Did Paul Hallucinate on the Road to Damascus?--Part One

In I Corinthians 15, Paul says that the risen Jesus appeared to him just like he had appeared to Peter, James, the Twelve and the 500. When did this experience happen and what was it like? It took place on the road to Damascus as Paul was on his way to persecute Christians. He had already been involved in the persecution and execution of Christians in Jerusalem. His experience on the Damascus road is recounted three times in the book of Acts.

Meanwhile, Saul was still breathing out murderous threats against the Lord's disciples. He went to the high priest and asked him for letters to the synagogues in Damascus, so that if he found any there who belonged to the Way, whether men or women, he might take them as prisoners to Jerusalem. As he neared Damascus on his journey, suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to the ground and heard a voice say to him, "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?" "Who are you, Lord?" Saul asked. "I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting," he replied. "Now get up and go into the city, and you will be told what you must do." The men traveling with Saul stood there speechless; they heard the sound but did not see anyone. Saul got up from the ground, but when he opened his eyes he could see nothing. So they led him by the hand into Damascus (Acts 9:1-8, NIV).

And I persecuted the followers of this Way to their death, arresting both men and women and throwing them into prison, as also the high priest and all the Council can testify. I even obtained letters from them to their brothers in Damascus, and went there to bring these people as prisoners to Jerusalem to be punished. "About noon as I came near Damascus, suddenly a bright light from heaven flashed around me. I fell to the ground and heard a voice say to me, 'Saul! Saul! Why do you persecute me?'" 'Who are you, Lord?' I asked." 'I am Jesus of Nazareth, whom you are persecuting,' he replied. My companions saw the light, but they did not understand the voice of him who was speaking to me. " 'What shall I do, Lord?' I asked. " 'Get up,' the Lord said, 'and go into Damascus. There you will be told all that you have been assigned to do.' My companions led me by the hand into Damascus, because the brilliance of the light had blinded me (Acts 22:4-11).

On the authority of the chief priests I put many of the saints in prison, and when they were put to death, I cast my vote against them. Many a time I went from one synagogue to another to have them punished, and I tried to force them to blaspheme. In my obsession against them, I even went to foreign cities to persecute them. On one of these journeys I was going to Damascus with the authority and commission of the chief priests. About noon, O king, as I was on the road, I saw a light from heaven, brighter than the sun, blazing around me and my companions. We all fell to the ground, and I heard a voice saying to me in Aramaic, 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? It is hard for you to kick against the goads.' "Then I asked, 'Who are you, Lord?'" 'I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting,' the Lord replied. 'Now get up and stand on your feet. I have appeared to you to appoint you as a servant and as a witness of what you have seen of me and what I will show you. I will rescue you from your own people and from the Gentiles. I am sending you to them to open their eyes and turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God, so that they may receive forgiveness of sins and a place among those who are sanctified by faith in me.' "So then, King Agrippa, I was not disobedient to the vision from heaven (Acts 26:10-19).

What happened to Paul? Did he hallucinate or did he really encounter the resurrected Jesus?

One of the most recent attempts to bring together all of the relevant research related to hallucinations is Hallucinations: The Science of Idiosyncratic Perception by Andre Aleman and Frank Laroi(American Psychological Association, 2008). They open their book by saying:

Hallucinations are an intriguing psychological phenomenon. A person perceives something: a sound, a voice, an image. However, there is no corresponding source in the outside world. . . . Hallucinations can occur in several medical conditions, including psychiatric disorders, but they can also arise because of the intake of a variety of substances, such as LSD or PCP. Further, hallucinations have also been reported in healthy people from the nonpatient population. The riddle of how hallucinations come about has puzzled clinicians, researchers, and laypeople alike (p. 3).

They provide a number of various definitions of hallucination from the literature including one by Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary (2004): Hallucination is a false perception characterized by externalization and a continued belief that the experience is a perception of something outside the self rather than an internal thought or image (p. 312).

What is the difference between an illusion and an hallucination? An illusion is a misperception that is based on an existing stimulus, for example, misinterpreting a coat and hat on a coat rack for a man standing in the hall. In contrast, a hallucination is entirely based on internal representations with no corresponding stimulus coming through the senses (p. 18). On the surface, this seems a clear enough distinction. However, often the lines are blurred. The fact that in a large number of individuals hallucinations can be triggered by certain enviromental stimuli already makes this distinction problematic (p. 18). In other words, often some external stimuli will result in an hallucination. The stimuli is misinterpreted (an illusion) and then the brain creates images and sounds which are not really present in the external world (an hallucination).

Is this what happened to Paul on the road to Damascus? Did he see some phenomenon in the sky which he misinterpreted as the risen Jesus and then his brain created sounds that he understood as Jesus speaking to him? It is certainly possible. The latest research reveals the following points which may help us in evaluating Paul's experience.

1. "Normal" people have hallucinations.

Hallucinations occur in "normal" people. In other words, they are not just found in people with psychotic disorders or in substance abusers. They are much more common than one might think among the general population. In 1991, Tien sampled 18,572 people and found 10-15% reporting experiences which could be classified as an hallucination. In 2000, Ohayon studied 13,057 people from three different countries in Europe and found 38.7% reported having experienced an hallucination (pp. 62-63).

As Aleman and Laroi report,

Numerous studies have revealed that hallucinations may occur in a number of populations, including psychiatric patients, non-psychiatric patients, and even normal subjects. These findings question the diagnostic specificity of hallucinations and also challenge the idea that hallucinations are necessarily a sign of mental illness or pathology. Moreover, these findings provide evidence for the so-called "continuum hypothesis of hallucinations," that is, that both clinical and nonclinical hallucinations lie as points on a continuum and do not differ qualitatively from each other (p. 47).

Hallucinations experienced by "normal" people do not differ qualitatively from those induced by psychosis or drugs. Aleman and Laroi state:

Similarities in both clinical and nonclinical groups suggest that hallucinations may lie on a continuum with normal experiences. This line of reasoning, known as the "continuum hypothesis," argues that the main difference between pathological and normal groups is quantitative rather than qualitative (p. 80).

2. Auditory hallucinations are the most common form of hallucination.

Research shows that auditory hallucinations are more common than visual hallucinations. Often the percipient hears a voice commanding him to do something. Command hallucinations may be considered a particular subtype of auditory hallucinations in that the voice is experienced as commanding rather than commenting . . . . Studies have reported that they are relatively common in voice hearers, with between 33% and 74% reporting such activity (p. 37).

3. Emotional factors can lead to hallucinations.

Its not surprising that one's emotions can be a major factor in producing hallucinations. Studies have shown several key emotional issues present in people who experience hallucination.

a) Stress

A study by Gauntlett-Gilbert and Kuipers in 2003 revealed that stress was a major factor in the onset of an hallucination. 85% of their patients reported being under enormous stress prior to their experience. This study also showed that a majority (55%) interpreted their experience as a supernatural event. It also showed that at least with their patients, the hallucinations were not chronic or persistent. Often they stopped in two weeks or less but they nontheless had an impact on patients long after their offset. For example, more than half of the participants reported that visual hallucination affected their beliefs, and in 55% of the cases, the visual hallucination helped underpin a delusion (e.g., "It is Jesus telling me I must kill a man") (p. 39).

In addition, Johns, Hemsley, and Kuipers (2002) found that a majority of non-psychiatric participants had experienced stress when their hallucinations first started and that stress was the most important factor in triggering hallucinations (pp. 66-67).

b) Anxiety

Another major emotional factor that seems to be present in many people who experience an hallucination is anxiety. This has been seen especially in those with posttraumatic stress disorder (p. 50). A traumatic experience, particularly, observing a violent death can be the stressor that leads to an hallucination.

Morrison et al. (1995) argued that the need to attribute intrusive thoughts to an external force is due to motivational factors. The presence of certain intrusive thoughts may lead to negative affect in the subject in the form of anxiety (Bentall, 1990) or congnitive dissonance (Morrison, et al., 1995). According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), dissonance occurs when two cognitions contradict each other, resulting in an uncomfortable state from which an individual is motivated to escape. Morrison et al. argued that to reduce levels of negative affect, the subject chooses to externalize the intrusive thought, resulting in hallucinations (p. 147).

c) Depression

Severe depression is another factor especially in auditory hallucinations. A psychotically depressed person may hear voices that are mocking and humiliating and that criticize him or her for various failures, shortcomings, and sins (which may be real or imagined). A depressed person may be accused of various wrongdoings and might be further ordered by the voices to "make up" for these by performing acts of self-mutiliation or even suicide (pp. 49-50).

