John Owen on Penal Substitution--Part Three

This is part three in my series on John Owen's (1616-1683) defense of the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST). As noted before, Owen, the 17th century Puritan, is one of the "superstars" of Reformed theology. His explanation of how the sins of the elect could be transferred to Jesus, thus allowing Jesus to suffer the penalty for those sins, is found in his work on the Doctrine of Justification (in The Works of John Owen, vol. 5, ed. William Goold).

First, Owen takes issue with the distinction between reatus poenae [guilt related to penalty] and reatus culpae [guilt related to fault] which was commonly made by medieval theologians. He writes:

Others say that our sins were imputed unto him "quoad reatum poena" ["as to the guilt of the penalty"] but not "quoad reatum culpae" ["as to the guilt of the fault"]. But I must acknowledge that unto me this distinction gives "inanem sine mente sonum" ["an empty unmeaning sound"]. The substance of it is much insisted on by Feuardentius, Dialog. v. p. 467; and he is followed by others. That which he would prove by it is, that the Lord Christ did not present himself before the throne of God with the burden of our sins upon him, so as to answer unto the justice of God for them. Whereas, therefore, "reatus," or "guilt," may signify either "dignitatem poenae" ["deserving penalty"]," or "obligationem ad poenam" ["obligated to penalty"] as Bellarmine distinguisheth, De Amiss. Grat, lib. vii . cap. 7, with respect unto Christ the latter only is to be admitted. And the main argument he and others insist upon is this, that if our sins be imputed unto Christ, as unto the guilt of the fault, as they speak, then he must be polluted with them, and thence be denominated a sinner in every kind. And this would be true, if our sins could be communicated unto Christ by transfusion, so as to be his inherently and subjectively; but their being so only by imputation gives no countenance unto any such pretence (pp. 196-97).

He continues:

Guilt, in the Scripture, is the respect of sin unto the sanction of the law, whereby the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment; and to be guilty is to be ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, liable unto punishment for sin from God, as the supreme lawgiver and judge of all. And so guilt, or "reatus," is well defined to be "obligatio ad poenam, propter culpam, aut admissam in se, aut imputatum, juste aut injuste" ["obligation to penalty, close to being fault, or giving access into it, or reckoning, legitimately or illegitimately"] .... And the distinction of " dignitas poenae" ["desert of penalty"] and "obligatio ad poenam" ["obligation to penalty"] is but the same thing in diverse words; for both do but express the relation of sin unto the sanction of the law: or if they may be conceived to differ, yet are they inseparable; for there can be no "obligatio ad poenam" ["obligation to penalty"] where there is not "dignitas poenae" ["desert of penalty"].

Much less is there any thing of weight in the distinction of "reatus culpae" and "reatus poenae;" for this "reatus culpae" is nothing but "dignitas poenae propter culpam." Sin hath other considerations, namely, its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law, and the stain of filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. And so, indeed, "reatus culpae" is "reatus poenae," the guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where there is not this "reatus culpae" there can be no "poena," no punishment properly so called; for "poena" is "vindicta noxae," the revenge due to sin. So, therefore, there can be no punishment, nor "reatus poenae," the guilt of it, but where there is "reatus culpae," or sin considered with its guilt; and the "reatus poenae" that may be supposed without the guilt of sin, is nothing but that obnoxiousness unto afflictive evil on the occasion of sin which the Socinians admit with respect unto the suffering of Christ, and yet execrate his satisfaction.

...There is, therefore, no imputation of sin where there is no imputation of its guilt; for the guilt of punishment, which is not its respect unto the desert of sin, is a plain fiction, there is no such thing "in rerum natura" ["in existence"]. There is no guilt of sin, but in its relation unto punishment [emphasis mine] (p. 199).

