Is Christ held vicariously liable for our sins?--From Sola Ratione

I have discovered a blog, Sola Ratione, which has some good posts on the penal substitutionary theory of the atonement. With the author's permission, I am going to re-post them here. This one is entitled: Is Christ held vicariously liable for our sins?

"I remember once sharing the Gospel with a businessman. When I explained that Christ had died to pay the penalty for our sins, he responded, "Oh, yes, that's imputation." I was stunned, as I never expected this theological concept to be familiar to this non-Christian businessman. When I asked him how he came to be familiar with this idea, he replied, "Oh, we use imputation all the time in the insurance business." He explained to me that certain sorts of insurance policy are written so that, for example, if someone else drives my car and gets in an accident, the responsibility is imputed to me rather than to the driver. Even though the driver behaved recklessly, I am the one held liable; it is just as if I had done it. Now this is parallel to substitutionary atonement. Normally I would be liable for the misdeeds I have done. But through my faith in Christ, I am, as it were, covered by his divine insurance policy, whereby he assumes the liability for my actions. My sin is imputed to him, and he pays its penalty. The demands of justice are fulfilled, just as they are in mundane affairs in which someone pays the penalty for something imputed to him. This is as literal a transaction as those that transpire regularly in the insurance industry." - W. L. Craig, "Question 122, Subject: Penal Theory of the Atonement."

Craig is right to say that the owner of a car can be held vicariously liable for any negligence committed by someone to whom they have loaned their car. But what he omits to mention is that the driver must be using the car primarily for the purpose of performing a task for the owner.

For this kind of imputation to work as a parallel to substitutionary atonement, then, it would have to be the case that when we commit sins, we are acting primarily so as to achieve the purposes of Jesus Christ! Only then could he rightly be held liable for our sinful actions.

Don't think that one is going to work too well!

This kind of 'test' is also used when imputing liability to a corporation for the acts of its employees. A corporation can be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees only if (1) the employee acted within the scope of their employment; (2) their actions, at least partly, benefited the corporation; and (3) it would be reasonable to impute the employee's acts and intentions to the corporation.

None of these three conditions find a parallel in the doctrine of penal substitution. Quite the opposite in fact.

(1) When we sin, we are acting against what it is that God has demanded of us. (2) It is hard to see how our sinfulness could, even partly, be said to 'benefit' Jesus Christ. (3) It could never be reasonable to impute our sinful acts or our sinful intentions to Christ himself, since he is, by definition, incapable of sin.

Does Anyone Really Teach that the Hebrew Verb Bara' (ברא) Demands Creation Ex Nihilo?

In response to a prior post , dealing with the Hebrew verb Bara'
(ברא), I had a couple of comments that seemed to say that no knowledgable person would ever argue that Bara' (ברא) demands creation ex nihilo . However, listen to the apologist Hugh Ross, in an article entitled: Big Bang - The Bible Taught It First!: The Hebrew verb translated “created” in Isaiah 42:5 is bara’ which has as its primary definition “bringing into existence something new, something that did not exist before.”7 His footnote cites: 7. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, and Bruce K. Waltke, Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament 1 (Chicago: Moody, 1980), 127.

Ross argues:

The first direct scientific evidence for a big bang universe dates back to 1916. . . . All these scientists, however, were upstaged by 2500 years and more by Job, Moses, David, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and other Bible authors. The Bible’s prophets and apostles stated explicitly and repeatedly the two most fundamental properties of the big bang, a transcendent cosmic beginning a finite time period ago and a universe undergoing a general, continual expansion. In Isaiah 42:5 both properties were declared, “This is what the Lord says—He who created the heavens and stretched them out.”

Many other Christian apologists, who accept an old earth creation view (OEC), argue similarly, including William Craig in the Reasonable Faith, pp. 111ff. Interestingly enough, there is an Orthodox Jewish scholar Gerald Schroeder who uses the same type of arguments as Hugh Ross and William Craig. Schroeder, who has a Ph.D. from MIT in nuclear physics, has written, Genesis and the Big Bang: The Discovery Of Harmony Between Modern Science And The Bible and The Science of God: The Convergence of Scientific and Biblical Wisdom .

So, the notion that only some proof-texting uneducated person holds these views is simply mistaken.

Does Genesis Teach the Big Bang?

William Craig and other apologists claim that the veracity of the Bible has been verified by science in that the big bang is described in Genesis 1 (see Creation and Big Bang Cosmology ). Craig maintains that for centuries Christians held that the universe had a definite time in which it began even though science seemed to say otherwise. In the 20th century, with the rise of the big bang cosmology, the Christian view of origins, was validated by science.

But does Genesis 1 really teach that the universe was created ex nihilo (out of nothing)? Craig maintains that it does and since an effect must have a cause, the universe must have been caused by a necessary and uncaused being, namely God.

Genesis 1:1-2 states: In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters (NIV).

Stephen C. Meyer, one of the founders of the Intelligent Design movement, in an article on the Institute for Biblical & Scientific Studies website argues:

The opening paragraph of Genesis depicts the situation before creation begins in verse 3. It does not tell us the ultimate origin of the darkness or the abyss. I think Delitzsch is correct in the meaning of the first verse when he says, "His point is not that heaven and earth had a beginning, but that the creation of the heaven and the earth was the beginning of all history" (Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11, 1994, p. 98).