A number of studies indicate that emotional disorders (especially depression and anxiety) are associated with hallucinatory experiences in nonclinical participants (p. 65).

4. Auditory hallucinations are externalizations of inner speech.

As Aleman and Laroi write:

There is a certain consensus in the literature that auditory hallucinations occur when the individual misattributes inner speech to a source that is external or alien to the self. The term "inner speech" refers to the internal dialogue one uses to regulate one's own behavior. This may include commenting to oneself about what is happening or issuing instructions to oneself about what to do (p. 110).

Finally, neuroimaging studies have also shown that auditory hallucinations coincide with the activation of those areas in the brain responsible for the production and perception of speech, which in most people is located in the left hemisphere. Thus, the obserations from behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies all provide strong evidence that inner speech may occur simultaneously with auditory hallucinations and, therefore, that hallucinations relfect the individual's mistaken judgments about the source or location of their inner speech (pp. 111-12).

5. Culture and beliefs influence how one interprets the hallucination.

People will interpret their experience based on their culture and religious beliefs. A study done by Mitchell and Vierkant in 1989 compared hallucinations in patients admitted in the 1930's with those admitted in the 1980's in the same East Texas hospital. They found that the primary sources of the hallucinations in the 1930's were religious in nature (God, the Holy Ghost, spirits), whereas the primary sources of the hallucinations in the 1980's included not only God, devils, and demons but also doctor, scanner, television, and radio (p. 30). In the 30's people typically thought the voices they were hearing were from the spirit world whereas in the 80's they though the voices were coming from the television, radio, or scanner (as well as the spirit world).

More current research has confirmed this conclusion.

Furthermore, a cross-cultural study (Wahass & Kent, 1997) found that whereas patients from the United Kingdom were more likely to use biological and psychological approaches to explain the apparition of their hallucinations, patients from Saudi Arabia were more likely to evoke religious and superstitious causes (p. 31).

The suggestion that source monitoring judgments are influenced by the inherent plausibility of perceived events helps to explain the role of culture in shaping hallucinatory experiences. Bentall (2000) went on to explain that an individual who grows up to adulthood in a society that recognizes the existence of ghosts or that values spiritual experiences is more likely to attribute reality to the image of a deceased relative compared with a person who reaches maturity in a materialistic, scientifically oriented society (p. 120).

In the next post, we will examine the evidence that we have from Paul's life to see if he might have been a good candidate for an hallucination.

Are Religious Experiences Evidence for God?

The particular wing of Christianity that I was a member of for 20 years did not really emphasize mystical experiences. As a matter of fact, we were very critical of Charismatic Christians who claim to experience the supernatural on a regular basis. Our wing emphasized the "born-again" experience as a life-changing experience but even that was not always accompanied with any type of unusual feelings except maybe relief and gratitude. We were more concerned about doctrine and dotting every "i" and crossing every "t" when it came to our theology. We were quick to judge other groups whose doctrines weren't as perfectly aligned with the Bible as we perceived ours to be. We also criticized those Christian groups that seemed to minimize doctrinal purity in favor of personal experiences of the divine.

While the description above is definitely true of certain elements of evangelicalism, especially those with an allegiance to Reformed theology, the fact is that the majority of Christians and the majority of religions seek to experience the divine. The great popularity of "worship music" in the evangelical church, I think, is emblematic of this trend. People will sing the same few words over and over again as they close their eyes and look toward heaven. They are looking to experience "the presence of God." Others meditate and pray in beautiful cathedrals with stained glass windows and inspiring organ music and sit in silence and awe of the majesty of their God. These uplifting emotional experiences are Christianity for many people. They interpret them as proof that they have a real relationship with God and that their faith is real. This sense of transcendency is what draws many people to religion.

Neuroscientists are making some interesting discoveries relative to these "religious experiences," and it has some Christians worried. A recent article in Christianity Today the mouthpiece of evangelical Christianity in America is entitled: "The End of Christianity as We Know It," by Mark Galli. He writes:

This sort of thing makes many a Christian nervous, and for good reason. We live in an age in which religious experience is the centerpiece of faith for many, many Christians. We disdain faith that is mere intellectual assent or empty formality. We want a faith that is authentic, that makes us feel something—in particular, one that enables us to experience God. When we describe the one time in the week when we put ourselves in the presence of God, we talk less and less about "worshipping God" and more about "the worship experience." The charismatic movement, with its emphasis on experiencing the Holy Spirit, has penetrated nearly all churches. This religious mood, which characterizes our era, is epitomized by the title of Henry Blackaby's continuing best seller, Experiencing God.

A decade ago, neuroscientist Andrew Newberg did a series of scans on Buddhists while they were meditating. What he found was fascinating. Bob Holmes in New Scientist Magazine (21 April 2001), reported the following:

The researchers found intense activity in the parts of the brain that regulate attention--a sign of the meditators' deep concentration. But they saw something else, too. During meditation, part of the parietal lobe, towards the top and rear of the brain, was much less active than when the volunteers were merely sitting still. With a thrill, Newberg and d'Aquili realised that this was the exact region of the brain where the distinction between self and other originates.

Broadly speaking, the left-hemisphere side of this region deals with the individual's sense of their own body image, while its right-hemisphere equivalent handles its context--the space and time inhabited by the self. Maybe, the researchers thought, as the meditators developed the feeling of oneness, they gradually cut these areas off from the usual touch and position signals that help create the body image.

"When you look at people in meditation, they really do turn off their sensations to the outside world. Sights and sounds don't disturb them any more. That may be why the parietal lobe gets no input," says Newberg. Deprived of their usual grist, these regions no longer function normally, and the person feels the boundary between self and other begin to dissolve. And as the spatial and temporal context also disappears, the person feels a sense of infinite space and eternity.

More recently, Newberg has repeated the experiment with Franciscan nuns in prayer. The nuns--whose prayer centers on words, rather than images--showed activation of the language areas of the brain. But they, too, shut down the same self regions of the brain that the meditators did as their sense of oneness reached its peak.

This sense of unity with the Universe isn't the only characteristic of intense religious experiences. They also carry a hefty emotional charge, a feeling of awe and deep significance. Neuroscientists generally agree that this sensation originates in a region of the brain distinct from the parietal lobe: the "emotional brain", or limbic system, lying deep within the temporal lobes on the sides of the brain.

Neuroscience can now duplicate the mystical experiences claimed by religious people over the years in two different ways. One is through the use of hallucinogenic drugs such as ketamine and psilocybin. The other is through electrical stimulation of certain parts of the brain.

Karl Jansen, M.D., Ph.D., a is a leading neuroscientist and a member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. In an article entitled, "Neuroscience, Ketamine, and the Near Death Experience," published in The Near-Death Experience: A Reader (ed. Lee Worth Bailey and Jenny L. Yates) he writes:

There is overwhelming evidence that the mind is produced by the brain. The effects on the mind of adding drugs to the brain, and the religious experiences which sometimes result, provide further evidence (p. 267).

Jansen's research shows that drugs such as ketamine produce out of the body experiences or the sensation of experiencing the divine which are virtually identical to many near death experiences.

Brain scientists have also found that

electrode stimulation of the temporal lobes evokes experiences which become part of the subjective stream of consciousness, embedded into the very fabric of the personality, such that the personality, and even sexual orientation may be altered. Moreover, patients may experience profound visual and auditory hallucinations and even feel as if they have left their bodies and are floating in space or soaring across the heavens (Rhawn Joseph, Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, Clinical Neuroscience , 3rd Edition, chapter 9).

What does this research on how the brain operates tell us about religious experiences? I think it makes clear that there is no reason to suppose there is a supernatural element at all. Thus, another one of the "proofs" for Christianity evaporates.

Further Thoughts on Medjugorje and the Resurrection of Jesus

In the comment section of my last post on the apparitions at Medjugorje and the ramifications for NT claims of Resurrection, a gentleman by the name of Scott offered some objections. Below is my response.

Scott,

Thanks for your comments. No, I don't find them offensive at all. I appreciate your tone and your thoroughness. I invite intelligent dialogue. Believe it or not, I don't claim infallibility for my positions. They are subject to change, if I am convinced that I need to.

You say:

1) It is my understanding that the common rabbinical teachings of that time did not teach to expect a resurrected Messiah simply because they didn't expect a crucified one. They were anticipating an earthly king to assume the throne of David and restore the majesty of God's nation. Jesus routinely chides the Pharisees and Sadducees for misinterpreting Moses, the prophets and the Psalms regarding this concept.