So far so good. I think Owen is correct to say that punishment makes no sense if there is no responsibility. In other words, the attempt to separate punishment and responsibility and make Christ obligated to the former but not the latter is non-sensical because the only reason for punishment is in response to a culpable act. To punish someone who is not culpable is as Owen says, "an obnoxious affliction of evil." However, as we will see, Owen does not think Jesus is culpable in real sense but in some type of formal sense.

Now Owen presents his position:

That, therefore, which we affirm herein is, that our sins were so transferred on Christ, as that thereby he became אָשֵׁם, ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, "reus," responsible unto God, and obnoxious unto punishment in the justice of God for them. He was "alienae culpae reus," perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt on him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin (p. 200).

He deals with the objection that such a transfer as he proposes would result in Christ becoming an actual sinner himself.

But it is fiercely objected against what we have asserted, that if the guilt of our sins was imputed unto Christ, then was he constituted a sinner thereby; for it is the guilt of sin that makes any one to be truly a sinner. This is urged by Bellarmine, lib. ii., De Justificat, not for its own sake, but to disprove the imputation of his righteousness unto us; as it is continued by others with the same design. For saith he, "If we be made righteous, and the children of God, through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, then was he made a sinner, 'et quod horret animus cogitare, filius diaboli;' by the imputation of the guilt of our sins or our unrighteousness unto him." ...

Nothing is more absolutely true, nothing is more sacredly or assuredly believed by us, than that nothing which Christ did or suffered, nothing that he undertook or underwent, did or could constitute him subjectively, inherently, and thereon personally, a sinner, or guilty of any sin of his own. To bear the guilt or blame of other men's faults, to be "alienae culpae reus," makes no man a sinner, unless he did unwisely or irregularly undertake it. But that Christ should admit of any thing of sin in himself, as it is absolutely inconsistent with the hypostatical union, so it would render him unmeet for all other duties of his office, Heb. vii. 25, 26 (p. 201).

So, according to Owen, even though the responsiblity for man's sin is transferred to Christ thus allowing him to be punished justly; nevertheless, Christ does not become personally and subjectively a sinner. If he did become subjectively a sinner, then of course that would overthrow the doctrine of the atonement (as well as the Trinity and the whole Christian faith). Thus, Owen is going to argue that in some way, Christ became objectively a sinner and personally culpable without becoming subjectively a sinner.

He continues:

None ever dreamed of a transfusion or propagation of sin from us unto Christ, such as there was from Adam unto us. For Adam was a common person unto us, we are not so to Christ: yea, he is so to us; and the imputation of our sins unto him is a singular act of divine dispensation, which no evil consequence can ensue upon.

To imagine such an imputation of our sins unto Christ as that thereon they should cease to be our sins, and become his absolutely, is to overthrow that which is affirmed; for, on that supposition, Christ could not suffer for our sins, for they ceased to be ours antecedently unto his suffering. But the guilt of them was so transferred unto him, that through his suffering for it, it might be pardoned unto us (p. 201).

Owen seems to be saying that our sins were not removed from us and placed upon Christ because that would mean they are no longer our sins. Instead, somehow Christ joins himself to us in such a way that he shares the responsibility and penal consequences that our sins deserve (This is quite a game of mental gymnastics that Owen is playing).

He explains:

First, There is in sin a transgression of the preceptive part of the law; and there is an obnoxiousness unto the punishment from the sanction of it. It is the first that gives sin its formal nature; and where that is not subjectively, no person can be constituted formally a sinner. However any one may be so denominated, as unto some certain end or purpose, yet, without this, formally a sinner none can be, whatever be imputed unto them. And where that is, no non-imputation of sin, as unto punishment, can free the person in whom it is from being formally a sinner. When Bathsheba told David that she and her son Solomon should be חַטָּאִים (sinners)[1 Kings 1:21], by having crimes laid unto their charge; and when Judah told Jacob that he would be a sinner before him always on the account of any evil that befell Benjamin (it should be imputed unto him)[Gen. 43:9]; yet neither of them could thereby be constituted a sinner formally. And, on the other hand, when Shimei desired David not to impute sin unto him, whereby he escaped present punishment, yet did not that non-imputation free him formally from being a sinner [2 Sam. 19:19-20]. Wherefore sin, under this consideration, as a transgression of the preceptive part of the law, cannot be communicated from one unto another, unless it be by the propagation of a vitiated principle or habit. But yet neither so will the personal sin of one, as inherent in him, ever come to be the personal sin of another. Adam hath upon his personal sin communicated a vicious, depraved, and corrupted nature unto all his posterity; and, besides, the guilt of his actual sin is imputed unto them, as if it had been committed by every one of them: but yet his particular personal sin neither ever did, nor ever could, become the personal sin of any one of them any otherwise than by the imputation of its guilt unto them. Wherefore our sins neither are, nor can be, so imputed unto Christ, as that they should become subjectively his, as they are a transgression of the preceptive part of the law. A physical translation or transfusion of sin is, in this case, naturally and spiritually impossible; and yet, on a supposition thereof alone do the horrid consequences mentioned depend. But the guilt of sin is an external respect of it, with regard unto the sanction of the law only. This is separable from sin; and if it were not so, no one sinner could either be pardoned or saved. It may, therefore, be made another's by imputation, and yet that other not rendered formally a sinner thereby. This was that which was imputed unto Christ, whereby he was rendered obnoxious unto the curse of the law; for it was impossible that the law should pronounce any accursed but the guilty, nor would do so, Deut xxvii. 26 (p. 202).

Owen is saying that a person can agree to be held responsible for someone else's sin and justly punished for it, without having that person's sin beome subjectively his. He uses the biblical illustrations of Bathsheba and Solomon being treated as sinners by Adonijah (1 Kings 1:21) and Judah agreeing to be held responsible if anything happens to Benjamin (Gen. 43:9).

First, in the case of Bathsheba and Solomon, if Adonijah treats them as sinners, he does so unjustly. His reason for treating them as sinners (criminals) would be because he sees them as a threat to his kingship. Second, in the case of Judah and Benjamin, Judah agrees that if anything happens to Benjamin, he will bear the blame. That makes sense. He is merely agreeing that he will protect Benjamin and that it will be his fault (subjectively) if harm comes to the boy. How these illustrations are supposed to reflect the imputation of man's sins to Jesus is beyond me. In the first case, the imputation to Bathsheba and Solomon would be unjust and in the second case, the imputation would be deserved because Judah has agreed to protect Benjamin and if he doesn't then it is subjectively his fault.

Owen then maintains that the guilt of sin is separate from the sin itself (external to it) and can be legitimately transferred to another party. He says that if this is not so, then "no one sinner could either be pardoned or saved." I fail to see how the guilt can be separated from that which caused the guilt. If the cause is removed, then so is the effect. When a person is pardoned, the guilt and the crime are not being separated. Merely the judge is agreeing to forego punishment. It is true that here a logical division between the punishment and the crime is being made but I fail to see how such a logical division can be used to claim that the punishment could be transferred to someone else.

Now Owen turns to the question of how God the Father could be angry at God the Son, which presents a host of theological problems. He writes:

But it will be said that if our sins, as to the guilt of them, were imputed unto Christ, then God must hate Christ; for he hateth the guilty.... [But]God in this matter is considered as a rector, ruler, and judge. Now, it is not required of the severest judge, that, as a judge, he should hate the guilty person, no, although he be guilty originally by inhesion, and not by imputation. As such, he hath no more to do but consider the guilt, and pronounce the sentence of punishment (p. 203).

It is true that a judge would not necessarily be angry with the criminal or hate him personally. However, in the case of God we are not talking about a party who is disconnected from the crime. Sin, according to the Bible, is an offense against God himself. It is an offense against his person. The Bible says that God is angry and full of wrath as a result of the sin. He is not presented as an objective and unaffected third party (which a judge would be).