Meyer maintains that creation ex nihilo was not taught until the 2nd century CE. He writes:

The first mention of "out of nothing" is in 2 Maccabees 7:28 which says, "look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing, and mankind also" (Douay Version, or DV). The Greek is "ex ouk onton." This phrase "out of nothing" is best understood as "out of non-being" or "out of invisible matter" because at that time they still believed in the preexistence of matter. Matter was consider eternal (Goldstein, 1983, pp. 307-10). The Wisdom of Solomon 11:17 states, "For thy almighty hand which made the world of matter without form" (DV). This verse teaches that God made the world out of formless (eternal) matter (Winston, 1971-2, 185-202; Goldstein, 1984, 127-35). In chapter 7:25 wisdom is seen as a "pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God" (DV). Philo sees Genesis 1:1-3 through platonic eyes. This is the creation of the invisible world of ideas (On the Creation, 26-37, compare Plato’s Timaeus 29E). The book of Hebrews also seems to follow platonic ideas. The visible world comes from invisible matter (Heb. 11:3). Philo sees preexistent matter alongside of God at the beginning. This invisible matter was eternal (On the Creation, 12). God is the active principle, the formless matter is the passive principle (May, 10). Philo even uses the phrase "ek mh ontwn," meaning "out of non-being," and not "out of nothing" (Allegorical Interpretation III. 10). Clearly, there is no ex nihilo creation in Philo. . . . May concludes, "a firm, unambiguously formulated doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is not worked out in ancient Jewry" (1994, 23).

Another great Jewish thinker who came after Maimonides was Gersonides (1288-1344 AD) Gersonides asked some probing questions like "When were the waters created?" Because there was no mention in Genesis of the creation of water, he rejected the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (Burrell and McGinn, 6; Staub, 1982). The early church fathers seem to believe the platonic idea of eternal matter from which God fashioned the world. Justin Martyr is an example. In The First Apology of Justin he says, "He in the beginning did of His goodness, for man’s sake, created all things out of unformed matter" (Chapter 10). Justin and Plato in Timaeus both agree that everything came into being through God (Apology I:20, 4). Justin says that Plato took his ideas about God making the world out of unformed matter from Genesis. Justin states, "Plato borrowed his statement that God, having altered matter which was shapeless, made the world (Apology I:59). The world was made out of preexistent matter. The successor of Justin Martyr was Athenagoras who was an Athenian philosopher who became a Christian. His Apology or Embassy was presented to Emperors Aurelius and Commodus about 177 AD. He explicitly believed in the pre-existence of matter (Chadwick 1966, 12, 47). Clement of Alexandria three times "declares that the world is made 'out of nothing', but in each case the phrase he employs is "ek me ontos," not "ex ouk ontos;" that is to say, it is made not from that which is absolutely non-existent, but from relative non-being or unformed matter" (Chadwick 1966, 46). May in his book Creatio ex Nihilo argues very persuasively for the second century AD development of the doctrine of "creation out of nothing" (1994). It was not until the second century AD that the church fathers saw a theological problem with eternal matter. It was their conflict with the Gnostic and middle platonists that developed the idea of God creating "out of nothing."

Meyer maintains that it is misguided to try to find scientific information in the Genesis account. He says:

I see Genesis one as a polemic against the surrounding heathen nations, who worshipped many gods. It also seems to be etiologically in nature, explaining the Sabbath as a day of rest. One must understand the ancient Near Eastern background in order to properly interpret Genesis. The genre of Genesis one seems to be half way between poetry and prose. Cassuto argues that Genesis one goes back to an original poetic prototype (1961, 8, 10). Genesis two seems to reflect an earlier tradition than Genesis one. Genesis one demythologizes ancient creation stories. I see it as wrong to try to draw out scientific data about the creation of the universe from Genesis one. Both young-earth creationists and old-earth creationists are guilty of pouring modern scientific terms back into Genesis. God could have written in scientific terms like E=Mc2, but He did not. I believe God had to accommodate himself to our limited knowledge, and limited language to communicate with us. God did not choose to use technical scientific terms to communicate with us. God used the common language, and familiar phrases of their day. God could have told us that the sun does not rise nor set, but that the earth is spinning around the sun. God instead used the common language of sunrise and sunset which was literal to the writers back then, but which modern concordists excuse as phenomenal language that we still use today. God is trying to communicate absolute spiritual truths, not shifting scientific theories.

Meyer maintains that Genesis 1:1 can be seen as a dependent clause or an independent clause. If it is an independent clause then it is a summary statement or heading for the story contained in Genesis 1:1-2:3. If it is a dependent clause, then it is modifying verses two and would be rendered something like this: Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters in the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth.

As a dependent clause, it would lend no credence to the idea of creation ex nihilo and as an independent clause, it doesn't have to indicate creation ex nihilo. Whether one takes Genesis 1:1 as a dependent or independent clause, one thing is certain, creation does not start until verse 3 with light .

Meyer further claims that the Hebrew word translated "create" (ברא, bara) does not demand creation ex nihilo as some have argued. He says the word

may come from the root which originally meant "to cut, or separate." Most of creating involved a separation of things. "bara" does not imply ex nihilo creation since it is used in parallel to "make" (New International Dictionary of OT Theology, 1997, Vol. 1, 731). . . . Van Leeuwen states, "This root begins in the OT with a theologically rich wordplay. But it also, in a punning way, accents the manner in which God gives order to his creation: he divides its various cosmic components from one another through a series of 'cuts or separation'" (Ibid., p. 732).