I agree with everything except the last sentence. I tend to think that the references to Jesus dying and rising are later redactions to the oral tradition and then the gospels. If Jesus had been as clear on his dying and rising as the gospels indicate, then the disciples would have been as "thick as a brick" not to have understood what has happening when he was crucified. If the gospels are accurate, they should have expected him to rise on the third day.

You are right that Second Temple Judaism did not expect or teach a dying Messiah. So the disciples were completely confused when Jesus died and scared that they might also be crucified. As they contemplated what happened, they began to think of Jesus as a martyr. There was a concept that the resurrection would be for the martyrs as a form of God's vindication. (Dan. 12; 2 Mac. 4). When Peter announced that he had seen the Lord alive, the disciples fit this report into their theological grid of a resurrected martyr. Now, why did Peter have a vision? I think his can truly be explained as a hallucination brought on by grief and guilt. After Peter told them of the appearance, the disciples mood changed to one of expectation.

You say:

2) Jesus' followers didn't even really get that He was the promised Messiah until after his ascension. That is clear from the questions they ask while he's with them, and from all of Jesus' rebukes to the disciples. It is also clear in the record of the 2 travelers on the Emmaus road. They were devastated by the death of Jesus; there is no reason to conclude that they would have been expecting to "see" a resurrected Jesus then or anytime afterward.

I don't accept the Emmaus road story as factual.

You say:

3) Before Jesus came on the scene contemporary resurrections weren't exactly common place. The Jews would have been familiar with the account of Elisha and the Shumanite woman's son but outside of that resurrection wasn't on their radar, especially not resurrections that they would witness. This is evident from Martha's response to Jesus over the death of her brother Lazarus. When Jesus tells her that Lazarus will rise again she says "Ya. I know. On the last day." She was thinking of the after-life not the now-life.

You are right, the Jewish expectation was that the resurrection took place on the last day. But when the disciples started to believe that Jesus was alive, they also started to believe that the last day had begun. Jesus had preached the end of the age from the beginning of his ministry until the last. He told them in Matt. 24:34 that it would come about in their generation. They began to think that the eschaton had begun and that any moment the Son of Man would come in the clouds and bring about the final resurrection and judgment. When the first theologian of Christianity, Paul wrote about this in 1 Cor. 15, he said that Jesus' resurrection was the first-fruits and that the believers would soon follow suit (1 Cor. 15:23-24). Paul expected Jesus to return any moment (1 Cor. 7:29-31; 15:51-52; 1 Thess. 4:15). As time passed and Jesus didn't return and people started to die, there was concern over whether these "dead in Christ" had missed out.

As time continued to go by and Jesus still had not returned, Paul began to think that the end would not come until he had taken the gospel all the way to Rome and the fullness of the Gentiles be brought in. At that point, Jesus would return and all of Israel would be saved (Rom. 11:25-26). After Paul was executed, the church had to rethink things again. Some came to the conclusion that Jesus meant that at least one of his disciples would be alive to see his return. This came to be associated with John (John 21:23). But then John died. This caused many to begin to really mock (2 Pet. 3). New explanations had to come into place. Interpretations of eschatology have since evolved in all kinds of directions--amillennialism, premillennialism, preterism (both full and partial), dispensationalism, postmillennialism, and so on (see "At Best Jesus was a Failed Apocalyptic Prophet," by John Loftus in The Christian Delusion; also see E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus, and Dale Allison, Jesus of Nazareth: millenarian prophet).

Concerning Medjugorje, I don't argue that every last detail is the same as the reported appearances of Jesus but I agree with Avalos that there are enough similarities to warrant a thorough comparison.

You say:

1. The Medjugorie apparitions proper of Mary are limited to just 6 visionaries. While others have reported seeing other mysterious things none of them have the same apparitions of Mary that those exclusive 6 have. In contrast Jesus appeared not to just a select few but to many different people: 2 Marys, the 11 disciples, the 2 on the road to Emmaus, a group of about 500 people and Saul/Paul.

2. The visions of Medjugorie are isolated; Mary appears and speaks only in Medjugorie. Whereas with Jesus, he appeared in many different places and under different circumstances: at the tomb site; on the shores of the Sea of Galilee; in the upper room; to a group of about 500 people; to the 2 on the road to Emmaus; and finally to Saul/Paul (who wasn't a believer) on his way to persecute Christians.

3. The Medjugorie apparitions are on a schedule. Some daily; some yearly. The sightings of the post-resurrection Jesus were neither predicted nor predictable on any timetable with one exception: when Jesus told both Marys to tell the disciples to meet him in Galilee.

4. The Medjugorie sightings of Mary are visions only. At the very least Mary Magdalene, Mary, and Thomas touched the resurrected Jesus. And the 2 on the Emmaus road ate with Jesus post-resurrection.

But understand, I don't accept every detail in the NT as inerrant as you and Craig and Habermas do. I take into account the results of historical criticism which show that many of these stories were added and modified by redactors. I accept the notion that Peter and Paul saw the risen Jesus (or thought they did) but I am dubious about the other reports. As I pointed out in the posts, if one accepts the inerrancy of the NT, then, of course, one will conclude a supernatural event took place. That is why I say that the apologists are begging the question. What they need to do is to prove that historical criticism is wrong and that the NT really is inerrant and then they would have a strong case for the resurrection.

You say:

Finally I'd like to comment in general on this whole idea of attempting to discover and explain the supernatural using natural methods and means. By definition supernatural things are those that occur/exist above or outside of the natural. If you can explain/prove a "supernatural" event by naturalistic means then by definition it is not supernatural. The Venn diagram of things "Natural" just keeps including more of what was "Supernatural." This occurred to me while viewing one of the diagrams of one of your professor friends that you linked to in one of your recent posts (sorry I'm not finding it right now). But I can describe it. The picture was divided in half horizontally; on top were things that were so-called "supernatural" and on the bottom was the "natural." As I recall the goal was to move all things from the top to the bottom of the diagram through naturalistic explanations thus nullifying (at least in theory) the supernatural realm. As each thing in the upper half is explained by naturalistic means and methods it is no longer supernatural and now becomes subsumed by the sphere of what is natural. The fault with that should be obvious. If it can be explained naturally then of course by definition it is not supernatural and it never was. However this activity dis/proves nothing about the existence or non-existence of the supernatural. This approach does nothing to eliminate the concept of the supernatural or the fact that there really might be things in this universe that cannot be explained by naturalistic means no matter how hard we try. Isn't it possible?

I agree but what it does show is that much of what used to be thought only explainable through supernatural means is now explainable through natural means. Fewer and fewer things are on the top half. That doesn't prove the supernatural doesn't exist, but it does prove that man has often too quickly jumped to the conclusion of a supernatural explanation.

You say:

The other obvious fault in your position is the same one you lay at the feet of those who believe in the supernatural: presuppositionalism. I know you'd like to think that you are totally objective and unaffected by anything other than science, logic and reason.

I don't even claim to be objective much less totally objective. I don't think true objectivity exists. We are all subjects and whatever we see and experience is by definition subjective. An attempt can be made to move towards objectivity by involving more people (that's why juries have multiple people) and "comparing notes" and listening to objections to your views, and so on. We all have biases but if one realizes what one's biases are and tries to give a "fair shake" to other viewpoints, one can move towards the goal of objectiivity. That is why I am a firm believer in reading the "other side." If one only reads what one agrees with, one will never be challenged or be able to move towards the truth. That is why I read Craig, Habermas, Licona, and so on. I want to see the best arguments that evangelicalism has to offer.

And, I have not ruled out the supernatural a priori. I allow for the possibility that it might exist. I just have not seen sufficient evidence to believe at this point.

Scott, thanks again for your interaction.

One more point I would like to make about Medjugorje. Hector Avalos, in his book, The End of Biblical Studies (pp. 191-92) looks at the apparitions of Medjugorje in light of William Craig's criteria for a historical theory.

1. It has great explanatory scope. It explains why Mary's tomb has never been found, why people all over the world see postmortem appearances of Mary, and why faith in Marian apparitions came into being.

2. It has great explanatory power. It explains why Mary's body has never been found, why people repeatedly see Mary alive despite her earlier presumed death and burial (or disappearance).

3. It is plausible. Given the historical context of Mary's own unparalleled life and claims, the resurrection or continued existence of Mary serves as a direct confirmation of those radical claims.

