Carl Trueman on the Connection Between Martin Luther and the Holocaust

Carl Trueman is a Reformed theologian and Church historian. He teaches at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Recently on his blog (Pt. 1, Pt. 2, Pt. 3), he made an attempt to deny any connection between the anti-Semitism displayed by the German reformer Martin Luther and the holocaust in 20th century Nazi Germany. Some historians have argued that Luther's views as enunciated in his 1543 treatise, On the Jews and Their Lies, were instrumental in bringing about the Holocaust 400 years later in Nazi Germany (see for example, Hector Avalos's chapter in The Christian Delusion [ed. John W. Loftus] entitled, "Atheism Was Not The Cause Of The Holocaust."

Trueman's argument is threefold. First, he maintains that Luther's ideas were formed and shaped by his times and were not unusual for his day. Trueman writes:

In fact, sad though it is to acknowledge, the 1543 tirade against the Jews is pretty typical of medieval and Renaissance rants against Judaism. Of course, nasty comments about Jews are the stock in trade of Christian writers right back to the Apostolic Fathers of the late first and early second centuries (e.g., The Didache; the Martyrdom of Polycarp); but by the late Middle Ages anti-Jewish diatribes were something of an established form, with their own themes and idioms. Looked at in this way, Luther is not actually doing anything unusual.

Trueman is correct. The anti-Jewish sentiment displayed by Christians during Luther's time was not anything new. Not only did it go back to the Apostolic Fathers as Trueman admits but it goes all the way back to the New Testament itself. The author of Matthew has the Jews saying: "His blood be on us and on our children!" (Matt. 27:25). In the book of Acts, the Christians consistently blame the Jews for the death of Jesus (Acts 2:23; 3:13-14; 5:30; 10:39, etc). Jews have been called "Christ-killers" since the first century.

How the fact that Luther is reflecting the thought of his times excuses him, Trueman never says. Luther was bold enough to stand against the current theological and ecclesiastical thought of his times, why couldn't he take a stand on this matter as well?

Trueman's second line of defense for Luther involves the fact that Luther's hatred for the Jews was inspired by religious issues and not racial ones. He asks the question:

Did he [Luther] write against Jews because he was racist in the modern sense? The answer is no. Race as we think of it today is really a concept of relatively modern provenance, something that arguably emerges in the nineteenth century as interest grew in biology, evolution etc. The ideology of the Holocaust was undoubtedly racist in this sense: the Nuremberg laws of 1935, which effectively paved the way in judicial terms for what became the Final Solution, made it clear that conversion to Christianity did not exempt someone: for the Nazis the matter was one of blood (albeit built on completely fallacious science) not of religion. For Luther, however, Judaism was a religious category. he had no real grasp of racial identity and no concern for the kind of racial issues which dominated Nazi ideology.

I would agree that Luther's attitude towards the Jews was inspired more by religious issues than racial ones but does that really matter? Is it any more palatable to mistreat and abuse people because of their religion than it is because of their race? The mistreatment is the problem not the reason underlying it. While the Nazi's and Luther may have had different motivations underlying their hatred for the Jews, the fact is that they were in agreement on their hatred.

The third line of defense for Luther is that he was caught up in a faulty eschatological scheme according to Trueman:

The reason lies with Luther's understanding of the times in which he was living. Scholars have become increasingly aware over the years that Luther is part of a late medieval culture of eschatological expectancy. To put it simply: he thought his rediscovery of the gospel was a sign that history was about to end, with the triumph of the church and the return of Christ.

This connects to his early attitude to the Jews. The 1523 treatise was written in the context of great hope for the gospel, and his advice then is to reach out to them as positively as possible, to win them for Christ. When we move forward to 1543, by contrast, Luther is old, ill, and, above all, disillusioned both by the divisions among the Reformers and the way in which the gospel has not carried all before it. In such a context, he looks for those who are responsible; and, among them, he sees the Jews, those who have the Holy Scriptures but who adamantly refuse to see Christ therein. It is this that drives him to write such a bombastically bitter and hateful treatise against them.

Once again, I fail to see how this excuses Luther. The fact that he believed the end was near suddenly makes it okay for him to call for the mistreatment and abuse of the Jews?