John Walton, Professor of OT at Wheaton College, agrees:

In the ancient world and in the Bible, something existed not when it had physical properties, but when it had been separated from other things, given a name and a role within an ordered system. This is a functional ontology rather than a material ontology. In this view, when something does not exist, it is lacking role, not lacking matter. Consequently, to create something (cause it to exist) means to give it a function, not material properties.

The Hebrew word translated “create” should be understood within a functional ontology—i.e., it means to assign a role or function. This is evident through a word study of the usage of the biblical term itself where the direct object of the verb is always a functional entity not a material object. Theologians of the past have concluded that since materials were never mentioned that it must mean manufacture of objects out of nothing. Alternatively, and preferably, it does not mention materials because it does not refer to manufacturing. Bara’ deals with functional origins, not material origins.

In Genesis 1:2 the “before” picture, as throughout the ancient Near East, is portrayed in non-functional, non-productive terms ("tohu" and "bohu") in which matter already exists. If this were an account of material origins, it would start with no matter. As an account of functional origins, it starts with no functions. ("Genesis 1 as Ancient Cosmology," The Bible and Interpretation).

If the word bara refers to cutting or separating, then Genesis 1:1-2 is saying that in the beginning God divided the heavens and the earth and darkness was over the face of the water . The first act of creating was in v. 3 when God said: Let there be light. Nothing is said in the passage about the ultimate origin of the heaven and the earth.

Thus, it seems that Craig is wrong in his assessment of the data. Genesis does not teach creation ex nihilo and therefore the big bang cosmology does nothing to validate the accuracy of the Bible.

Did the Disciples Hallucinate? -- Part Three

In a prior post, I referred to NT scholar Gerd Lüdemann's book What really happened to Jesus: a historical approach to the Resurrection. The book is a popularization of his more thorough treatment of the subject, The Resurrection of Christ: A Historical Inquiry . Ludeman is perhaps the best defender today of the hallucination theory among NT scholars. In 1997, William Craig debated Ludemann at Boston University. The debate turned into a book entitled: Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?: A Debate Between William Lane Craig and Gerd Ludemann .

Craig has also written an article, Visions of Jesus: A Critical Assessment of Gerd Lüdemann's Hallucination Hypothesis, which is available on his web site.

In the article, Craig gives his problems with the hallucination theory. First, he says that it lacks explanatory scope, i.e., the ability to explain all the factors associated with the resurrection. He writes:

This is the central failing of the Hallucination Hypothesis. Offered only as a way of explaining the post–mortem appearances of Jesus, its explanatory scope is too narrow because it offers nothing by way of explanation of the empty tomb. In order to explain the empty tomb, one must conjoin some independent hypothesis to the Hallucination Hypothesis.

If this is the central failing of the theory, then I think Craig is in trouble. Why should all the various details surrounding the resurrection as reported in the gospels have to be explained by one theory? In reality, the hallucination theory is part of a bigger theory that would include how the empty tomb legend developed. Craig's objection seems ludicrous. Reports of unusual phenomena are sometimes complicated, especially when more than one person is involved; to require that one explanation fit all the circumstances involved is absurd. For example, many different people report seeing UFO's. Must all of these be explained under one theory? They all saw a weather balloon? No, there is a multitude of different things that one could see that might make him think he is seeing a UFO.

Second, Craig maintains that the hallucination theory lacks explanatory power, i.e., the ability to adequately explain the nature of the appearances. He writes:

... the diversity of the appearances is not well–explained by means of such visions. The appearances were experienced many different times, by different individuals, by groups, at various locales and under various circumstances, and by not only believers, but also by unbelievers like James the brother of Jesus and the Pharisee Saul of Tarsus.

This diversity is very difficult to explain by recourse to hallucinations. For hallucinations require a special psychological state on the part of the percipient. But since a guilt complex "ex hypothesi" obtained only for Peter and Paul, the diversity of the post–mortem appearances must be explained as a sort of contagion, a chain reaction.

Just like Gary Habermas, Craig is presupposing the inerrancy of the NT reports. If one does that, then, of course, there is no way to explain the resurrection in naturalistic terms. The counter-apologist must not allow himself to be drawn into this trap. It could be that Peter and Paul are the only ones who actually did see something. The stories of the appearances to the Twelve, to James, and to the 500 could be legendary developments. Or, some others could have claimed to see visions too as we know that it was a status symbol (1 Cor. 9:1). You didn't want to be a second-class citizen. This "me too" phenomena is seen in all kinds of human social settings. For example, in some Charismatic churches, one is not a good Christian unless one has spoken in tongues. There is huge sociological pressure to "fit in." Under this kind of pressure and the contagious excitement of those who have claimed the supernatural gift, many people will claim something that they are really not sure they have experienced but, as time goes on, they do convince themselves of the reality of their experiences (See Glossolalia: behavioral science perspectives on speaking in tongues, by H. Newton Malony and A. Adams Lovekin).