4. It is not ad hoc or contrived. It requires only one additional hypothesis--that God exists. And even that need not be an additional hypothesis if you already believe in God's existence.

5. It is in accord with accepted beliefs. The hypothesis "God raised Mary from the dead or keeps her alive" does not in any way conflict with the accepted belief tht people don't rise naturally from the dead. The Marianist Christian accepts that belief wholeheartedly as he or she accepts the hypothesis that God raised Mary from the dead (or kept her from ever dying).

6. It far outstrips any rival theories in meeting conditions 1 through 5. Down through history various rival explanations have been offered. Such hypotheses have been almost universally rejected by contemporary Marian scholarship. No naturalistic hypothesis has attracted a great number of Marian scholars.

If one were to apply Craig's criticisms of naturalistic explanations for the belief in the resurrection of Jesus against the naturalisitic explanations for the belief in Marian apparitions, one would have to conclude that the Marian apparitions are genuine. It is a double standard to accept one and not the other.

On Being Certain

How is it that people can be certain of things which don't seem to be true? It's a very interesting question. Over a hundred years ago, William James wrote: belief follows psychological and not logical laws. A single veridical hallucination experienced by one's self or by some friend who tells one all the circumstances has more influence over the mind than the largest calculated probablility either for or against (Essays in Psychical Research).

Recent studies have confirmed James' assertion. Robert Burton, MD is a board-Certified Neurologist and Psychiatrist. He has recently written a book entitled: On Being Certain: Believing You Are Right Even When You're Not.



He gave an interview in Scientific American about the book. In the article he says: There are two separate aspects of a thought, namely the actual thought, and an independent involuntary assessment of the accuracy of that thought .

This is illustrated by the Muller-Lyer optical illusion:





Burton says:

Even when we consciously know and can accurately determine that these two horizontal lines are the same length, we experience the simultaneous disquieting sensation that this thought—the lines are of equal length—is not correct. This isn't a feeling that we can easily overcome through logic and reason; it simply happens to us.

This sensation is a manifestation of a separate category of mental activity—-unconscious calculations as to the accuracy of any given thought. On the positive side, such feelings can vary from a modest sense of being right, such as understanding that Christmas falls on December 25, to a profound a-ha, "Eureka" or sense of a spiritual epiphany. William James referred to the latter—the mystical experience—as "felt knowledge," a mental sensation that isn't a thought, but feels like a thought.

Once we realize that the brain has very powerful inbuilt involuntary mechanisms for assessing unconscious cognitive activity, it is easy to see how it can send into consciousness a message that we know something that we can't presently recall—the modest tip-of-the-tongue feeling. At the other end of the spectrum would be the profound "feeling of knowing" that accompanies unconsciously held beliefs—a major component of the unshakeable attachment to fundamentalist beliefs—both religious and otherwise—such as belief in UFOs or false memories.

Why do people like to be certain? Burton says that just as certain drugs, sex, gambling, and so on, provide a reward to the brain which causes it to want to repeat the action, even so, certainty provides reward. He says:

It is quite likely that the same reward system provides the positive feedback necessary for us to learn and to continue wanting to learn. The pleasure of a thought is what propels us forward; imagine trying to write a novel or engage in a long-term scientific experiment without getting such rewards. Fortunately, the brain has provided us with a wide variety of subjective feelings of reward ranging from hunches, gut feelings, intuitions, suspicions that we are on the right track to a profound sense of certainty and utter conviction. And yes, these feelings are qualitatively as powerful as those involved in sex and gambling. One need only look at the self-satisfied smugness of a "know it all" to suspect that the feeling of certainty can approach the power of addiction.

All human beings seem to feel better if they have certainty about something. The feeling of uncertainty is not pleasant. We seek an explanation. Some psyches seem to have more difficulty dealing with uncertainty than others even leading to a strong sense of frustration or despair. I tend to think that many religious fundamentalists tend to fall within in this category but so would those that are sometimes called fundamentalist atheists . So would some political commentators (especially on Fox and MSNBC) fall within this classification. It will be fascinating to see what further research on this matter discovers. I agree with Burton's conclusion: Only in the absence of certainty can we have open-mindedness, mental flexibility and willingness to contemplate alternative ideas . When one is dogmatically certain he has arrived at the truth, learning has ceased.

Below is a lecture that Burton gave related to his book:

Apparitions at Medjugorje and Ramifications for NT Claims of Resurrection

In the comments section of yesterday's post a gentlemen who calls himself Pilgrim described some of his experiences at Medjugorje. He has visited the location 35 times in the last 10 years. I appreciate him sharing his thoughts. The phenomena happening at Medjugorje is fascinating and relevant to the discussion of the reported post-mortem appearances of Jesus in the NT.

Hector Avalos wrote the following to me in an email yesterday:

I argue that the Medjugorje apparitions are an excellent laboratory for testing claims about the Jesus stories. There you have all the elements that are usually used to argue for the historicity of Jesus:

1. Witnesses that have little social standing.

2. Claimed physical contact with a person otherwise regarded as dead.

3. Creation of "gospels" within a short span of time, as opposed to the claim that legends need long periods of time to form.

4. Disavowal of the witnesses by main authorities, and yet popular support growing enormously.

5. No recantations of the witnesses despite opposition and persecution.

6. The Medjugorje witnesses were subjected to more scientific tests than anything we have for the Jesus witnesses.

There are many others, too. In short, I don't think the that historical Jesus can be discussed again without thorough acquaintance with events such as those at Medjugorje.

I am not aware of any in-depth study of this phenomena by evangelical Christians. As Steve pointed out in the comment section, Craig and other apologists constantly say that people in NT times would have checked out the disciple's claim that Jesus was risen. Yet, I don't see Craig or any other apologist checking out these apparitions at Medjugorje. I wonder why not? Could it be that they just dismiss it as emotionalism fueled by superstition? Perhaps, that is what the people in NT times thought when they heard the disciples' claim and so they didn't bother to check it out either.

There have been studies of the phenomena at Medjugorje by others, however. A book published in 1987 by Rene Laurentin and Henri Joyeux, entitled: Scientific and Medical Studies on the Apparitions at Medjugorje . Joyeux, a medical doctor, was the Professor of Oncology in the Faculty of Medicine at Montpellier, France at the time of the study. Laurentin, a priest, a Marian apologist and historian, synthesized the research and co-authored the book with Joyeux. I have not personally read the book but I have it on order. However, Hector Avalos, wrote an article in 1994 for Free Inquiry in which he examined the evidence presented by Joyeux and Laurentin. The article is entitled: Mary at Medjugorje: A Critical Inquiry .

Avalos writes:

Joyeux concluded that the visionaries had no mental illness of any sort. The apparitions are not sleep or dream or hallucination in
the medical or pathological sense of the word. This is scientifically excluded by the electro-encephalogram and by clinical observation. He also excludes "any element of deceit." Since Joyeux could not find any condition that he would label "pathological," he concludes, "We are dealing with a perception which is essentially objective both in its causality and in its scope." As to the cause of the youngsters' experience, he says, "The most obvious answer is that given by the visionaries who claim to meet the Virgin Mary, Mother of God." In sum, Laurentin and Joyeux conclude that there is no scientific or natural explanation available to account for the reports of the visionaries. More important, they conclude that the absence of any condition labeled as "pathological" is evidence that the reported experience of the visionaries is authentically supernatural.

So, the doctor and the priest conclude that the visionaries were (1) not mentally ill, (2) not hallucinating nor dreaming, and (3) not lying. Their conclusion was that the phenomena was indeed supernatural.

Avalos points out that studies have shown that hallucinations are not necessarily due to mental illness. There is a misconception that hallucinations are either caused by psychosis or by drugs. Instead, there is evidence that otherwise perfectly normal and sober people do experience hallucinations. An article in the Scientific American, Ghost Stories: Visits from the Deceased, cites a research study that concluded that 80% of elderly people experience hallucinations of their deceased spouse. A third of those studied heard their recently departed partner speak to them. One of the most thorough studies of hallucinations, Sensory Deception: A Scientific Analysis of Hallucination, written by Peter Slade and Richard Bentall, estimates that 7 to 14% of people have experienced an hallucination. In the article, Hallucinations, in the Encylopedia of Psychology (ed. R. J. Corsini), it is reported that anywhere from 1/8 to 2/3 of the normal population experience hallucinations.