Trueman's purpose in his blog series seems to be to eliminate any connection between Luther's treatise on the Jews and the holocaust implemented by the Nazis. He is correct that the motivations were not precisely the same as the Nazi's, and in fairness to Luther, he did not advocate the extermination of the Jews as did Hitler, but it seems to me indisputable that Luther's writings, as well as the long tradition of anti-Semitism displayed by Christianity, laid the foundation for the awful treatment of the Jews demonstrated by the Nazis. As Avalos makes clear in his article, there is a much stronger connection between Christianity and the holocaust than there is between atheism and the holocaust.

The Christian Delusion: Chapter Fourteen--Atheism Was Not The Cause Of The Holocaust

In chapter 14 of the book, The Christian Delusion (ed. John Loftus), Hector Avalos returns to deal with one of the arguments often put forward by Christians, namely, that atheist regimes have been responsible for killing many more people than Christian groups ever have. One of the more recent Christians to make that argument is Dinesh D’Souza in his book, What’s So Great About Christianity. In this chapter entitled, "Atheism Was Not The Cause Of The Holocaust," Avalos demolishes D’Souza’s arguments and exposes his sloppy scholarship.

With regard to the violence under Communist regimes, particularly the one of Josef Stalin, Avalos writes:

Most of Stalinist violence resulted from forced collectivization, and recently published documents show the complicity of church authorities in the Stalinist agenda. . . . Moreover, communism, in the sense of a system of collectivized property, is a biblical notion found already in Acts 4:32-37. That Christian communist system also results in the killing of a married couple (Acts 5:1-11) that reneged on their promise to surrender their property. Thus, the principle of killing those who did not conform to collectivization of property is already a biblical one (pp. 368-69).

The truth is that Stalin's violence, as well as that of the Maoist regime in China and other communist governments, had much more to do with their need to harness power and control of their countries than it did with their atheism.

Another argument put forth by D’Souza is that atheism is far worse than Christianity due to the much larger numbers killed under atheistic regimes. Avalos responds: But if, as D’Souza seems to think, genocide is always evil, then the numbers don’t matter as much as does the principle. If D’Souza does not think that genocide is always evil, then he is no less a moral relativist than atheists, and now we would have only his arbitrary reasons for justifying it (p. 371). A murderer's crime is not mitigated by the fact that he only killed one person instead of more. In addition, Avalos points out that the numbers are irrelevant anyway because the goal of Christians in some instances was to kill all they could find of a particular group. The fact that they were only able to round-up a certain number does not impact the immorality of their action. Avalos says: Consider that by D’Souza’s admission, Christian witch-hunts killed some 100,000 persons in Europe. . . . we might have had 10 million witches killed if witch-hunters had managed to find and kill that many. (p. 371).

Another favorite claim of Christian apologists, such as D’Souza, is that the Nazi regime under Hitler was anti-religious and its atrocities were influenced by Darwinism and atheism. This is simply false as Avalos shows. Hitler’s own writings demonstrate that he was influenced, not by atheism nor even Darwinism, but by Christianity in his desire to exterminate the Jews. Avalos cites the Catholic historian Jose Sanchez: “There is little question that the Holocaust had its origin in the centuries-long hostility felt by Christians against Jews” (Pius XII and the Holocaust, p. 70, cited by Avalos, p. 372).

In an especially damning revelation, Avalos shows how Hitler’s plan against the Jews models precisely the plan that Martin Luther, the German Reformer, had enunciated in 1543 (On the Jews and Their Lies).

Luther wrote:

What shall we Christians do with this rejected and condemned people, the Jews? . . . I shall give you my sincere advice:

First, to set fire to their synagogues or schools and to bury and cover with dirt whatever will not burn, so that no man will ever again see a stone or cinder of them. This is to be done in honor of our Lord and of Christendom, so that God might see that we are Christians, and do not condone or knowingly tolerate such public lying, cursing, and blaspheming of his Son and of his Christians. . . .

Second, I advise that their houses also be razed and destroyed. . . .

Third, I advise that all their prayer books and Talmudic writings, in which such idolatry, lies, cursing, and blasphemy are taught, be taken from them.

Fourth, I advise that their rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on pain of loss of life and limb. . . .