Craig argues that the diversity associated with the various appearances argues against the hallucination theory. He says:

It is important to keep in mind that it is the diversity that is at issue here, not merely individual incidents. Even if one could compile from the casebooks an amalgam consisting of stories of hallucinations over a period of time (like the visions in Medjugorje), mass hallucinations (as at Lourdes), hallucinations to various individuals, and so forth, the fact remains that there is no single instance in the casebooks exhibiting the diversity involved in the post–mortem appearances of Jesus. It is only by compiling unrelated cases that anything analogous might be constructed .

But the fact that there are so many different cases in history that can be amalgamated as Craig says is proof that hallucinations can take place under a lot of various circumstances.

Craig also maintains that an hallucination would not have been interpreted by the disciples as a physical resurrection. He writes:

Subjective visions, or hallucinations, have no extra–mental correlate but are projections of the percipient's own brain. So if, as an eruption of a guilty conscience, Paul or Peter were to have projected visions of Jesus alive, they would have envisioned him in Paradise, where the righteous dead awaited the eschatological resurrection. But such exalted visions of Christ leave unexplained their belief in his resurrection. The inference "He is risen from the dead," so natural to our ears, would have been wholly unnatural to a first century Jew. In Jewish thinking there was already a category perfectly suited to describe Peter's postulated experience: Jesus had been assumed into heaven. An assumption is a wholly different category from a resurrection.

This argument is also put forward by N. T. Wright in his massive volume, The Resurrection of the Son of God. There are at least two problems with it.

First, there was a lot of diversity among Jewish beliefs in the first century. There were the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes, as well as others. There were also sects and cults that had incorporated various Greek ideas into Jewish theology. To maintain that the Jewish belief in the afterlife was monolithic in the first century is mistaken.

Second, the concept of the resurrection seems to have entered Jewish theology during the exile and is found primarily in the Hebrew writings after that time, namely Daniel and 2 Maccabees. Many scholars believe this belief in the resurrection was adapted from the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism . The concept of the resurrection in Jewish theology arose as a way to explain how God would vindicate the martyrs. Initially, it seems that Jews who believed in a resurrection expected only the martyrs to be raised (see Life after death: a history of the afterlife in the religions of the West, by Alan Segal, pp. 248ff.)

Since Jesus would have been viewed by his followers as a martyr, it would have been natural for them to think that he would be resurrected. As for the argument that they believed the resurrection would only take place at the end of the age, the fact is they did think they were at the end of the age. Jesus had taught that the end was near. He said that this generation will not pass away until all these things be fulfilled (Matthew 24:36). The author of Matthew's gospel, which is commonly thought to be written primarily to a Jewish audience, is the only one to include the resurrection of many saints in connection with Jesus' death (Matthew 27:52-53). When Paul offered the first theological interpretation of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15, he argued that Jesus' resurrection was the first-fruits (15:23) and that soon all believers will join in that resurrection (15:51-52).

I will continue discussing Craig's objections to the hallucination theory in the next post.

Bart Ehrman's Explanation of the Origin of the Belief in the Resurrection of Jesus

Bart Ehrman, a fellow apostate, explains how he thinks the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus originated. This makes much more sense to me than the theological statement that God raised Jesus from the dead.

Grasping at Straws Part Four--Evangelicals Defend Genocide

In yesterday's post, I examined three of the reasons that William Craig, arguably the leading evangelical apologist, gives in defense of the genocides ordered by his God. Today, I will look at Craig's six other arguments for believing his God is good in spite of ordering the killing of children.

4. God delayed the genocide for 400 years showing his long-suffering.

Craig says: Think of it! God stays His judgment of the Canaanite clans 400 years because their wickedness had not reached the point of intolerability! This is the long-suffering God we know in the Hebrew Scriptures.

How does this excuse God? If I delay committing an atrocity for a long time, then I am excused? Lets say that I delay killing my neighbor for 40 years even though he has been offending me from day one. I am patient and suffer through his offenses year after year until finally it becomes intolerable and I have to kill him. Does the fact that I waited 40 years in any way mitigate my crime?

5. The sin of the Canaanites became so noxious that God could not delay his judgment any longer.

Craig writes:

By the time of their destruction, Canaanite culture was, in fact, debauched and cruel, embracing such practices as ritual prostitution and even child sacrifice. The Canaanites are to be destroyed “that they may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices that they have done for their gods, and so you sin against the Lord your God” (Deut. 20.18). God had morally sufficient reasons for His judgment upon Canaan, and Israel was merely the instrument of His justice, just as centuries later God would use the pagan nations of Assyria and Babylon to judge Israel.

So because the Canaanites practiced such horrific things as ritual prostitution and child sacrifice, God is justified in exterminating all of them, according to the leading evangelical apologist.

First, I think the Hebrew God is a little bit hypocritical here. He obviously has no problem burning young people alive as he commanded it in Leviticus 21:9: If a priest's daughter defiles herself by becoming a prostitute, she disgraces her father; she must be burned in the fire (NIV). Its okay if he does it but wrong if some other god commands it. Note also the misogyny in this passage. She is to be burned alive not because of the sexual offense but because she disgraced her father. Muslim fathers, to this very day, will kill their own daughters for disgracing them (see Man Accused Of Killing Daughter For Family Honor. Is the Hebrew God really any better than the Muslim God? They sound the same to me.

Second, how is killing all of the Canaanite children justified by the fact that the Canaanite parents killed their own children? That is absurd. Its like punishing an incestuous child molester by molesting his children yourself.

