if her master dislikes her, he causes her to be redeemed; if he deprives her of food, clothing, or oil (?), he must let her go free for no payment. Redemption and letting go free are ways of speaking about the manumission of slaves, not the divorce of a wife. . . .

Thirdly, the view that the girl is a free wife rather than a slave wife is based largely on v. 9, which accords her the customary rights of a daughter, and v. 11, which requires her master to provide her with clothing, food and oil (?). Neither phrase demonstrates that the 'amah (אמה) has the status of a free wife (pp. 163-64).

Since God only regulates this practice and does not forbid it, it seems crystal clear that the God of the Bible is condoning rape. More instances of God condoning rape will be seen in the next post.