Fifth, I advise that safe-conduct on the highways be abolished completely for the Jews.

Sixth, I advise that usury be prohibited to them, and that all cash and treasure of silver and gold be taken from them and put aside for safekeeping. . . .

Seventh, I recommend putting a flail, an ax, a hoe, a spade, a distaff, or a spindle into the hands of young, strong Jews and Jewesses and letting them earn their bread in the sweat of their brow, as was imposed on the children of Adam (Gen. 3 [:19]). (cited by Avalos, pp. 372-73).

As Avalos points out: Every single point in Luther’s plan was implemented by Nazi policy. In Mein Kampf (trans. Ralph Manheim, 1971, p. 213 cited by Avalos, p. 373), Hitler called Luther one of the greatest men who ever lived, hardly what one would expect an atheist to say.

Avalos quotes Guenter Lewy, the famed Holocaust historian, “Hitler was merely doing what the Church had done for 1,500 years” (The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, p. 51 cited by Avalos, p. 375). Avalos adds: Hitler simply had much better logistics and technology to do what some Medieval Christians wanted to do to the Jews (p. 375). In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote: Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator; by defending myself against the Jews, I am fighting for the work of the Lord (p. 65 cited by Avalos, p. 375).

Avalos cites a report that as of 1938, the Nazi SS was made up of 51.4% Catholic, 22.7% Protestant and 25.7% God-believers (Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945, p. 221 cited by Avalos, p. 376). That would leave less than 2/10th's of one percent who did not believe in God.

Avalos also refutes the claim that Hitler’s genocides were motivated by Darwinism. He says that Darwinism taught “natural selection,” whereas, Hitler practiced “artificial selection” (p. 387). Mein Kampf reveals that Hitler’s racist attitudes came from his understanding of the Bible not from Darwin. Hitler wrote: “. . . it is one of those concerning which it is said with such terrible justice that the sins of the fathers are avenged down to the tenth generation . . . Blood sin and desecration of the race are the original sin in this world . . .” (p. 249, cited by Avalos, p. 387).

Where did Hitler derive this idea? From the Bible, specifically Deut. 23:2-3:

No one born of a forbidden marriage nor any of his descendants may enter the assembly of the Lord, even down to the tenth generation. No Ammonite or Moabite or any of his descendants may enter the assembly of the Lord, even down to the tenth generation (see also Ezra 9:1-12).

Thus, Avalos shows conclusively that Hitler’s motivation to kill the Jews came from Christian sources. To claim, as many Christian apologists do, that Hitler’s atrocities were due to atheism or Darwinism is completely contradicted by the historical evidence.

The Christian Delusion: Chapter Eight--Yahweh is a Moral Monster

Chapter Eight in The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails, (ed.John W. Loftus) is entitled, "Yahweh is a Moral Monster," by Hector Avalos, a former evangelical and current Professor of Religious Studies at Iowa State University. Avalos' essay is an answer to the article "Is Yahweh a Moral Monster? The New Atheists and Old Testament Ethics," (Philosophia Christi 10 [2008]: 7-37), by Paul Copan, President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society.

Dr. Avalos has a Ph.D. from Harvard University and is a prolific author. He has written numerous journal articles and eight books including: The End of Biblical Studies (2007), This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies (Editor, 2007), Strangers in Our Own Land: Religion in U.S. Latina/o Literature (2005), Fighting Words: The Origins Of Religious Violence (2005), Introduction to the U.S. Latina and Latino Religious Experience, (Editor, 2004), Se puede saber si Dios existe? [Can One Know if God Exists?] (2003), Health Care and the Rise of Christianity (1999), Illness and Health Care in the Ancient Near East: The Role of the Temple in Greece, Mesopotamia, and Israel (1995).

Paul Copan in his article, "Is Yahweh a Moral Monster," attempted to defend the integrity and virtue of his God in spite of the moral atrocities in the OT attributed to Yahweh. Atrocities such as genocide and slavery. Avalos shows why Copan's attempt fails.