Third, as I pointed out in a previous post, Yahweh's problem with human sacrifice doesn't seem to be the act of the sacrifice itself but rather to whom the child is sacrificed. In other words, these Canaanites are morally repugnant not because they sacrificed their children but because they sacrificed them to a pagan deity.

What else do you have Dr. Craig?

6. The children had to be killed so that the Israelites would not intermarry with them or assimilate their culture and evil practices.

He writes:

But why take the lives of innocent children? The terrible totality of the destruction was undoubtedly related to the prohibition of assimilation to pagan nations on Israel’s part. In commanding complete destruction of the Canaanites, the Lord says, “You shall not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons, or taking their daughters for your sons, for they would turn away your sons from following me, to serve other gods” (Deut 7.3-4).

What a weak straw Dr. Craig is grasping now!

First, Israel continued to have problems with idolatry throughout its history, so Yahweh's plan obviously didn't work. If God knew that it wouldn't work, why murder the poor children?

Second, in Numbers 31:17-18, Yahweh allowed the Israelites to keep the Midianite virgins for themselves. Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man. (NIV). I guess the Midianites were not as bad as the Canaanites and Yahweh could trust his people not to assimilate the false religion of the Midianites. Furthermore, in Deut. 21:10-14, the Hebrew God allows the Israelite soldier to keep a beautiful woman for himself if he finds one in the midst of a battle. (I guess it pays to be beautiful, if you are an ugly woman, you probably die). When you go to war against your enemies and the Lord your God delivers them into your hands and you take captives, if you notice among the captives a beautiful woman and are attracted to her, you may take her as your wife. (NIV)

Third, its not at all clear that the Canaanite children would have corrupted the Israelites. They were children after all. They could be reared by the Israelites to believe in Yahweh and follow his laws. Would a Christian today refuse to adopt a Haitian orphan because the child's parents practiced voodoo?

Fourth, isn't Craig's rationale an example of the end justifying the means? The means, killing innocent children, which is clearly wrong, is suddenly okay because it will prevent a greater evil, i.e., the worship of false gods? This is the concept of choosing the lesser evil but it is still an evil which is supposed to be impossible for a perfectly holy God.

Craig continues grasping.

7. The killing of the children is not really bad because now they get to go to heaven.

Craig states:

Moreover, if we believe, as I do, that God’s grace is extended to those who die in infancy or as small children, the death of these children was actually their salvation. We are so wedded to an earthly, naturalistic perspective that we forget that those who die are happy to quit this earth for heaven’s incomparable joy. Therefore, God does these children no wrong in taking their lives.

I have dealt with this argument previously but let me summarize again.

First, there is no support in the biblical text for Craig's contention. It is an ad hoc explanation.

Second, Christians don't agree among themselves as to what happens to children who die before the so-called age of accountability.

Third, even if we were to accept Craig's argument, is it justified to kill the children in such a painful manner?

Dr. Craig, you are running out of straws.

8. We are judging these actions based on Western morals. In the ANE, this practice (of genocide) was commonplace.

Craig says: But then, again, we’re thinking of this from a Christianized, Western standpoint. For people in the ancient world, life was already brutal. Violence and war were a fact of life for people living in the ancient Near East.

First, this sounds like an excuse that I sometimes hear from my children. Well, everyone else is doing it. I don't accept that from my children and I sure as hell don't accept it from Dr. Craig's God.

Second, God is not bound by the morality of the ANE. While Craig's argument might excuse the Israelites, it doesn't excuse his perfectly good and holy God.

Third, the fact that contemporary Western morals are superior to the morals exhibited in the Bible actually argues against the Bible being the source of objective morality as Christians constantly claim.

Now we come to the final straw.

9. The genocide was an unusual historical circumstance not a regular practice.

Craig opines: Moreover, the slaughter of the Canaanites represented an unusual historical circumstance, not a regular means of behavior.

What desperation! Its like telling the police officer when you are pulled over for speeding, Officer I don't do this all the time just in unusual circumstances. I guess if I don't speed all the time, then its okay? Poor Dr. Craig is drowning and he has run out of straws.

Grasping at Straws Part Three--Evangelicals Defend Genocide

In the two previous posts (here and here), I have shown how the President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, Paul Copan, is grasping at straws in trying to defend the genocides ordered by his God in the Bible. Today, I want to deal with the answers to this problem put forth by, arguably the leading evangelical apologist of our day, William Craig. Craig can also be seen as grasping at straws in trying to explain how the perfectly good and holy God that he worships could order the extermination of a whole civilization including women, children and even infants. I will enumerate his potential answers below and then respond to them.

1. The genocides recorded in the OT did NOT really happen. Its mere folklore.

2. The genocides recorded in the OT did happen but were NOT commanded by God. The Israelites were simply practicing warfare in the common method of their day.

Now, Craig does not say that he holds either one of these positions but he says its possible to hold them and still remain a Christian. He says it would destroy the inerrancy of the Bible but would not undermine the fact of Jesus' resurrection nor of the existence of God.

He says:

Suppose we agree that if God (who is perfectly good) exists, He could not have issued such a command. What follows? That Jesus didn’t rise from the dead? That God does not exist? Hardly! So what is the problem supposed to be?

Craig continues:

The question of biblical inerrancy is an important one, but it’s not like the existence of God or the deity of Christ! If we Christians can’t find a good answer to the question before us and are, moreover, persuaded that such a command is inconsistent with God’s nature, then we’ll have to give up biblical inerrancy. But we shouldn’t let the unbeliever raising this question get away with thinking that it implies more than it does.