So, while Owen has made a valiant effort to defend the PST, it seems to me that his attempt also fails. There does not seem to be anyway to justify the punishment of a person unless that person is himself responsible in some way for the crime for which the punishment is demanded. One can go through all manner of mental gymnastics to try to justify it, but at the end of the day, in my opinion, it cannot be justified.

John Owen on Penal Substitution--Part Two

John Owen (1616-1683) is generally regarded as one of the premier Calvinist theologians. According to J. I. Packer:

Owen was by common consent the weightiest Puritan theologian, and many would bracket him with Jonathan Edwards as one of the greatest Reformed theologians of all time. Born in 1616, he entered Queen's College, Oxford, at the age of twelve and secured his M.A. in 1635, when he was nineteen. In his early twenties, conviction of sin threw him into such turmoil that for three months he could scarcely utter a coherent word on anything; but slowly he learned to trust Christ, and so found peace. In 1637 he became a pastor; in the 1640s he was chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, and in 1651 he was made Dean of Christ Church, Oxford's largest college. In 1652 he was given the additional post of Vice-Chancellor of the University, which he then reorganized with conspicuous success. After 1660 he led the Independents through the bitter years of persecution till his death in 1683.

In a prior post, I discussed John Owen's (1616-1683) position regarding retributive justice and sacrifices. In this post, I want to deal with his position regarding how man's sins are imputed to Jesus. He discusses the matter in his series of essays on the doctrine of Justification (The Works of John Owen, vol. 5, ed. William Goold; recently published in a volume entitled, The Doctrine of Justification by Faith).

He writes:

The principal foundation hereof is, that Christ and the church, in this design, were one mystical person; which state they do actually coalesce into, through the uniting efficacy of the Holy Spirit He is the head, and believers are the members of that one person, as the apostle declares, 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13. Hence, as what he did is imputed unto them, as if done by them; so what they deserved on the account of sin was charged upon him (p. 176).

Owen argues that due to a "mystical union" between Christ and the church, they somehow become one "mystical person." Apparently this is a "spiritual union" and a "spiritual person," since, according to him, it is brought about by the Holy Spirit.

I have several problems with this idea of a "mystical person." First, the word "mystical" means:

1. Of or having a spiritual reality or import not apparent to the intelligence or senses.
2. Of, relating to, or stemming from direct communion with ultimate reality or God: a mystical religion.
3. Enigmatic; obscure: mystical theories about the securities market.
4. Of or relating to mystic rites or practices.
5. Unintelligible; cryptic.

I guess Owen is using the word "mystical" according to gloss #1 above. This would mean that the "mystical union" is not apparent to the intelligence or sense or as #5 says, "unintelligible." If that is correct, then one is wasting his or her time trying to understand it because it is unintelligible.

Second, the "mystical person" created by this "mystical union" seems to be a creation of Paul's mind. It is at best an abstract entity that really has no parallel. Thus, I fail to see how it can explain how the guilt of man's sin of man could be transferred to Jesus.

Third, even if one plays along with Paul's and Owen's imaginary "mystical person," the problem of how the guilt of man's sin could be seen as belonging to Jesus is still not resolved. According to Owen and other defenders of the PST, only the guilt of man's sin is transferred to Jesus not the actual demerit or sin itself. In this way, they protect the sinlessness of Jesus while finding some way for him to justly bear the punishment that man's sins are said to deserve. However, if the guilt is shared due to the "mystical union," why isn't the demerit or the sin itself also shared? How is it that only the guilt or liability to punishment is shared? This is also an artificial distinction because guilt cannot be separated from the actual crime. Guilt only makes sense if there is something of which to be guilty. In addition, if for some reason the demerit of sin is not shared by this "mystical union," then how is the merit of Jesus' righteousness shared by the believer? It seems that Owen and others are merely making up the rules as they go. What they claim can be shared and what cannot be shared are merely their own dictates based on the imaginary "mystical union" their creative imaginations have invented.