Avalos asks:

Why do otherwise normal people come to believe that they are witnessing non-occurring entities and events? The Barber and Calverley experiment [Toward a Theory of "Hypnotic" Behavior] as well as a host of recent research, indicates that human acts of perception always involve interpretations and inferences that may be held in common by large groups of people. Raw visual and auditory data are combined with inferences about what was thought to be seen and heard. We often select out of the large raw input of visual and auditory data those that we regard as important and that confirm expectations, especially if they are desirable.

Many recent experiments show that the human mind is biologically wired to interpolate many expected images or portions thereof, even if such images are not objectively present. People often form mental images of all types of objects, real and unreal.

He continues:

Once a believer is convinced that an inference is valid, then the conclusion may be considered sufficiently certain to contradict or suppress raw visual data. Any further disconfirmation of their interpretation may be either ignored or disregarded in favor of the inference. This type of avoidance of disconfirming data among Marian devotees is clearly manifested in the oft-repeated dictum: "To those who believe, no proof is necessary; to those who doubt,
no proof is sufficient."

Avalos argues:

If, as in the Barber and Calverley experiments, an average of at least 33 percent of people with no obvious pathology can report clearly seeing or hearing events that are not occurring, then it would not be extraordinary to find 333 "normal" people in a parish of at least one thousand believers who could report seeing or hearing non-occurring events, especially when, as is the case with supposed Marian apparitions, the events in question are believed to be not only possible but desirable as well.

If, as in the Barber and Calverley experiment, at least 2.5 percent believe what they are seeing or hearing is actually present, then it would not be extraordinary to find at least twenty-five people in a parish of one thousand members who actually believe what they are seeing and hearing is present in real time and space.

Avalos believes that the social setting in which many of these visions takes place is very conducive to such claims. He writes: Imagine living in a subculture that constantly and repeatedly suggests to its members the desirability of experiencing a Marian apparition. Imagine living in a subculture where young people who have claimed to have seen Marian apparitions at Lourdes, Fatima, and other places also are beloved role models.

In addition, other cues within in the subculture can influence the nature of the visions. . . .it also provides detailed and coherent imagery of how the Virgin Mary ought to look and speak. According to P. and I. Rodgers, a picture of Mary supported by a cloud rising above Medjugorje has been present in the church of the visionaries since about 1971. Not surprisingly, the youngsters' description of the Virgin is quite consistent with the picture to which they were exposed for years.

So, it seems to me that we are justified in being skeptical of these visions. Many within the Catholic Church are themselves skeptical. Bishop Pavao Zanic, the former bishop for the diocese which includes Medjugorje, denies the validity of the visions. He even maintains that it is a conspiracy of the Franciscans. Cardinal José Saraiva Martins, the former prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints (the group that recommends individuals for sainthood, a requirement of which is to have worked miracles), as recently as January of this year expressed his strong doubts about the authenticity of the visions.

I do not question the sincerity of those who claim to have experienced miraculous phenomena in Medjugorge but I do question the reality of it. Pilgrim, the individual who commented on yesterday's post, says he saw the sun "spinning" in the sky on many occasions and on one occasion he saw it "dancing." He describes what he saw:

The sun seemed to descend towards me. In fact, I thought it about to crash to the earth. It then receded, and then moved to my right across the sky to a two o’clock position before returning to its starting point. From there it again started to descend towards me and once more receded. Its next move was to my left and a 10 o’clock position. When this happened I literally had to turn my head to follow its movement. Once more it moved back to its starting point before descending towards me. Finally, it settled back to its original position, pulsating and spinning. The whole event probably lasted between five and ten minutes

.
Once again, I do not doubt Pilgrim's sincerity but I do deny the objective reality of what he saw. If the sun had literally moved around in the sky in the fashion he describes, it would have caused enormous consequences on the earth. It would have been reported by every observatory in the world. It just could not have happened in any objective sense.

What are the ramifications of all of this for the claims in the NT that Jesus was seen alive after his death? I think we can conclude that at least some of those who claimed to see him probably did see something. What they saw, however, was not, in my opinion, objective reality. They were not crazy. They were not lying. They were not on drugs. They experienced a phenomena that was not unique to them or their time in history. Such visions have been reported almost since the invention of writing. We don't understand everything involved in this phenomena but I don't believe there is any need to conclude they are supernatural.

Did the Disciples Hallucinate? -- Part Three

In a prior post, I referred to NT scholar Gerd Lüdemann's book What really happened to Jesus: a historical approach to the Resurrection. The book is a popularization of his more thorough treatment of the subject, The Resurrection of Christ: A Historical Inquiry . Ludeman is perhaps the best defender today of the hallucination theory among NT scholars. In 1997, William Craig debated Ludemann at Boston University. The debate turned into a book entitled: Jesus' Resurrection: Fact or Figment?: A Debate Between William Lane Craig and Gerd Ludemann .

Craig has also written an article, Visions of Jesus: A Critical Assessment of Gerd Lüdemann's Hallucination Hypothesis, which is available on his web site.

In the article, Craig gives his problems with the hallucination theory. First, he says that it lacks explanatory scope, i.e., the ability to explain all the factors associated with the resurrection. He writes:

This is the central failing of the Hallucination Hypothesis. Offered only as a way of explaining the post–mortem appearances of Jesus, its explanatory scope is too narrow because it offers nothing by way of explanation of the empty tomb. In order to explain the empty tomb, one must conjoin some independent hypothesis to the Hallucination Hypothesis.

If this is the central failing of the theory, then I think Craig is in trouble. Why should all the various details surrounding the resurrection as reported in the gospels have to be explained by one theory? In reality, the hallucination theory is part of a bigger theory that would include how the empty tomb legend developed. Craig's objection seems ludicrous. Reports of unusual phenomena are sometimes complicated, especially when more than one person is involved; to require that one explanation fit all the circumstances involved is absurd. For example, many different people report seeing UFO's. Must all of these be explained under one theory? They all saw a weather balloon? No, there is a multitude of different things that one could see that might make him think he is seeing a UFO.

Second, Craig maintains that the hallucination theory lacks explanatory power, i.e., the ability to adequately explain the nature of the appearances. He writes:

... the diversity of the appearances is not well–explained by means of such visions. The appearances were experienced many different times, by different individuals, by groups, at various locales and under various circumstances, and by not only believers, but also by unbelievers like James the brother of Jesus and the Pharisee Saul of Tarsus.

This diversity is very difficult to explain by recourse to hallucinations. For hallucinations require a special psychological state on the part of the percipient. But since a guilt complex "ex hypothesi" obtained only for Peter and Paul, the diversity of the post–mortem appearances must be explained as a sort of contagion, a chain reaction.

Just like Gary Habermas, Craig is presupposing the inerrancy of the NT reports. If one does that, then, of course, there is no way to explain the resurrection in naturalistic terms. The counter-apologist must not allow himself to be drawn into this trap. It could be that Peter and Paul are the only ones who actually did see something. The stories of the appearances to the Twelve, to James, and to the 500 could be legendary developments. Or, some others could have claimed to see visions too as we know that it was a status symbol (1 Cor. 9:1). You didn't want to be a second-class citizen. This "me too" phenomena is seen in all kinds of human social settings. For example, in some Charismatic churches, one is not a good Christian unless one has spoken in tongues. There is huge sociological pressure to "fit in." Under this kind of pressure and the contagious excitement of those who have claimed the supernatural gift, many people will claim something that they are really not sure they have experienced but, as time goes on, they do convince themselves of the reality of their experiences (See Glossolalia: behavioral science perspectives on speaking in tongues, by H. Newton Malony and A. Adams Lovekin).

Craig argues that the diversity associated with the various appearances argues against the hallucination theory. He says:

It is important to keep in mind that it is the diversity that is at issue here, not merely individual incidents. Even if one could compile from the casebooks an amalgam consisting of stories of hallucinations over a period of time (like the visions in Medjugorje), mass hallucinations (as at Lourdes), hallucinations to various individuals, and so forth, the fact remains that there is no single instance in the casebooks exhibiting the diversity involved in the post–mortem appearances of Jesus. It is only by compiling unrelated cases that anything analogous might be constructed .

But the fact that there are so many different cases in history that can be amalgamated as Craig says is proof that hallucinations can take place under a lot of various circumstances.