How important is the doctrine of biblical inerrancy to the evangelical Christian faith?

J. Hampton Keathley, III, argues:

If the Bible teaches inerrancy, then to deny it is to deny that which the Scripture claims is true. Further, if the Bible contains some errors, how can we be sure that its claims concerning Christ, salvation, man, etc., are true? Also, the chronology, geography, and history of the Bible are often woven together like strands of a basket with vital spiritual truths. As you cannot start pulling strands out of a woven basket without doing damage to the whole, so it is with the Bible.

If the Bible is in error when it says that God ordered genocide, then how do we know that its not in error when it says that Jesus rose from the dead? How do we know that its not in error when it says that Jesus' death on the cross atones for man's sin? How do we know that its not in error when it says that man is saved by grace through faith?

If the Bible contains errors, then the evangelical Christian must either redefine the doctrine of inspiration or redefine the extent of the canon. Evangelicals have typically held to plenary, verbal inspiration of the Scripture. Plenary meaning that all of it is equally inspired and verbal meaning that the very words and not just the thoughts are inspired. The word inspired is taken from 2 Timothy 3:16 and means "God-breathed" (Greek is Θεοπνευστος). In other words, the Scriptures are breathed out from God (expiration would really be a better word than inspiration). If the Bible comes directly from the mouth of God, and God cannot lie (Titus 1:2), then it follows the Bible cannot lie or contain errors.

If some of the Bible is not true, then it also follows that the part that is not true is not from God and thus should not be part of the canon of inspired Scripture. Harold Lindsell, former editor of Christianity Today, in The Battle for the Bible, famously argued that if you deny inerrancy then you are left with a "canon within the canon." The problem then becomes how does one decide what parts should be in the canon and what parts should not. We would need another Church Council to settle it.

Now, we come to the answers that Craig himself favors.

3. God is not subject to the same moral obligations and prohibitions as man.

According to the version of divine command ethics which I’ve defended, our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a holy and loving God. Since God doesn’t issue commands to Himself, He has no moral duties to fulfill. He is certainly not subject to the same moral obligations and prohibitions that we are. For example, I have no right to take an innocent life. For me to do so would be murder. But God has no such prohibition. He can give and take life as He chooses.

Okay, but Craig believes that God is perfectly holy and incapable of sin. I wonder how he gets around the following syllogism:

(1)Deliberately killing innocent babies is a sin.
(2)God ordered the killing of innocent babies.
(3)Therefore, God committed sin.

I guess he would say that (1) should be modified to read: Deliberately killing innocent babies is a sin for man but not for God.

While I still have problems even with the modified statement, for the sake of argument, let me propose another syllogism.

(1) Deliberately causing innocent babies to suffer and die is a sin.
(2) God ordered the killing of innocent babies in a manner that involved their suffering.
(3) Therefore, God committed sin.

There is no doubt that the babies that were killed in the biblical genocides were made to suffer. How can you kill a person with a sword without that person suffering? Perhaps, they didn't use the sword on the babies but did as the Psalmist sings:

O Daughter of Babylon, doomed to destruction, happy is he who repays you for what you have done to us--he who seizes your infants and dashes them against the rocks. (Psalm 137:8-9, NIV)

Can you possibly kill a baby painlessly by "dashing it against a rock". I am sure some Christian apologists will try to argue that you can.

In reality, I don't see these commands by the Biblical God to be out of character for him. In Genesis 7:21-23, he had no trouble drowning infants. In Genesis 19:24-25, he had no problem burning infants alive. Today, he has no trouble burying infants alive in earthquakes or drowning them in tsunamis, so why should he have had a problem with ordering his people to kill all the infants in the Canaanite cities? It seems to be a normal activity for the Christian God. What amazes me is that Christians can still call this God perfectly good and perfectly loving!

I will continue this discussion tomorrow.

When Jesus Died Did God Die?

A person wrote William Craig and asked the following question (see link):

I don't see how it's possible that God could actually die. For if God were to die then He wouldn't be a necessary Being. But this is impossible because God must be necessary by definition. So when Christ died on the cross, was it just the human part that died?

Dr. Craig responds:

I couldn't resist your question, Jesse, since it appeals to my favorite hymn, the magnificent "And Can It Be?" by Charles Wesley. I urge anyone who knows only praise songs and choruses to listen to this hymn and contemplate the wonderful lyrics about God's amazing love.

Your question is one that also troubles our Muslim friends and is therefore very urgent. Fortunately, the historic Christian church has addressed this question clearly.

The Council of Chalcedon (451) declared that the incarnate Christ is one person with two natures, one human and one divine. This has very important consequences. It implies that since Christ existed prior to his incarnation, he was a divine person before taking on a human nature. He was and is the second person of the Trinity. In the incarnation this divine person assumes a human nature as well, but there is no other person in Christ than the second person of the Trinity. There is an additional human nature which the pre-incarnate Christ did not have, but there is no human person in addition to the divine person. There is just one person who has two natures.