1. Copan's position presupposes the moral superiority of his particular religion.

Avalos writes:

The religiocentric and ethnocentric biases of Copan play a fundamental role in how he evaluates other religions. Copan preselects the standards of his religion, and then just simply judges other religions by that standard. He is actually relying on a moral relativism that could be used to establish the superiority of any standard. For example, if we, as Americans, value freedom of religion, then it is clear that biblical law is inferior to that of other Near Eastern systems. One could easily argue that the denial of religious freedom is at the “moral heart” of the OT. It is the very first of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20:3: "You shall have no other gods before me.”

The intolerance of other religions is found in every single one of the biblical books. This includes: 1) commands to destroy the temples and property of other religions (e.g., Deut. 7, 2 Kings 23); 2) destruction of the “clergy” of other religions (1 Kings 18:40), 3) consistent commands not to worship other gods (e.g., Exodus 20:3), 4)laws requiring the outright murder of any Hebrew exercising religious freedom (e.g., Deut. 13:1-16; 17:2-5; Exodus 22:18).

In contrast, most Near Eastern religions valued religious diversity, and allowed the worship of almost any god people chose. This freedom to worship would actually be more consistent with American ideals than with anything in the Bible. By the standard which attempts to maximize freedom of religion, the Bible is a setback for humanity, not an advance(pp. 220-21).

So, if Paul Copan and other evangelical apologists are right, the founders of our nation were wrong to insist upon religious freedom. Assuming the moral superiority of his religion demands that Copan follow one of the foremost principles of his religion, namely, that false religion should not be tolerated. It is interesting that Christian zealots are constantly wanting to place the Ten Commandments in public venues in the United States. Of course, the first two commandments of the ten denies religious freedom.

2. Copan's position contradicts the Christian claim that all human beings are made in the image of God.

Avalos argues:

First, the genocide of the Canaanites flies in the face of Copan’s touting of the concept of humans being created in the image of god (Imago Dei)as a superior aspect of biblical ethics. He remarks: "Even more fundamentally, human beings have been created in God's image as co-rulers with God over creation (Gen. 1:26-7; Ps. 8)unlike the ANE mindset, in which the earthly king was the image-bearer of the gods. The imago Dei establishes the fundamental equality of human beings, despite the ethnocentrism and practice of slavery within Israel." Yet, biblical narratives clearly show that the imago Dei matters very little in ensuring human equality (pp. 222-23).

The fact that the Canaanites were supposedly made in the image of God didn't seem to make any difference to Yahweh or the Israelites. It didn't prevent the Canaanites from being slaughtered as if they were mere animals.

3. Copan's position is based on a religious faith-claim.

Avalos points out:

Copan’s main defense is a faith claim. He remarks: "First, Israel would not have been justified to attack the Canaanites without Yahweh's explicit command. Yahweh issued his command in light of a morally-sufficient reason-the incorrigible wickedness of Canaanite culture... if God exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life? The new atheists seem to think that if God existed, he should have a status no higher than any human being." Of course, this assumes that Yahweh exists and has the authority to kill women and children. Copan is accepting the faith claim of the biblical author.
By this logic, if Allah exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life? Indeed, a jihadist Muslim could say that Allah has the authority to wipe out all Americans because they are incorrigible and wicked. Of course, these jihadists might also feel entitled to use their own definition of “wicked” and “incorrigible” no less so than Copan (p. 223)

If the actions of human beings are to be morally evaluated by the faith claims of their particular religion, then how can one say that Muslims are wrong to commit terroristic acts, that Mormons are wrong to practice polygamy, that David Koresh was wrong to have sex with minor children, that Jim Jones was wrong to order his followers to commit suicide, etc. In each case mentioned above, the adherents of the specific religion would argue that their actions were moral based upon the precepts of their religion. It seems that one must be able to evaluate the morality of actions based on something that is beyond the faith claims of a specific religion.

4. Copan's position is based on one-sided information.

As Avalos remarks:

We must also recall that all the supposed crimes and wickedness of the Canaanite is being narrated by their enemies, the biblical authors. Over and over, we see Copan applying words such as “morally decadent,” “wicked,” to Canaanites because he is accepting the judgments of biblical authors. In any case, Copan’s procedure would be analogous to using only the pronouncements of Osama bin Laden to judge American culture(p. 224).