Owen continues:

How then did he make our sins to be his own, and how did he bear our iniquities? Is it not from thence, that we are said to be his body? as the apostle speaks, "You are the body of Christ, and members for your part, or of one another." And as when one member suffers, all the members do suffer; so the many members sinning and suffering, he, according unto the laws of sympathy in the same body (seeing that, being the Word of God, he would take the form of a servant, and be joined unto the common habitation of us all in the same nature), took the sorrows or labours of the suffering members on him, and made all their infirmities his own; and, according to the laws of humanity (in the same body), bare our sorrow and labour for us. And the Lamb of God did not only these things for us, but he underwent torments, and was punished for us; that which he was no ways exposed unto for himself, but we were so by the multitude of our sins: and thereby he became the cause of the pardon of our sins, namely, because he underwent death, stripes, reproaches, translating the thing which we had deserved unto himself, and was made a curse for us, taking unto himself the curse that was due to us; for what was he but (a substitute for us) a price of redemption for our souls (pp. 177-78)?

Once again Owen's imagination is running wild. He is saying that since Christ and believers are really one body, then when one part suffers the other suffers, etc. Okay, but in a body all parts are organically connected and that is why when one part suffers the whole body suffers. For the analogy to hold true and accomplish what Owen wants it to accomplish, then one would have to say that the whole body of Christ (the "mystical person" created by the "mystical union") is corrupted by the guilt of sin and thus one part of the body (i.e., the head, Christ) can somehow suffer the penalty that the whole body deserves. I fail to see how this can keep Jesus from becoming corrupt himself through his attachment with the other corrupt parts of the body. I also fail to see how the undiseased part of a body could be punished (or removed) in order to heal the diseased part. For example, if I have gangrene in my leg, it will do no good to amputate my arm.

Owen states:

This, then, I say, is the foundation of the imputation of the sins of the church unto Christ, namely, that he and it are one person; the grounds whereof we must inquire into.... But hereon sundry discourses do ensue, and various inquiries are made, What a person is? in what sense, and in how many senses, that word may be used? what is the true notion of it? what is a natural person? what a legal, civil, or political person? in the explication whereof some have fallen into mistakes. And if we should enter into this field, we need not fear matter enough of debate and altercation. But I must needs say, that these things belong not unto our present occasion; nor is the union of Christ and the church illustrated, but obscured by them. For Christ and believers are neither one natural person, nor a legal or political person, nor any such person as the laws, customs, or usages of men do know or allow of [emphasis mine]. They are one mystical person; whereof although there may be some imperfect resemblances found in natural or political unions, yet the union from whence that denomination is taken between him and us is of that nature, and ariseth from such reasons and causes, as no personal union among men (or the union of many persons) hath any concernment in. (And therefore, as to the representation of it unto our weak understandings, unable to comprehend the depth of heavenly mysteries, it is compared unto unions of divers kinds and natures. So is it represented by that of man and wife; not as unto those mutual affections which give them only a moral union, but from the extraction of the first woman from the flesh and bone of the first man, and the institution of God for the individual society of life thereon. This the apostle at large declares, Eph. v. 25-32: whence he concludes, that from the union thus represented, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," verse 30; or have such a relation unto him as Eve had to Adam, when she was made of his flesh and bone, and so was one flesh with him. So, also, it is compared unto the union of the head and members of the same natural body, 1 Cor. xii. 12; and unto a political union also, between a ruling or political head and its political members; but never exclusively unto the union of a natural head and its members comprised in the same expression, Eph. iv. 15; Col. ii. 19. And so also unto sundry things in nature, as a vine and its branches, John xv. 1, 2. And it is declared by the relation that was between Adam and his posterity, by God's institution and the law of creation, Rom. v. 12, etc. And the Holy Ghost, by representing the union that is between Christ and believers by such a variety of resemblances, in things agreeing only in the common or general notion of union, on various grounds, doth sufficiently manifest that it is not of, nor can be reduced unto, any one kind of them. (pp.178-179).