Therefore, what Christ said and did, God said and did, since when we speak of Christ we're talking about a person. For that reason the Council endorses speaking of Mary as "the mother of God." She bore the person who is a divine person. Unfortunately, this language has been disastrously misleading because it sounds as though Mary birthed the divine nature of Christ when in fact she birthed Christ's human nature. Mohammed apparently thought that Christians believed that Mary was the third member of the Trinity, and Jesus was the offspring of God the Father and Mary, a view which he rightly rejected as blasphemous, though no orthodox Christian holds it.

To avoid such inevitable misunderstandings it is helpful to speak of what Christ does or how he is relative to one of his two natures. For example, Christ is omnipotent relative to his divine nature but he is limited in power relative to his human nature. He is omniscient with respect to his divine nature but ignorant of various facts with respect to his human nature. He is immortal with regard to his divine nature, but mortal with regard to his human nature.

You can probably see now where I'm headed. Christ could not die with respect to his divine nature but he could die with respect to his human nature. What is human death? It is the separation of the soul from the body when the body ceases to be a living organism. The soul survives the body and will someday be re-united with it in a resurrected form. That's what happened to Christ. His soul was separated from his body and his body ceased to be alive. He became temporarily a disembodied person. On the third day God raised him from the dead in a transformed body.

In short, yes, we can say that God died on the cross because the person who underwent death was a divine person. So Wesley was all right in asking, "How can it be, that Thou, my God, shouldst die for me?" But to say that God died on the cross is misleading in the same way that it is misleading to say that Mary was the mother of God. So I think it better to say that Christ died on the cross with respect to his human nature but not with respect to his divine nature.

I find Craig's response contradictory. He is saying that the human nature of Jesus died not his divine nature. The divine nature, according to Craig and all orthodox theologians, cannot die. But then he says: yes, we can say that God died on the cross because the person who underwent death was a divine person . How is that not a contradiction?

The Chalcedonian Creed (451 CE), which Craig appeals to, states that Jesus was one person with two natures. Each nature, human and divine, is complete but yet there is still only one person.

We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach people to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood;

truly God and truly man, of a reasonable [rational] soul and body;

consubstantial [co-essential] with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood;

in all things like unto us, without sin;

begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the Manhood;

one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably;

the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ;

as the prophets from the beginning [have declared] concerning Him, and the Lord Jesus Christ Himself has taught us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers has handed down to us.

Historically, theologians have explained this creed by saying that the attributes of the divine nature and the attributes of the human nature are communicated (Latin, communicatio idiomatum) to the single person of Jesus. If the attributes of the divine nature are in fact communicated to the person of Jesus, then it would follow that the person of Jesus could not die. Theologians, however, have argued that the reason the death of Jesus is of sufficient value to pay the price for man's sin is because he was not only a man but also God. They claim He was the God-man (a theanthropic person). It is because of this fact that his death is of infinite value. As the Synod of Dordt (1618-1619 CE)stated it:

This death of the Son of God is the only and most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sins, of infinite value and worth, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world. This death is of such great value and worth because the person who submitted to it is not only a true and perfectly holy man, but also the only-begotten Son of God, of the same eternal and infinite essence with the Father and the Holy Spirit, for these qualifications were necessary for our Savior.

However, according to classic Christian theology, as espoused by Craig, only the human nature of Jesus died. If only the human nature died, then how is the death of Jesus of sufficient value to pay for all of mankind's sins? Does anyone beside me see the problem?

Furthermore, the Scripture teaches that the penalty for sin is more than physical death. It is also spiritual death. Craig defines death as: the separation of the soul from the body when the body ceases to be a living organism. The soul survives the body and will someday be re-united with it in a resurrected form. Okay, but that only defines physical death. Spiritual death, if I understand the Bible correctly, involves the separation of the spirit/soul of the individual from the presence of God. It is separation from God for eternity. This is usually defined as "hell." This is in reality the price for man's sin.

Now Jesus was supposed to have paid the price for man's sin, according to Christians. He could only do this if he died spiritually. The authors of Matthew (27:46) and Mark (15:34)seem to understand this when they report that on the cross Jesus cried out: My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?

This presents a huge theological problem. How can God (the Son) be separated from God (the Father)? This would create a break in the Trinity. Something no orthodox theologian would allow. However, if this did not happen, how then did the death of Jesus pay the price for man's sin? Once again, does anyone besides me see the problem? Craig apparently does not.

What I have presented here is an internal consistency problem for evangelical theology. Their own theology is contradictory. This inconsistency is, one of the reasons, why I left evangelical Christianity.

The "Witness of the Spirit" and the "Burning in the Bosom"

In a previous post, I argued that evangelical apologists such as William Craig have a vested interest in interpeting the evidence to agree with their belief in a literal resurrection. Because of their prior faith commitment and because of their careers being tied to their stand on a literal resurrection, they cannot interpret the evidence in a way that would disconfirm their faith

My contention is further proven by this video clip interview of Craig




In the interview he is asked how Christians should handle intellectual doubts. In response he says that he knows Christianity is true because of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit (Romans 8:16--The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God). He says that even if the evidence points against his faith at some point, he knows the evidence must be invalid or misinterpreted because ultimately the inner witness of the Spirit trumps everything.So, he admits point blank that his mind is closed. Nothing can disconfirm his faith.

I fail to see how that is any different than the Mormon's burning in the bosom..

One of the foundations of Mormonism is its insistence that a person seek the truth by praying for a private, special revelation from the Holy Spirit.