This is precisely correct. All the evidence that we have concerning the supposed incorrigible immorality of the Canaanites comes from their enemies, namely, the Israelites. Since we know that typically enemies tend to demonize their opposition as justification for going to war, how do we know that we can accept what the biblical authors say at face value?

5. Copan's position is contradictory.

Avalos continues:

One can see that Copan seems not to value life as much as he claims. Apparently, the value of practicing the right religion supersedes the value of life. Copan wants to kill women and children to save them from corrupt and wicked practices, but he does not see the killing of women and children as itself a “corrupt” or “wicked” practice (p. 225).

It is the height of hypocrisy to punish the Canaanites for practicing child sacrifice by killing their children. In addition, many scholars see child sacrfice as being practiced by the early Hebrews themselves. Indeed, in Genesis 22, Abraham seems to presume that child sacrifice is not an impossible request, and it is the substitution of the ram that is unexpected. For most of biblical history, Yahweh was not against child sacrifice "per se," but rather against child sacrifice to other gods (p. 227).

6. Copan's position prefers infanticide over birth-control.

Avalos states:

Moreover, Copan assumes that his omnipotent god could find no other alternative than to slaughter children to accomplish the purpose of preventing their corruption. Yet, Yahweh was believed to cause sterility in women (see Genesis 20:17-18). So, Yahweh could have sterilized Canaanite women supernaturally, and the problem would be solved in a generation or two. No need to kill children with this procedure (p. 225).

7. Copan's position is itself an example of moral relativism.

Avalos says:

For a Christian apologist to think he or she has triumphed by pointing out the moral relativism of the New Atheism is to miss the entire point. As an atheist, I don’t deny that I am a moral relativist. Rather, my aim is to expose the fact that Christians are also moral relativists. Indeed, when it comes to ethics, there are only two types of people in this world:

1. Those who admit they are moral relativists.
2. Those who do not admit they are moral relativists.

Copan fails because he cannot admit that he is a moral relativist, and he thinks that God will solve the problem of moral relativism. But having a God in a moral system only creates a tautology. All we end up saying is: “X is bad because X is bad.” Thus, if we say that we believe in God, and he says idolatry is evil, then that is a tautology: “God says idolatry is bad and so idolatry is bad because God says it is bad.” Or we end up using this tautology: “Whatever God says is good because whatever God says is good.”

As Kai Nielsen deftly argues, human beings are always the ultimate judges of morality even if we believe in God. After all, the very judgment that God is good is a human judgment. The judgment that what God commands is good is also a human judgment. So Christians are not doing anything different except to mystify and complicate morality. Christians are simply projecting what they call “good” onto a supernatural being. They offer us no evidence that their notion of good comes from outside of themselves. And that is where the danger lies. Basing a moral system on unverifiable supernatural beings only creates more violence and endangers our species (pp. 232-33).

8. Copan's "Christian morality" is inferior to "atheistic morality."

Avalos argues:

Speaking only for myself here, I can say that atheism offers a much better way to construct moral rules. We can construct them on the basis of verifiable common interests, known causes, and known consequences. There is an iron-clad difference between secular and faith-based morality, and we can illustrate it very simply with these propositions:

A. I have to kill person X because Allah said so.
B. I have to kill person X because he is pointing a gun at me.

In case A, we commit violence on the basis of unverifiable premises. In case B, we might commit violence on the basis of verifiable premises (I can verify a gun exists, and that it is pointed at me). If I am going to kill or be killed, I want it to be a for a reason that I can verify to be true. If the word “moral” describes the set of practices that accord with our values, and if our highest value is life, then it is always immoral to trade real human lives for something that does not exist or cannot be verified to exist. What does not exist has no value relative to what does exist. What cannot be proven to exist should never be placed above what does exist. If we value life, then you should never trade something that exists, especially life, for something that does not exist or cannot be proven to exist. That is why it would always be immoral to ever take a human life on the basis of faith claims. It is that simple (pp. 233-34).

So, in this chapter Avalos demonstrates that Yahweh, the God of the Christians, is in fact a moral monster. He concludes:

What is tragic is that in the twenty-first century a Copan can still defend genocide and infanticide in any form. What is still unbelievable is that a Copan can say that killing women and children is sometimes good. It is that sort of frightening biblical moral ethos that makes the New Atheism more attractive all the time (p. 234).