Okay, so according to Owen, there is nothing in human experience or reason that corresponds to the "mystical union" of Christ and believers. It is a unique case. That seems to be the cop-out that theologians give when their doctrines make no sense. We see it with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. How can three be one and one be three? They reply that no human illustration accurately captures the truth of the doctrine. All analogies ultimately fail and thus it is beyond human understanding. However, we know that it contradicts reason for something or someone to be simultaneously three and one. In the same way, it contradicts reason for a "mystical union" to exist in which Jesus shares in the guilt of man's sin and man shares in his righteousness. If something contradicts reason, are we supposed to just sacrifice our intellect, swallow real hard, and believe it anyway (since it is taught in a book which is thought by some to be a divine revelation)? That seems to be what one is required to do.

John Owen on the Atonement

John Owen (1616-1683), a Puritan and a Professor at Oxford University, was one of the most prolific defenders of the Penal Substitutionary Theory (PST) of the Atonement.  His book, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, written when he was only 31 years old (1647) is still in print and is widely read in Reformed theological schools. In 1653, he wrote a treatise specifically against the Socinians entitled, A Dissertation on Divine Justice. In it he argues that retributive (or corrective) justice is a principle universally recognized by men and thus must originate from natural revelation. He puts his argument this way:

What common opinion and the innate conceptions of all assign to God, that is natural to God; but this corrective justice is so assigned to God: therefore, this justice is natural to God.

He continues: But nobody, even by report, hath heard that there exist any who have acknowledged the being of a God, and who have not, at the same time, declared him to be just, to be displeased with sinners and sin, and that it is the duty of mankind to propitiate him if they would enjoy his favour (ch. III).

Furthermore, Owen argues that mankind has universally agreed that one way to propitiate the god(s) is through offering sacrifices. But as mankind have testified this consent by other methods, so they have especially done it by sacrifices; concerning which Pliny says, "That all the world have agreed in them, although enemies or strangers to one another" (ch. III).

Owen holds that this universal belief in the necessity of a sacrifice to appease the deity can only be explained as a result of divine revelation. He writes:

But since these are plainly of a divine origin, and instituted to prefigure, so to speak, the true atonement by the blood of Christ, in which he hath been the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, -- that is, from the promise made of the seed of the woman, and from the sacrifice of Abel which followed, -- the use of them descended to all the posterity of Adam: therefore, though afterward the whole plan and purpose of the institution was lost among by far the greatest part of mankind, and even the true God himself, to whom alone they were due, was unknown, and though no traces of the thing signified, -- namely, the promised seed, -- remained, yet still the thing itself, and the general notion of appeasing the Deity by sacrifices, hath survived all the darkness, impieties, dreadful wickedness, punishments, migrations of nations, downfalls and destructions of cities, states, and people, in which the world for these many ages hath been involved; for a consciousness of sin, and a sense of divine and avenging justice, have taken deeper root in the heart of man than that they can by any means be eradicated (ch. III).

Owen then goes on to detail many examples of human sacrifices among the Pagans as well as among the Jews (he considers Jepthah an example). He believes that this practice of human sacrifice was a perversion instigated and motivated by the devil. He believes it may be traceable to a misunderstanding of Yahweh's command to Abraham to offer up Isaac as a sacrifice.

The fame of this transaction, no doubt, was spread in ancient times over many of the eastern nations. But that those who were altogether ignorant of the communion and friendship which Abraham cultivated with the Lord, and yet were convinced in their consciences that a more noble sacrifice than all cattle, and a more precious victim, was necessary to be offered to God (for if this persuasion had not been deeply impressed on their minds, the devil could not have induced them to that dreadful worship), assumed the courage of practising the same thing from that event, there is not any room to doubt (ch. IV).