"In answer to our prayers, the Holy Ghost will teach us through our feelings and thoughts... Heavenly Father will answer their prayers, typically through feelings of their hearts and thoughts in their minds." (Preach the Gospel, p. 39; this is the "2004 handbook utilized by the Mormon missionaries").

What they receive is sometimes called a burning in the bosom as a confirmation of truth. Mormons frequently appeal to James 1:5 for this, especially given that their founder, Joseph Smith, claimed that this was the verse and method he used for finding the truth. This is often accompanied by the insistence that one suspend judgment of his or her religion (even in the face of its historical and theological problems) until he or she has read the Book of Mormon and received, by prayer, a special revelation from the Holy Spirit of its truthfulness.

The Mormon knows his religion is true because the Holy Spirit has personally assured him. No amount of evidence against Mormonism can disconfirm this witness of the Spirit. I would like for Craig or some other Christian to tell me how that is any different from their position?

He would probably say: Well the Mormon's burning in the bosom is either Satanic in origin or its just imaginary. But wouldn't the Mormon say the exact same thing about the evangelical's witness of the Spirit?

Craig goes on to say in the video link that if doubts about evangelicalism arise, they come from Satan. So, I think my point in the previous post is just further confirmed. Evangelicals, like Craig, cannot be open-minded about the evidences for Christianity. They look at the evidence with their minds already made up. If the evidence causes them to doubt their Christianity, then they say the doubts are being put in their mind by Satan.

Craig may have two doctorates and be a learned philosopher, but when it comes right down to it, he is no different than the fundamentalist preacher who will stand in a pulpit today and proclaim: Jesus loves me this I know, because the Bible tells me so.

Am I Just Biased Against the Supernatural?

Some Christians will maintain that I and others who reject the literal resurrection of Jesus are just biased against the supernatural. In other words, they say we have made up our minds in advance of the evidence that the supernatural does not exist. Is that a fair assessment, in light of what I said yesterday about everyone being biased by their worldview?

I agree that I have a bias against the supernatural. But I maintain most evangelical Christians do as well, unless the supernatural event is recorded in their canonical Scriptures.

Why don't they believe that the Angel Moroni appeared to Joseph Smith? Why don't they believe in the miracles reported at Lourdes? Why don't they believe in the Hindu milk miracle?

They don't believe these miracles because they contradict their presupposition that the Bible is the Word of God. Now in all fairness, a minority of evangelicals might argue that these miracles are indeed true but that they are done by a diabolical power. At least that is more consistent. It is also more in line with the general mindset of the people in the Bible days.

For example, we were at the doctor's office the other day and a woman was having a diabetic seizure. She was screaming, groaning, trying to bite the nurse, etc. A first century person seeing this would have probably concluded that the person was demon possessed. They tended to interpret unexplainable events as being supernatural in cause. They were biased in favor of the supernatural(See Matthew 17:15-18).

As a post-Enlightenement individual living in a world where most events that used to be ascribed to the supernatural now have natural explanations, I freely admit that I am biased against supernatural explanations. I think the evidence for a supernatural cause for an event would have to be overwhelming (not extraordinary--I am not falling into the trap that extraordinary events require extraordinary evidence).

But are Christians any less biased, albeit in the opposite direction? No, I don't think so. Since they have presupposed the Bible to be a divine revelation, they will believe what it reports no matter what.

For example, Mark Smith claims he asked William Craig the following question:

Dr. Craig, for the sake of argument let's pretend that a time machine gets built. You and I hop in it, and travel back to the day before Easter, 33 AD. We park it outside the tomb of Jesus. We wait. Easter morning rolls around, and nothing happens. We continue to wait. After several weeks of waiting, still nothing happens. There is no resurrection- Jesus is quietly rotting away in the tomb.

I asked him, given this scenario, would he then give up his Christianity? Having seen with his own eyes that there was no resurrection of Jesus, having been an eyewitness to the fact that Christianity has been based upon a fraud and a lie, would he NOW renounce Christianity? His answer was shocking, and quite unexpected.

He told me, face to face, that he would STILL believe in Jesus, he would STILL believe in the resurrection, and he would STILL remain a Christian. When asked, in light of his being a personal eyewitness to the fact that there WAS no resurrection, he replied that due to the witness of the "holy spirit" within him, he would assume a trick of some sort had been played on him while watching Jesus' tomb.

Now whether Craig actually said this or not, I don't know for certain but it is in agreement with his writings in which he says that he knows Christianity is true ultimately due to the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. (See Reasonable Faith, pp. 32ff.)

So, Craig believes because of the "inner witness of the Spirit" and then he interprets the evidence to agree with his prior belief. No contrary evidence, according to him, can overturn his belief. Isn't that blatant bias?

Now, I maintain that my position is more consistent. I acknowledge my bias against the supernatural but I apply that bias across the board. In other words, when I read a report of a miracle in the Koran, the Book of Mormon, the Bible, or any other book, I begin with the assumption that it is false. I will examine whatever evidence exists and if there is overwhelming evidence, I am willing to re-think my initial assumption.

Evangelical Christians such as Craig, on the other hand, will not allow any evidence to disconfirm their belief in Christianity. When they read a report of a miracle in the Koran or the Book of Mormon, they assume its false and apply post-enlightenement criteria to examine the claim. When they read a miracle claim in the Bible, they assume its true and go about to explain away the post-enlightenment understanding of such a miracle claim.

Who is more consistent?