Hector Avalos on the Canaanite Genocide

I have recently been made aware of, my friend and fellow former evangelical, Hector Avalos' response to Paul Copan's article, Is Yahweh a Moral Monster. Avalos delivers a devastating critique of Copan's arguments. I understand that a revised version of Hector's article will be published in the forthcoming book, The Christian Delusion, ed. by John Loftus.

I want to share some of the more salient points made by Avalos in his critique of Copan. The entire article is available here.

1. Copan's position presupposes the moral superiority of his particular religion.

Avalos writes:

The religiocentric and ethnocentric biases of Dr. Copan play a fundamental role in how he evaluates other religions. Dr. Copan preselects the standards of his religion, and then just simply judges other religions by that standard.

Dr. Copan is actually relying on a moral relativism that could be used to establish the superiority of any standard. For example, if we, as Americans, value freedom of religion, then it is clear that biblical law is inferior to that of other Near Eastern systems.

One could easily argue that the denial of religious freedom is at the “moral heart” of the Old Testament. It is the very first of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20:3: "You shall have no other gods before me.”

The intolerance of other religions is found in every single one of the biblical books. This includes: a) commands to destroy the temples and property of other religions (e.g., Deut. 7, 2 Kings 23); b) Destruction of the “clergy” of other religions (1 Kings 18:40); c) Consistent commands not to worship other gods (e.g., Exodus 20:3)....

In contrast, most Near Eastern religions valued religious diversity, and allowed the worship of almost any god people chose. This freedom to worship would actually be more consistent with American ideals than with anything in the Bible. By the standard which attempts to maximize freedom of religion, the Bible is a setback for humanity, not an advance.

So, if Paul Copan and other evangelical apologists are right, the founders of our nation were wrong to insist upon religious freedom. Assuming the moral superiority of his religion demands that Copan follow one of the foremost principles of his religion, namely, that false religion should not be tolerated. It is interesting that Christian zealots are constantly wanting to place the Ten Commandments in public venues in the United States. Of course, the first two commandments of the ten denies religious freedom.

2. Copan's position contradicts the Christian claim that all human beings are made in the image of God.

Avalos argues:

First, the genocide of the Canaanites flies in the face of Dr. Copan’s touting of the concept of humans being created in the image of god as a superior aspect of biblical ethics. He remarks: "Even more fundamentally, human beings have been created in God's image as co-rulers with God over creation (Gen. 1:26-7; Ps. 8)unlike the ANE mindset, in which the earthly king was the image-bearer of the gods. The imago Dei establishes the fundamental equality of human beings, despite the ethnocentrism and practice of slavery within Israel." Yet, biblical narratives clearly show that the imago Dei matters very little in ensuring human equality.

The fact that the Canaanites were supposedly made in the image of God didn't seem to make any difference to Yahweh or the Israelites. It didn't prevent the Canaanites from being slaughtered as if they were mere animals.

3. Copan's position is based on a religious faith-claim.

Avalos points out:

Dr. Copan’s main defense is a faith claim. He remarks: "First, Israel would not have been justified to attack the Canaanites without Yahweh's explicit command. Yahweh issued his command in light of a morally-sufficient reason-the incorrigible wickedness of Canaanite culture... if God exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life? The new atheists seem to think that if God existed, he should have a status no higher than any human being." Of course, this assumes that Yahweh exists and has the authority to kill women and children. Dr. Copan is accepting the faith claim of the biblical author.

By this logic, if Allah exists, does he have any prerogatives over human life? Indeed, a jihadist Muslim could say that Allah has the authority to wipe out all Americans because they are incorrigible and wicked. Of course, these jihadists might also feel entitled to use their own definition of “wicked” and “incorrigible” no less so than Dr. Copan.

If the actions of human beings are to be morally evaluated by the faith claims of their particular religion, then how can one say that Muslims are wrong to commit terroristic acts, that Mormons are wrong to practice polygamy, that David Koresh was wrong to have sex with minor children, that Jim Jones was wrong to order his followers to commit suicide, etc. In each case mentioned above, the adherents of the specific religion would argue that their actions were moral based upon the precepts of their religion. It seems that one must be able to evaluate the morality of actions based on something that is beyond the faith claims of a specific religion.