Owen continues:

Thus the prophecies concerning the oblation of Christ being but badly understood, mankind were seduced, through the instigation of the devil, to pollute themselves with these inhuman and accursed sacrifices. Perhaps, too, that most artful seducer had it in view, by such sacrifices, to prejudice the more acute and intelligent part of mankind against that life-giving sacrifice that was to be destructive of his kingdom; for such now hold these atrocious sacrifices and detestable rites in abhorrence (ch. IV).

So, according to Owen, the devil inspired man to misunderstand the natural revelation that he had received and pervert it into the offering of human sacrifices. By doing this, the devil accomplished two things: 1) He caused man to sin in an especially vile manner; and 2) He caused the more "acute" to revolt in horror at the whole notion of a human sacrifice, so that when the perfect and ultimate sacrifice of Jesus Christ took place, the more "intelligent" would reject it.

Owen rejects the idea of Samuel Rutherford that the concept of sacrifices was revealed in the Mosaic law and then spread among Gentiles and became perverted. He writes:

But he must be a mere novice in the knowledge of these matters into whose mind even the slightest thought of that kind could enter; for I believe there is no one who doubts the custom and ceremony of sacrificing among the Gentile nations to be much more ancient than the Mosaic institutions. Nor can any one imagine that this universal custom among all nations, tribes, and people, civilized and barbarous, unknown to one another, differently situated and scattered all over the world, could have first arisen and proceeded from the institutions of the Jews (ch. IV)

Owen, on the other hand, believes that man's idea of guilt before  God and the need to offer a sacrifice to propitiate God is a result of natural revelation which God has given to all men. Man misunderstood and misapplied the revelation, thinking that he could offer something that would actually propitiate God instead of realizing his own bankruptness and depending upon God to provide the necessary sacrifice. He states:

Yea, I say, that a sinful creature could perform this [make propitiation to God] is false, and a presumption only, arising from that darkness which we are in by nature. But, notwithstanding, it is true that God must be appeased by a propitiatory sacrifice, if we would that our sins should be forgiven us; and this much he hath pointed out to all mankind by that light of nature, obscure indeed, but not dark (ch. IV)

Thus, Owen argues that the universal notion of mankind that a sacrifice is needed to appease God's wrath with regard to sin is proof that this notion is true because it is universally believed. He cites several Greek philosophers to bolster his point. Aristotle: "What is admitted by all, we also admit; but he who would destroy such faith can himself advance nothing more credible," and "it is a very strong proof, if all shall agree in what we shall say." Hesiod: "That sentiment cannot be altogether groundless which many people agree in publishing." Seneca: "When we discourse of the eternity of the soul, the consent of mankind is considered as a weighty argument; I content myself with this public persuasion" (ch. IV).

I come to a different conclusion than the distinguised Puritan. I believe that man's sense of the need to appease the god(s) through sacrifice is an evolutionary development in the history of religion and can be better explained through a study of the anthropology of religion (see David Eller, Introducing Anthropology of Religion, pp. 230-34). This belief in the need to offer a sacrifice was the fertile soil in which the in the idea that the death of Jesus was the ultimate and final sacrifice developed. When Jesus died, the disciples were dumbfounded because they thought Jesus was to be the Messiah. As they pondered what happened, they reverted back to this concept of a sacrifice appeasing God and making atonement for the soul. The Hebrew Bible was of course filled with that notion (e.g., Lev. 17:11). There was also the concept that the highest or most valuable offering that one could present to God was one's only son. The story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22 indictates that idea and in Micah 6:17, the prophet asks: Shall I offer my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul (NIV)?

So, my point is that it is understandable how the early Christians came to explain the death of Jesus as a propitiatiory sacrifice because the concept was prevalent in the Jewish mind as well as all of the Graeco-Roman world. The Jewish concepts were taken and then interpreted for a Hellenistic world by Paul. Thus, I see no reason to think that Evangelical Christianity is divinely revealed truth. It can be explained on a purely naturalistic basis.