Craig also maintains that an hallucination would not have been interpreted by the disciples as a physical resurrection. He writes:

Subjective visions, or hallucinations, have no extra–mental correlate but are projections of the percipient's own brain. So if, as an eruption of a guilty conscience, Paul or Peter were to have projected visions of Jesus alive, they would have envisioned him in Paradise, where the righteous dead awaited the eschatological resurrection. But such exalted visions of Christ leave unexplained their belief in his resurrection. The inference "He is risen from the dead," so natural to our ears, would have been wholly unnatural to a first century Jew. In Jewish thinking there was already a category perfectly suited to describe Peter's postulated experience: Jesus had been assumed into heaven. An assumption is a wholly different category from a resurrection.

This argument is also put forward by N. T. Wright in his massive volume, The Resurrection of the Son of God. There are at least two problems with it.

First, there was a lot of diversity among Jewish beliefs in the first century. There were the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes, as well as others. There were also sects and cults that had incorporated various Greek ideas into Jewish theology. To maintain that the Jewish belief in the afterlife was monolithic in the first century is mistaken.

Second, the concept of the resurrection seems to have entered Jewish theology during the exile and is found primarily in the Hebrew writings after that time, namely Daniel and 2 Maccabees. Many scholars believe this belief in the resurrection was adapted from the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism . The concept of the resurrection in Jewish theology arose as a way to explain how God would vindicate the martyrs. Initially, it seems that Jews who believed in a resurrection expected only the martyrs to be raised (see Life after death: a history of the afterlife in the religions of the West, by Alan Segal, pp. 248ff.)

Since Jesus would have been viewed by his followers as a martyr, it would have been natural for them to think that he would be resurrected. As for the argument that they believed the resurrection would only take place at the end of the age, the fact is they did think they were at the end of the age. Jesus had taught that the end was near. He said that this generation will not pass away until all these things be fulfilled (Matthew 24:36). The author of Matthew's gospel, which is commonly thought to be written primarily to a Jewish audience, is the only one to include the resurrection of many saints in connection with Jesus' death (Matthew 27:52-53). When Paul offered the first theological interpretation of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15, he argued that Jesus' resurrection was the first-fruits (15:23) and that soon all believers will join in that resurrection (15:51-52).

I will continue discussing Craig's objections to the hallucination theory in the next post.

Did the Disciples Hallucinate? -- Part Two

In a previous post, the question, did the disciples hallucinate?, was examined. This post continues that discussion.

The Christian apologist Gary Habermas has written an article in which he argues against the hallucination theory. He lists four problems with the concept of collective hallucinations.

First, he says that the primary example often cited for the reality of mass hallucinations is Marian apparitions. He argues that these examples simply beg the question whether such experiences could possibly be objective, or even supernatural, at least in some sense. In other words, why must a naturalistic, subjective explanation be assumed? This approach seems to rule out the apparitions in an a priori manner, before the data are considered.

It is interesting that Habermas is open to the possibility that these visions of Mary may be genuine because most of his evangelical brethren are not so open. The reason is that if these visions were veridical, then that would validate the Roman Catholic teaching on Mary and by implication all of Roman theology. Evangelical Christianity and the RCC are at odds on major theological doctrines and thus most evangelicals are not willing to grant this validation. I agree, however, that one should not rule out the reality of these visions a priori . The data should be examined and if possible scientific methodology used to evaluate the evidence.

Habermas' second objection is that the collective hallucination thesis is unfalsifiable. It could be applied to purely natural, group sightings, simply calling them group hallucinations, too. Concerning this thesis, crucial epistemic criteria seem to be missing. It can be used to explain (away) almost any unusual occurrence. How do we determine normal occurrences from group hallucinations?

This is a valid objection and needs to be examined. It is impossible to say that the individuals are hallucinating in psychological terms unless each individual can be examined. However, whether or not the claimed vision seems to have any real objective presence can be evaluated. This evaluation can then determine if the group of people really saw what they thought they saw or not. If it is determined that they did not really see what they thought they saw, then an explanation for their mistaken perception can be sought.

There is an interesting discussion on an apologetics website in which a fictional scenario is created with a defense attorney arguing that the three eyewitnesses to the murder were actually hallucinating. The judge will not permit the argument because in his opinion unless there can be some grounds for believing the witnesses did hallucinate, then it would
create substantial danger of undue prejudice. The point that the apologist is attempting to make by using this fictional court case is this:

Before trying to convince people that the disciples hallucinated Jesus resurrection, there should be some basis for finding it likely that they may have. This doesn’t exist in the case of the resurrection. Consequently, even though it can be raised as a possibility, the claims should be disregarded on the basis that, without more foundation, they create “substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading” the listener.

There are a number of problems in using this court analogy to illustrate the case for the resurrection of Jesus. First, there are no multiple eyewitness accounts in Scripture. There are second or third hand reports of multiple eyewitnesses. Second, in a court room, eyewitnesses can be cross-examined and even evaluated psychologically if deemed appropriate by the court. Third, contrary testimony can be introduced if it exists. In the case of the gospels, we don't have the other side of the story because all we have are documents written by the side that believes the appearances were real. We don't have any documents from those, and there were obviously many, who did not believe the resurrection had really taken place.

Habermas' third objection to collective hallucinations is:

Even if it could be established that groups of people experienced hallucinations, it does not mean that these experiences were therefore collective. If, as most psychologists assert, hallucinations are private, individual events, then how could groups share exactly the same subjective visual perception? Rather, it is much more likely that the phenomena in question are either illusions — perceptual misinterpretations of actual realities— or individual hallucinations.

I think this is a valid argument. From what we know about hallucinations, it doesn't appear that a group of people could have precisely the same hallucination at precisely the same time. However, as Habermas admits, there are other possibilities. First, one person could hallucinate and then as that person describes what he is seeing, others see the same thing perhaps by illusion rather than hallucination. Second, it could be that the whole group is experiencing an illusion rather than a hallucination.

Habermas' fourth objection is that the conditions reported in the NT differ from the conditions necessary for collective hallucinations. He refers to the work of Leonard Zusne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic psychology: a study of magical thinking , in which they maintain that expectation and emotional excitement are prerequisites before such group experiences can occur. Habermas contends:

These necessary elements contradict the emotional state of the early witnesses of Jesus’ resurrection appearances. The early believers were confronted with the utter reality of the recent and unexpected death of their best friend, whom they had hoped would rescue Israel. As those events unfolded in a whirlwind of incidents that included Jesus’ physical beatings, crucifixion, and seeming abandonment, the normal response would have been fear, disillusionment, and depression. To suppose that these believers exhibited “expectation” and “emotional excitement” in the face of these stark circumstances would require responses on heir part that would scarcely be exhibited at a funeral! All indications are that Jesus’ disciples exhibited the very opposite emotions from what Zusne and Jones assert as being necessary for such hallucinations.

Again, Habermas is assuming the inerrancy of the NT documents, and as I have already admitted, if the NT documents are inerrant then there is no natural explanation for what happened. However, if one treats the documents as one treats any other historical documents and assumes that there is both truth and error in the stories, then one can come up with other explanations. I would propose the possibility that Peter was the first one to have a vision of the risen Jesus. Perhaps it could be explained on the basis of his grief and overwhelming guilt for denying his Lord. In order to resolve these psychological issues, he experienced an hallucination in which he really believed that his Lord was alive.(See Gerd Lüdemann, What really happened to Jesus: a historical approach to the Resurrection, pp. 92-95). When he reported this experience to the other disciples, they did become emotionally excited and anxiously expected their Lord to appear to them as well.

In reality, there is no reason to believe that were any group sightings of Jesus unless one presupposes the inerrancy of the NT. It is actually more likely than a few experienced visions or hallucinations at separate times and as these appearances were told and retold by word of mouth and eventually written down a generation or more later, the individual appearances had morphed into group appearances with Jesus even having a physical body and being able to eat fish, and so on.

Did the Disciples Hallucinate?

After going through, in previous posts, Phillip Wiebe's possible explanations of the visions of Jesus discussed in his book,Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the NT to Today, I want to ask the question: Were the reported post-mortem appearances of Jesus in the NT hallucinations?

Christian apologists such as Gary Habermas have argued that the hallucination theory is not plausible. The primary argument given by Habermas and other defenders of the resurrection against the theory is that hallucinations are experienced by individuals not groups. Since the NT records Jesus appearing to groups of people at various times, those appearances cannot be hallucinations. Habermas poses the following question: If, as most psychologists assert, hallucinations are private, individual events, then how could groups share exactly the same subjective visual perception?