4. Copan's position is based on one-sided information.

As Avalos remarks:

We must also recall that all the supposed crimes and wickedness of the Canaanite is being narrated by their enemies, the biblical authors. Over and over, we see Dr. Copan applying words such as “morally decadent,” “wicked,” to Canaanites because he is accepting the judgments of biblical authors. In any case, Dr. Copan’s procedure would be analogous to using only the pronouncements of Osama bin Laden to judge American culture.

This is precisely correct. All the evidence that we have concerning the supposed incorrigible immorality of the Canaanites comes from their enemies, namely, the Israelites. Since we know that typically enemies tend to demonize their opposition as justification for going to war, how do we know that we can accept what the biblical authors say at face value?

5. Copan's position is contradictory.

Avalos continues:

One can see that Dr. Copan seems not to value life as much as he claims. Apparently, the value of practicing the right religion supersedes the value of life. Dr. Copan wants to kill women and children to save them from corrupt and wicked practices, but he does not see the killing of women and children as itself a “corrupt” or “wicked” practice.

As I have pointed out in a previous post, it is the height of hypocrisy to punish the Canaanites for practicing child sacrifice by killing their children.

6. Copan's position prefers infanticide over birth-control.

Avalos writes:

Moreover, Dr. Copan assumes that his omnipotent god could find no other alternative than to slaughter children to accomplish the purpose of preventing their corruption.

Yet, Yahweh was believed to cause sterility in women (see Genesis 20:17-18). So, Yahweh could have sterilized Canaanite women supernaturally, and the problem would be solved in a generation or two. No need to kill children with this procedure.

7. Copan's position is itself an example of moral relativism.

Avalos says:

For a Christian apologist to think he or she has triumphed by pointing out the moral relativism of the New Atheism is to miss the entire point.

As an atheist, I don’t deny that I am a moral relativist. Rather, my aim is to expose the fact that Christians are also moral relativists. Indeed, when it comes to ethics, there are only two types of people in this world:

A. Those who admit they are moral relativists;
B. Those who do not admit they are moral relativists.

Dr. Copan fails because he cannot admit that he is a moral relativist, and he thinks that God will solve the problem of moral relativism.

But having a God in a moral system only creates a tautology. All we end up saying is: “X is bad because X is bad.” Thus, if we say that we believe in God, and he says idolatry is evil, then that is a tautology: “God says idolatry is bad and so idolatry is bad because God says it is bad.” Or we end up using this tautology: “Whatever God says is good because whatever God says is good.”

As Kai Nielsen (Ethics Without God [1992]) deftly argues, human beings are always the ultimate judges of morality even if we believe in God. After all, the very judgment that God is good is a human judgment. The judgment that what God commands is good is also a human judgment.

Christians are not doing anything different except to mystify and complicate morality. Christians are simply projecting what they call “good” unto a supernatural being. They offer us no evidence that their notion of good comes from outside of themselves.

And that is where the danger lies. Basing a moral system on unverifiable supernatural beings only creates more violence and endangers our species.

8. Copan's "Christian morality" is inferior to "atheistic morality."

Avalos aruges:

Speaking only for myself here, I can say that atheism offers a much better way to construct moral rules. We can construct them on the basis of verifiable common interests, known causes, and known consequences. There is an iron-clad difference between secular and faith-based morality, and we can illustrate it very simply with these propositions:

A. I have to kill person X because Allah said so;
B. I have to kill person X because he is pointing a gun at me.

In case A, we commit violence on the basis of unverifiable premises. In case B, we might commit violence on the basis of verifiable premises (I can verify a gun exists, and that it is pointed at me). If I am going to kill or be killed, I want it to be a for a reason that I can verify to be true.

If the word “moral” describes the set of practices that accord with our values, and if our highest value is life, then it is always immoral to trade real human lives for something that does not exist or cannot be verified to exist.

What does not exist has no value relative to what does exist. What cannot be proven to exist should never be placed above what does exist. If we value life, then you should never trade something that exists, especially life, for something that does not exist or cannot be proven to exist. That is why it would always be immoral to ever take a human life on the basis of faith claims. It is that simple.