First, and most importantly, Habermas is presupposing that the accounts in the NT are true in every detail. The school where he teaches, Jerry Falwell's Liberty University, has in its doctrinal statement the following: We affirm that the Bible, both Old and New Testaments, though written by men, was supernaturally inspired by God so that all its words are the written true revelation of God; it is therefore inerrant (emphasis added) in the originals and authoritative in all matters. If one begins by assuming that the gospels are without error, then of course one is going to conclude that Jesus arose literally from the tomb. One is going to find it impossible to explain what is recorded in the NT on a purely naturalistic basis if one begins with the prior faith commitment that the Scriptures are absolute truth. But that is simply begging the question.

Second, one could theorize that perhaps Peter was the first to have a vision of Jesus and then as he told the other disciples about his experience, some of them also had a similar experience. It is not necessary to suppose that they all had the same experience at the same time unless one presupposes the inerrancy of the gospels. The same holds true of the 500 to whom Jesus is said to have appeared. Since Paul give no details about the alleged appearance--not the time, not the place, not the circumstances, not the names of the people involved, nothing--then, it is impossible to evaluate the claim.

Third, contrary to Habermas' claim, it is possible for a group of people to hallucinate at the same time. Hallucinate may not technically be the best word to describe group appearances, but regardless, we know that groups of people have all claimed to see the same apparition at the same time. The best examples are the cases of Marian apparitions which have occurred throughout history and today in settings where groups of people claim to have seen the Virgin. In recent times, these group visions of Mary have taken place in Conyers, Georgia and Medjugorje, Bosnia.

The Skeptic's Dictionary defines collective hallucination as:

a sensory hallucination induced by the power of suggestion to a group of people. It generally occurs in heightened emotional situations, especially among the religiously devoted. The expectancy and hope of bearing witness to a miracle, combined with long hours of staring at an object or place, makes certain religious persons susceptible to seeing such things as weeping statues, moving icons and holy portraits, or the Virgin Mary in the clouds.

Those witnessing a "miracle" agree in their hallucinatory accounts because they have the same preconceptions and expectations. Furthermore, dissimilar accounts converge towards harmony as time passes and the accounts get retold. Those who see nothing extraordinary and admit it are dismissed as not having faith. Some, no doubt, see nothing but "rather than admit they failed...would imitate the lead given by those who did, and subsequently believe that they had in fact observed what they had originally only pretended to observe...."(Rawcliffe, 114).

Not all collective hallucinations are religious, of course. In 1897, Edmund Parish reported of shipmates who had shared a ghostly vision of their cook who had died a few days earlier. The sailors not only saw the ghost, but distinctly saw him walking on the water with his familiar and recognizable limp. Their ghost turned out to be a "piece of wreck, rocked up and down by the waves" (Parish, 311; cited in Rawcliffe, 115).

The Rawcliffe cited above is the psychologist, Donovan H. Rawcliffe, who in 1952 wrote a book entitled: Illusions and Delusions of the Supernatural and the Occult . On page 113 of that book, he writes:

The same factors which operate for a single individual in the induction of hallucinations or pseudo-hallucinations may become even more effective in an excited or expectant crowd, and on occasion may result in mass hallucinations. This is not to say that any two people are capable of having precisely the same hallucination identical in every respect. But similar preconceptions and expectations can undoubtedly result in hallucinatory visions so alike that subsequent comparisons would not disclose any major discrepancy. . . . Accounts of comparatively dissimilar hallucinatory experiences often attain a spurious similarity by a process of harmonisation in subsequent recollection and conversation.

Since we know that the reports of the post-mortem appearances of Jesus were passed down by oral tradition for many years before they were ever recorded, it is quite reasonable to assume that the various accounts were harmonized as they were retold.

Habermas is right to argue that its impossible for a group of people to have precisely the same hallucination at the same time but its not necessary to believe that is what actually occurred unless one presupposes the inerrancy of the written gospels. Thus, Habermas dismissal of the hallucination theory on the grounds that mass hallucinations is impossible is misguided.

Neurophysiological Explanations of Visions--Part Two

Continuing the discussion of Phillip Wiebe's Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the NT to Today, I want to again examine neurophysiological explanations for the visions.

Another theory produced by neruophysiology is the perceptual release theory. This theory states that information obtained through sensory perception is stored, altered, and then "released into consciousness" at a later time and experienced as a hallucination. This mechanism has been thought to be the basis for both dreams and hallucinations (Wiebe, p. 201).

According to Ernest Hartmann (Dreams and Other Hallucinations: An Approach to the Underlying Mechanism in R.K Siegel and L. J. West, eds. Hallucinations: Behavior, Experience, and Theory), The neurophysiological activities thought to be involved are those in the brain stem, including some originating in the pontine brain stem that bombard the cerebral cortex, possibly the visual area.... defects in the norepinephrine systems involved in neurotransmission could account for some forms of hallucination, and the chemical substructure of such functions as reality testing might be found in the ascending norepinephrine systems that extend to the cerebral cortex (Wiebe, p. 202).

Another theory propounded by some neurologists is the information processing theory. Mardi Horowitz (Hallucinations: An Information Processing Approach in Siegel and West) argues that hallucinations are a form of image representation. An image is information that remains after a perceptual event has taken place, capable of being combined with other information derived from memory, thinking, and fantasy (Wiebe, pp. 202-03).

An important factor according to Horowitz is the capacity of the image forming systems to obtain information from both internal and external origins. . . . Experimental evidence shows that normal subjects can confuse internal and external signals when the latter are vague or dim (Wiebe, p. 203). According to Horowitz, hallucinations are caused by an intensification or "release" of images of internal origin when external image formation decreases but the representational system is still "on" (cited in Wiebe, p. 203). When external stimulation falls below a certain threshold, but cortical arousal remains constant, previously recorded perceptions are released into awareness and are experienced there as hallucinations (Wiebe, p. 204). This phenomena is more likely in cases where the information processing system has become impaired either through damage, intoxication, sleep deprivation, high anxiety, stress, deep depression, grief, and so on.

Another neurophysiological explanation for visions is the overactive reticular system theory advocated by Frank Fish (A Neurophysiological Theory of Schizophrenia, Journal of Mental Science). The reticular system is a tight, complex network of fibers at a point where the spinal cord ends and the brain begins. A site of vital brain activity, it is causally related to sleep and arousal, reflexes and muscle tone, and with the organization of the brain as a whole (Wiebe, p. 206).

Fish says that the hallucinations of schizophrenics occur as a result of overactivity of the reticular system, resulting in certain cell assemblies being closer than usual to their firing threshold. When a sensory event occurs, the cell assemblies that are activated acquire greater significance than they normally would, and produce a new set of cell assemblies capable of later becoming active independently of the sensory input that led to their development in the first place. Because the new set of cell assemblies is not well-integrated into the central processes that are part of normal experience, it is not associated with the sense of self that is part of the central processes. So when the new set of cell assemblies is later triggered, producing a hallucination, it is experienced as foreign (Wiebe, p. 206).

This theory may explain the out of the body sensation that some experience when having a vision. Note Paul in 2 Corinthians 12:2: I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven. Whether it was in the body or out of the body I do not know-God knows. Mystics typically report out of the body sensations when they experience a vision. This experience can be seen clinically according to Fish, in both schizophrenics and amphetamines drug users. In both cases the reticular system is overactive.

Neurophysiology is still in its infancy. Much more about how the brain functions is being learned literally every day. While ancient peoples and even some people today attribute whatever they don't understand to the supernatural, it is no longer necessary. Superstition is being gradually eroded by the advances of modern science.

Neurophysiological Explanations of Visions--Part One

Continuing the discussion of Phillip Wiebe's Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the NT to Today, I want to examine neurophysiological explanations for the visions.

Neurophysiology (from Greek νεῦρον, neuron, "nerve"; φύσις, physis, "nature, origin"; and -λογία, -logia) is a part of physiology. Neurophysiology is the study of nervous system function. Primarily, it is connected with neurobiology, psychology, neurology, clinical neurophysiology, electrophysiology, biophysical neurophysiology, ethology, neuroanatomy, cognitive science and other brain sciences. This discipline is still in its infancy but the discoveries that have been made already are fascinating. I have been told that 95% of what we know about how the brain operates has been learned in the last 15 years.

Wiebe writes:

Western culture has increasingly come to rely on specialized sciences to give us explanations, and the sorts of unusual phenomena that constitute central elements in religious life are widely expected to be explained by sciences already in existence and developing rapidly. Human consciousness is considered by many in the scientific and philosophic communities to be susceptible to scientific explanation, and peak religious experiences, of which Christic apparitions would be one kind, are no exception (p. 193).

A person experiencing an apparition is thought to have central nervous system activity in those areas of the brain associated with perception, belief formation, affective states, and so forth (Wiebe, p. 193).

Weston La Barre writes: We are confident that there is no "supernatural" psychic event in tribal life anywhere that may not be better understood as a dissociated state--whether endogenous dream, vision, trance, REM state, sensory deprivation, hysteric "possession"--or as an hallucinatory activity of the brain, under the influence of exogenous psychotropic substances (Anthropological Perspectives on Hallucinations and Hallucinogens cited in Wiebe, p. 194).

One of the common neurophysiological explanations for visions is that it an hallucination. The Oxford English Dictionary defines hallucination as the apparent perception (usually by sight or hearing) of an external object when no such object is actually present . While the term is really neutral it has a bad connotation. People tend to think of hallucinations as signs of mental disease or drug intoxication. The fact is, though, that perfectly normal, sober people do sometimes have hallucinations. It can be caused from a variety of factors. You can make yourself hallucinate right now. Take a look at this video.



Now it may be, as I am not a neurophysiologist, that what you just experienced is best called an illusion as opposed to an hallucination . The point is the same, however. We can perceive things as real when they are not.

Brain scientists now know that tumors and lesions of the temporal lobe can cause visual hallucinations. In addition, clinical studies have shown that electrical stimulation of this lobe can do the same thing. Maitland Baldwin describes such a procedure: As the stimulating electrode activated the depth of his left temporal lobe, he remembered these experiences with a striking sense of familiarity . . . . The senses were in color and vividly portrayed, and he described them as if he were looking at a cinematic production in color. Yet, during the description he was oriented to the reality of the environment and he recognized that the recollected scenes were somehow apart from it (Hallucinations in Neurologic Syndromes cited in Wiebe, pp. 199-200).

Other researchers have found that sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, and hypnosis can produce hallucinations ((P. Solomon and J. Mendelson, Hallucinations in Sensory Deprivation; H. L. Williams, Illusions, Hallucinations, and Sleep Loss; and M. Orne, Hypnotically Induced Hallucinations in Hallucinations: behavior, experience, and theory, edited by Ronald K. Siegel, Louis Jolyon West).

I will continue this discussion in the next post but enough has been said here for one to realize that just because someone claims to have seen a vision of Jesus is no reason to think they actually have.

I will also interact with Christian apologists, such as Gary Habermas, who argue that the hallucination hypothesis is too problematic to offer a serious explanation of the post-mortem appearances of Jesus reported in the NT.

Psychological Explanations of Visions

Continuing the discussion of Phillip Wiebe's Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the NT to Today, I want to examine psychological or mentalist explanations for the visions.

Wiebe writes:

Various explanations using mentalistic concepts have been proposed for apparitions of all kinds. Gardner Murphy's suggestion that apparitions might be brought on by wishing [Three papers on the survival problem: An outline of survival evidence difficulties confronting the survival hypothesis field theory and survival], and Julian Jayne's explanation of hallucinations as arising from stress [The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind] are examples from psychologists of theories positing mental events. Popular explanations of apparitions in terms of mental events include the theories that they are brought by expecting them to occur, or by vigorous efforts to produce them, or by mental depression (p. 172).

Another psychological explanation comes from Carl Jung and his theory of archetypes. Wiebe writes: Archetypes are primordial mental structures that cannot be explained simply in terms of personal experience or the personal unconscious. They are "universal patterns or motifs which come from the collective unconscious, and are the basic content of religions, mythologies, legends and fairy tales"(p. 180 citing Daryl Sharp, C. G. Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms and Concepts, p. 29).

Wiebe continues Jung's explanation:

Apparitions, like dreams, are considered to involve psychic content from the unconscious that is forced into our conscious life. Such psychic complexes escape the control of our consciousness and appear and disappear according their own laws. Jung says: "The vision comes in much the same way as a dream, only in the waking state. It enters consciousness along with the perception of real objects, since it is an eruption of unconscious ideas into the continuity of consciousness." . . . Jung explains St. Paul's apparition experience by suggesting that Paul had already been a Christian for some time, only unconsciously. The incident in which he heard the voice speaking from heaven "marks the moment when the unconscious complex of Christianity broke through into consciousness. . . . The complex, being unconscious, was projected by St. Paul upon the external world as if it did not belong to him"(C. G. Jung, The Psychological Foundations for the Belief in Spirits cited in Wiebe, pp. 180-81).

While the psychological theories do seem to have great explanatory power, there is a problem, namely, its very hard to prove cause and effect between the proposed mental state and the vision. As Wiebe points out: Establishing the plausibility of the causal claim central to a mentalistic explanation is difficult (p. 183). If this can be accomplished, it will have to be done through neurophysiology and not psychology. Even then, there could be a correlation between the mental state and the vision but not necessarily a cause and effect relationship.

Obviously, there is much more research and analysis that needs to be done. While the believer will express certainty about the reality of his vision or the visions of those whose theology agrees with his, I think its better to remain skeptical until more study is done.

The Supernatural Explanation of Visions

In two prior posts (here and here), I discussed Philip Wiebe's accounts of visions of Jesus both in history and today and I also compared the quality of the evidence for contemporary visions versus the quality of the evidence for the post-mortem appearances of Jesus recorded in the Bible.

In the second half of Wiebe's book, Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the New Testament to Today, he analyzes all of the evidence and discusses three different interpretations of the visions: 1) Supernatural, 2) Psychological, and 3) Neurophysiological. (Another explanation that Wiebe seems to have ruled out is that the reports of these visions are just blatant fabrications. He does this on the basis of the volume of the reports and the sincerity of the individuals he interviewed.)

Supernatural explanations of visions were the exclusive interpretation until at least the 18th century and remained the dominant interpretation well into the 20th century. It is the view held by most religious people still today. Typically, visions that agree or confirm one's theology are considered to be from God and those that do not are believed to come from a diabolical source.

Psychological (sometimes called mentalism in philosophical discourse) explanations are apt to suggest that apparitions are brought on by mental states such as stress, or wishing, or a state of expectancy. Unconscious mental states are sometimes considered as well (p. 151).

Neurophysiological (sometimes called physicalism in philosophical literature) explanations tend to employ only the hard sciences such as chemistry, biology, and so on to interpret the origin of the vision phenomena.

The supernatural interpretation of events has typically been employed throughout history to explain any phenomena for which there did not seem to be a natural explanation. In ancient times, this involved a great deal of phenomena; today it involves much less. However, theists and especially Christian theists will argue for the supernatural explanation, at least of the NT visions of Jesus, on the basis that it is the best explanation of the evidence. Some more sophisticated apologists will argue that since science has postulated unseen entities to explain certain phenomena, then they are justified in postulating an invisible God to explain certain phenomena such as the resurrection of Jesus. Wiebe deals with this argument. He says that the theist defines the nature of the invisible entity, supposedly causing the phenomena, in advance rather than defining its properties in response to the empirical data, as science does. He explains:

Assigning properties to an entity by definition [as theists do of God] is contrary to the way in which theoretical enterprises are generally introduced, according to the causal theory of reference. These entities do not have their properties fixed in advance of the empirical inquiry that determines which properties should be tentatively assigned to them. Evidence is often obtained for the existence of new particles from photographic plates that record collisions between known particles. Tracks or gaps on these plates provide the basis for such posits, and a short gap in an otherwise well-defined track indicates that a particle having no electrical charge exists for a short time. Using principles of conservation of mass and energy, physicists can tentatively assign to it various properties such as mass, charge, and life span. These properties are subject to revision as more information becomes available about the newly posited entity.

What is important here is the empirical openness that is exhibited toward the posited entity in question. It "comes into being" primarily by its causal relationships with known objects or events, but its properties are not determined in advance (emphasis mine). They are filled in as empirical information becomes available. Traditional monotheism, by contrast, posits a being with a definition of many of its properties already in place. Instead of allowing properties to evolve as phenomena unfold, traditional monotheism begins with a conception of what it insists on finding (p. 158).

So, as Wiebe shows, the apologists attempt to use the practices of modern science to justify their belief in an invisible cause fails because, contrary to science, they have defined the causal agent with all of its properties in advance instead of allowing the empirical data to shape the definition. In addition, scientists are only positing these entities tentatively and not dogmatically as the Christian theist does of his God.

In the next couple of posts, we will look at the psychological and neurophysiological explanations and then attempt to make a conclusion on which interpretation holds the best promise in explaining the phenomena of visions.